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Spring 1982

Samuel P. Huntington — American Ideals versus American Institutions

John A. Scanlan
G. D. Loescher — Mass Asylum and Human Rights in American Foreign Policy

Amy Beth Bridges — Plutocracy and Politics in Antebellum New York City

Barry Rubin — America and the Egyptian Revolution

R. Douglas Arnold — Overtilled and Undertilled Fields in American Politics

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON shows how the gap between political ideals and political institutions creates both tension between "history" and "progress" in American development and also tension between the United States and the rest of the world. He argues that while American power has posed a threat to liberty at home, American power has been generally supportive of liberty abroad.

JOHN A. SCANLAN and G.D. LOESCHER examine the emerging restrictive U.S. policy toward Western Hemisphere refugees and contend that it is not likely to reduce immigration pressure in the long run. They conclude that a foreign policy that deals more directly with the problem of persecution abroad will be necessary if refugee flow to the United States is to be controlled.

AMY BETH BRIDGES looks at the activity of wealthy men in New York City politics before the Civil War. While it is commonly thought that men of wealth "abandoned" local politics in the 1850s, Bridges finds that local politics in these years makes most sense when their activity is taken into account.

BARRY RUBIN uses extensive interviews and newly released documents to analyze the rise and fall of the "special relationship" between the United States and Egypt.

R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD examines the allocation of scholarly labor among the many research areas in American politics. He complains that too many scholars are studying the same narrow questions while completely ignoring many broader problems.

JOEL SAMOFF explores the perspectives of development and modernization versus underdevelopment and dependence in Africa. He suggests that these conflicting orientations reflect a period of change in the social sciences and examines the methodological implications of recent theoretical departures.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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American Ideals versus American Institutions

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Throughout the history of the United States a broad consensus has existed among the American people in support of liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values. These political values and ideals constitute what Gunnar Myrdal termed "the American Creed," and they have provided the core of American national identity since the eighteenth century. Also throughout American history, political institutions have reflected these values but have always fallen short of realizing them in a satisfactory manner. A gap has always existed between the ideals in which Americans believed and the institutions that embodied their practice. This gap between ideals and institutional practice has generated continuing disharmony between the normative and existential dimensions of American politics. Being human, Americans have never been able to live up to their ideals; being Americans, they have also been unable to abandon them. They have instead existed in a state of national cognitive dissonance, which they have attempted to relieve through various combinations of moralism, cynicism, complacency, and hypocrisy. The "burr under the saddle," as Robert Penn Warren called it, and the efforts to remove that burr have been central features of American politics, defining its dynamics and shape, since at least the eighteenth century and perhaps before. The question now is: Will the gap between ideals and institutional practices and the responses to it

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continue to play the same role in American politics in the future that they have in the past? Or are there changes taking place or likely to take place in American political ideals, political institutions, and the relation between them that will make their future significantly different from their past?

Three possibilities exist. The relation between ideals and institutions, first, could continue essentially unchanged; second, it could be altered by developments within American society; or, third, it could be altered by developments outside American society and by American involvements abroad. Developments within American society or changes in the international environment could alter the relation between American political ideals and institutions in four ways: the content of the ideals could change; the scope of agreement on the ideals could change; the nature of American political institutions could more closely approximate American ideals, thereby reducing the gap between them; or American political institutions could be significantly altered in an illiberal, undemocratic, anti-individualistic direction; or some combination of these developments could take place.

History versus Progress?

At various periods in their history Americans have attempted to eliminate or reduce the gap between ideals and institutions by moralistic efforts to reform their institutions and practices so as to make them conform to the ideals of the American Creed. These periods include the Revolutionary years of the 1760s and 1770s, the Jacksonian surge of reforms in the 1820s and 1830s, the Progressive era from the 1890s to 1914, and the latest resurgence of moralistic reform in the 1960s and early 1970s. These four periods have much in common, and almost always the proponents of reform have failed to realize their goals completely. The relative success of reform, however, has varied significantly: in particular, the goals of reform have tended to be more widely achieved in the early periods than in the later ones. In the earlier periods, the affirmation of the goals of liberty, equality, democracy, and popular sovereignty was directed at the destruction or modification of traditional political and economic institutions; in the later periods, it was directed at the elimination or modification of modern political and economic institutions that had emerged in the course of historical development. In the earlier periods, in short, history and progress (in the sense of realizing American ideals) went hand in hand; in the later periods, the achievement of American ideals involved more the restoration of the past than the realization of the future, and progress and history worked increasingly at cross purposes.

The revolutionaries of the 1770s were the first to articulate the American Creed on a national basis and were generally successful in effecting major changes in American institutions: the overthrow of British imperial power, the end of monarchy, the widespread acceptance of government based on popular consent, the extension of the suffrage, an end to what remained of feudal practices and privileges, and the substitution of a politics of opinion for a politics of

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status. In part, the articulation of their goals was conservative; the rights asserted were justified by reference to common law and the rights of Englishmen. But the formulation and public proclamation of those rights was also a revolutionary event in terms of political theory and political debate.

In the Jacksonian years, the American ideology was still new, fresh, and directed toward the elimination of the political restrictions on democracy, the broadening of popular participation in government, the abolition of status and the weakening of specialization—that is, of both ascriptive and achievement norms—in the public service, and the destruction of the Bank of the United States and other manifestations of the "money power," so as to open wide the doors of economic opportunity. "Originally a fight against political privilege, the Jacksonian movement . . . broadened into a fight against economic privilege, rallying to its support a host of 'rural capitalists and village entrepreneurs.' "[1] Except for the role of blacks and women in American society, the Jacksonian reforms did complete the virtual elimination of traditional institutions and practices, either inherited from a colonial past or concocted by the Federalist commercial oligarchy, which deviated from liberal-democratic values. All this was progressive in the broad sense, but it too carried with it elements of conservatism. The paradox of the Jacksonians was that even as they cleared away obstacles to the development of laissez-faire capitalism, they also looked back politically to ideals of rural republican simplicity.[2] Restoration, not revolution, was their message.

The institutional changes of the Jacksonian years did not, of course, bring political reality fully into accord with Jacksonian principle. Neither property nor power was equally distributed. In the major cities a small number of very wealthy people, most of whom had inherited their position, controlled large amounts of property.[3] As is generally the case, however, income was much more equally distributed than wealth, and both wealth and income were far more evenly distributed in the rural areas, where 90 percent of the population lived, than in the urban areas. In addition, there were high levels of social and political equality, which never failed to impress European visitors, whether critical or sympathetic. All in all, money, status, and power were probably more equally distributed among white males in Jacksonian America than at any other

[1] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 65–66.

[2] Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 8.

[3] See Edward Pessen, "The Egalitarian Myth and the American Social Reality: Wealth, Mobility, and Equality in the 'Era of the Common Man,' " *American Historical Review* 76 (October 1971): 989–1034, and idem, *Riches, Class, and Power before the Civil War* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973). For critical discussions of Pessen's evidence and argument, see Whitman Ridgway, "Measuring Wealth and Power in Ante-Bellum America: A Review Essay," *Historical Methods Newsletter* 8 (March 1975): 74–78, and Robert E. Gallman, "Professor Pessen on the 'Egalitarian Myth,' " *Social Science History* 2 (Winter 1978): 194–207. For Pessen's response, see his "On a Recent Cliometric Attempt to Resurrect the Myth of Antebellum Egalitarianism," *Social Science History* 3 (Winter 1979): 208–27.

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time before or since. The other central values of the American Creed—liberty, individualism, democracy—were in many respects even more markedly embodied in American institutions at that time.

For these reasons, Gordon Wood argued, the Jacksonian generation "has often seemed to be the most 'American' of all generations." This "Middle Period" in American history has been appropriately labeled because

> many of the developments of the first two centuries of our history seem to be anticipations of this period, while many of the subsequent developments taking us to the present seem to be recessions from it. In the traditional sense of what it has meant to be distinctly American, this Middle Period of 1820–1860 marks the apogee in the overall trajectory of American history. Americans in that era of individualism, institutional weakness, and boundlessness experienced "freedom" as they rarely have since; power, whether expressed economically, socially, or politically, was as fragmented and diffused as at any time in our history.[4]

After the democratization of government and before the development of industry, the Middle Period is the time when the United States could least well be characterized as a disharmonic society. It was a period when Americans themselves believed that they had "fulfilled the main principles of liberty" and hence were exempt from "further epochal change."[5] All that was needed was to remain true to the achievements of the past.

In the Middle Period, in short, American dream and American reality came close to joining hands even though they were shortly to be parted. The gap between American ideals and institutions was clearly present in Jacksonian America but, outside the South, probably less so than at any other time in American history. The inequality of social hierarchy and political aristocracy had faded; the inequality of industrial wealth and organizational hierarchy had yet to emerge. Primogeniture was gone; universal (white male) suffrage had arrived; the Standard Oil trust was still in the future.

In the Middle Period and the years following, the only major institutional legacy that was grossly contradictory to the American Creed was slavery and the heritage of slavery, the remnants of which were still being removed a hundred years after the Civil War. With respect to the role of blacks, the Creed played a continuingly progressive role, furnishing the basis for challenging the patterns of racial discrimination and segregation that ran so blatantly against the proposition that "all men are created equal." Hence, in analyzing the American dilemma in the 1930s, Gunnar Myrdal could take an essentially optimistic attitude toward its eventual resolution. He could see hope in America because his attention was focused on the one area of inequality in American life that was clearly an anachronistic holdover from the past.

More generally, the Middle Period marked a turning point in the nature of progress in America. Prior to that time, "progress" in terms of the realization of

[4] Gordon S. Wood, *History Book Club Review* (June 1975): 16–17, commenting on Rush Welter's *The Mind of America: 1820–1860* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

[5] Welter, *The Mind of America: 1820–1860*, pp. 7–10.

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American ideals of liberty and equality did not conflict with "historical development" in terms of the improvement of economic well-being and security. After the Middle Period, however, progress and history began to diverge. Progress in terms of the "realization of the democratic ideal," in Herbert Croly's phrase, often ran counter to historical trends toward large-scale organization, hierarchy, specialization, and inequality in power and wealth that seemed essential to material improvement. Political progress involves a return to first principles; politically Americans move forward by looking backward, reconsecrating themselves to the ideals of the past as guidelines for the future. Historical development involves pragmatic responses to the increasing scale and complexity of society and economy, and demands increasing interaction, both cooperative and competitive, with other societies.

This distinctive character of the Middle Period and its inappropriateness as a foretaste of things to come are well reflected in the observations of the most celebrated foreign observer of the Jacksonian scene. Tocqueville was, in a sense, half right and half wrong in the two overarching empirical propositions (one static, one dynamic) that he advanced about equality in America. The most distinctive aspect of American society, he argued, is "the general equality of condition among the people." This "is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived and the central point at which all my observations constantly terminated." Second, the tendency toward equality in American and European society constitutes an "irresistible revolution"; the "gradual development of the principle of equality" is a "providential fact"; it is "lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress."[6] Like other European observers before and since, Tocqueville tended to confuse the values and ideals of Americans with social and political reality. His descriptive hypothesis, nonetheless, still rings true. By and large, American society of the Middle Period was characterized by a widespread equality of condition, particularly in comparison to conditions in Europe. Tocqueville's historical projection, in contrast, clearly does not hold up in terms of the distribution of wealth and only in limited respects in terms of the distribution of political power.

In attempting to sum up the diversity and yet common purpose of the Jacksonian age, Joseph L. Blau employs a striking metaphor: "As one drives out of any large city on a major highway, he is bound to see a large signpost, with arrows pointing him to many possible destinations. These arrows have but one thing in common; all alike point away from the city he has just left. Let this stand as a symbol of Jacksonians. Though they pointed to many different possible American futures, all alike pointed away from an America of privilege and monopoly."[7] The Jacksonians were, however, more accurate in pointing to

[6] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols., ed. Phillips Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), 1:6–17.

[7] Joseph L. Blau, ed., *Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954), pp. xxvii–xxviii.

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where America should go in terms of its democratic values and ideals than they were in pointing to the actual direction of economic and political development. Industrialization following the Civil War brought into existence new inequalities in wealth, more blatant corruptions of the political process, and new forms of "privilege and monopoly" undreamed of in the Jacksonian years. This divorce of history from progress had two consequences for the reaffirmation of American political values in the Progressive period.

First, during both the Revolutionary and Jacksonian years, the articulation of American political ideals was couched to some degree in conservative and backward-looking terms, as a reaffirmation of rights that had previously existed and as an effort to reorder political life in terms of principles whose legitimacy had been previously established. During the Progressive era, the backward-looking characteristics of the ideals and vision that were invoked stood out much more sharply. As Richard Hofstadter suggested, the Founding Fathers "dreamed of and planned for a long-term future," the Middle Period generations were absorbed with the present, and the Progressives consciously and explicitly looked to the past: "Beginning with the time of [William Jennings] Bryan, the dominant American ideal has been steadily fixed on bygone institutions and conditions. In early twentieth-century progressivism this backward-looking vision reached the dimension of a major paradox. Such heroes of the progressive revival as Bryan, [Robert M.] La Follette, and [Woodrow] Wilson proclaimed that they were trying to undo the mischief of the past forty years and re-create the old nation of limited and decentralized power, genuine competition, democratic opportunity, and enterprise."[8] The Progressives were reaffirming the old ideals in opposition to large-scale new organizations—economic and political—which were organizing and giving shape to the twentieth century. This was most manifest in William Jennings Bryan, who was, as Croly said, basically "a Democrat of the Middle Period." Bryan, according to Walter Lippmann, "thought he was fighting the plutocracy" but in actuality "was fighting something much deeper than that; he was fighting the larger scale of human life." Bryan was thus a "genuine conservative" who stood for "the popular tradition of America," whereas his enemies were trying to destroy that tradition.[9] But he was also a radical attempting to apply and to realize the ideals of the American Revolution. Bryan was, in fact, just as radical as William Lloyd Garrison, but Garrison was moving with history and Bryan against it. In a similar vein, Woodrow Wilson also reacted to the growth of large-scale economic organization with the call to "restore" American politics to their former pristine, individualistic strength and vigor. To achieve this goal Wilson was willing to employ governmental power, thereby, as Lippmann pointed out, creating the inner contradiction that was at the heart of the Progressive outlook. Among the Progressives, Theodore Roosevelt was most explicit in arguing that large-scale

[8] Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition*, p. vi.

[9] Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), p. 156; and Walter Lippmann, *Drift and Mastery* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 81–82.

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economic organizations had to be accepted; nonetheless he, too, held to much of the older ideal; his argument was couched in pragmatic rather than ideological terms: "This is the age of combination, and any effort to prevent all combination will be not only useless, but in the end vicious, because of the contempt for the law which the failure to enforce law inevitably produces."[10]

Second, the reaffirmation of American ideals at the turn of the century could not be as effective as the Revolutionary and Jacksonian affirmations in realizing those ideals in practice. At the extreme, Bryan became the Don Quixote of American politics, battling for a vision of American society that could never be realized again. In the Revolutionary and Jacksonian periods, the institutional reforms had been substantial and effective. In the Progressive period, both economic and political reforms could, at best, be described as only partly successful. The antitrust laws and other efforts to curb the power of big business made a difference in the development of American business—as any comparison with Europe will demonstrate—but they clearly did not stop or reverse the tendencies toward combination and oligopoly. In the political sphere, the introduction of primaries did not bring an end to political machines and bossism, and, according to some, may even have strengthened them. In Congress, the attack on "Czar" Joseph Cannon established the dominance of the seniority system; paternalistic autocracy, in effect, gave way to gerontocratic oligarchy. The efforts to make government more responsible encouraged the growth of presidential power. That institutional changes were made is indisputable, but so is the fact that, by and large, they were substantially less successful than the changes of the Revolutionary and Jacksonian years in realizing the hopes and goals of their proponents.

The passion of the 1960s and 1970s was, in some respects, ideologically purer than the theories of the Progressives. Perhaps for this reason, it was also somewhat more effective in eroding political authority. Yet outside of race relations, its more specific reforms were little more successful than those of the Progressives. Economic power was assaulted but remained concentrated. Presidential authority was weakened but rebounded. The military and intelligence agencies declined in money, matériel, and morale in the 1970s but were reestablishing themselves on all three fronts by the early 1980s. It seemed likely that the institutional structure and the distribution of power in American society and politics in 1985 would not differ greatly from what they had been in 1960. With the important exception of race relations, the gap between ideals and institutions of the early eighties duplicated that of the early sixties.

This changing record of success from one creedal passion period to the next reflected the changing nature of reform. In the earlier periods, reform generally involved the "dismantling" of social, political, and economic institutions responsible for the ideals-versus-institutions gap. The disharmony of American politics was thought to be—and in considerable measure was—man-made. Remove the artificial restraints, and society and politics would naturally move

[10] Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition*, p. 223.

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in the direction in which they morally should move. In later creedal passion periods, beginning with the Progressive era, this assumption of *natural* congruence of ideal and reality was displaced by the idea of *contrived* congruence. Consciously designed governmental policy and action was necessary to reduce the gap. In the post-World War II period, for instance, "for the first time in American history, equality became a major object of governmental policy."[11] The Progressives created antitrust offices and regulatory commissions to combat monopoly power and promote competition. The reformers of the 1960s brought into existence an "imperial judiciary" in order to eliminate racial segregation and inequalities. To a much greater degree than in the earlier periods, in order to realize American values the reformers of the later periods had to create institutional mechanisms that threatened those values.

In a broader context, the actual course of institutional development is the product of the complex interaction of social, political, economic, and ideological forces. In the United States, any centralization of power produced by the expansion of governmental bureaucracy is mitigated by pluralistic forces that disperse power among bureaucratic agencies, congressional committees, and interest groups and that undermine efforts to subordinate lower-ranking executive officials to higher-ranking ones. Yet an increasingly sophisticated economy and active involvement in world affairs seem likely to create stronger needs for hierarchy, bureaucracy, centralization of power, expertise, big government specifically, and big organizations generally. In some way or another, society will respond to these needs, while still attempting to realize the values of the American Creed to which they are so contradictory. If history is against progress, for how long will progress resist history?

Acute tension between the requisites of development and the norms of ideology played a central role in the evolution of the People's Republic of China during its first quarter-century. China can avoid this conflict for as long as its leaders agree on the priority of development over revolution. In the United States, in contrast, no group of leaders can suppress by fiat the liberal values that have defined the nation's identity. The conflict between developmental need and ideological norm that characterized Mao's China in the 1960s and 1970s is likely to be duplicated in the American future unless other forces change, dilute, or eliminate the central ideals of the American Creed.

What is the probability of this happening? Do such forces exist? Several possibilities suggest themselves. First, the core values of the Creed are products of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Their roots lie in the English and American revolutionary experiences, in seventeenth-century Protestant moralism and eighteenth-century liberal rationalism. The historical dynamism and appeal of these ideals could naturally begin to fade after two centuries, particularly as those ideals come to be seen as increasingly irrelevant in a complex modern economy and a threatening international environment. In addition, to

[11] J. R. Pole, *The Pursuit of Equality in American History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 326.

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the extent that those ideals derive from Protestant sources, they must also be weakened by trends toward secularism that exist even in the United States. Each of the four creedal passion periods was preceded or accompanied by a religious "great awakening." These movements of religious reform and revival, however, have successively played less central roles in American society, that of the 1950s being very marginal in its impact compared to that of the 1740s. As religious passion weakens, how likely is the United States to sustain a firm commitment to its traditional values? Would an America without its Protestant core still be America?

Second, the social, economic, and cultural changes associated with the transition from industrial to postindustrial society could also give rise to new political values that would displace the traditional liberal values associated with bourgeois society and the rise of industrialism. In the 1960s and 1970s in both Europe and America, social scientists found evidence of the increasing prevalence of "postbourgeois" or "postmaterialist" values, particularly among younger cohorts. In a somewhat similar vein, George Lodge foresaw the displacement of Lockean, individualistic ideology in the United States by a "communitarian" ideology, resembling in many aspects the traditional Japanese collectivist approach.[12]

Third, as Hofstadter and others argued, the early twentieth-century immigration of Orthodox, Catholics, and Jews from central, eastern, and southern Europe introduced a different "ethic" into American cities. In the late twentieth century, the United States experienced its third major wave of postindependence immigration, composed largely of Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Cubans, and others from Latin America and the Caribbean. Like their predecessors, the more recent immigrants could well introduce into American society political and social values markedly in contrast with those of Lockean liberalism. In these circumstances, the consensus on this type of liberalism could very likely be either disrupted or diluted.

Fourth, the historical function of the Creed in defining national identity could conceivably become less significant, and widespread belief in that Creed could consequently become less essential to the continued existence of the United States as a nation. Having been in existence as a functioning national society and political entity for over two-hundred years, the United States may have less need of these ideals to define its national identity in the future. History, tradition, custom, culture, and a sense of shared experience such as other major nations have developed over the centuries could also come to define American identity, and the role of abstract ideals and values might be reduced. The *ideational* basis of national identity would be replaced by an *organic* one. "American exceptionalism" would wither. The United States would cease to be

[12] See Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), and George C. Lodge, *The New American Ideology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).

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"a nation with the soul of a church" and would become a nation with the soul of a nation.

Some or all of these four factors could alter American political values so as to reduce the gap between these values and the reality of American institutional practice. Yet the likelihood of this occurring does not seem very high. Despite their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century origins, American values and ideals have demonstrated tremendous persistence and resiliency in the twentieth century. Defined vaguely and abstractly, these ideals have been relatively easily adapted to the needs of successive generations. The constant social change in the United States, indeed, underlies their permanence. Rising social, economic, and ethnic groups need to reinvoke and to reinvigorate those values in order to promote their own access to the rewards of American society. The shift in emphasis among values manifested by younger cohorts in the 1960s and 1970s does not necessarily mean the end of the traditional pattern. In many respects, the articulation of these values was, as it had been in the past, a protest against the perceived emergence of new centers of power. The yearning for "belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment" found to exist among the younger cohorts of the 1960s and 1970s,[13] could, in fact, be interpreted as "a romantic, Luddite reaction against the bureaucratic and technological tendencies of postindustrialism." This confrontation between ideology and institutions easily fits into the well-established American pattern. Indeed, insofar as "the postindustrial society is more highly educated and more participatory than American society in the past and insofar as American political institutions will be more bureaucratic and hierarchical than before, the conflict between ideology and institutions could be more intense than it has ever been."[14]

Similarly, the broader and longer-term impact of the Latin immigration of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s could reinforce the central role of the American Creed both as a way of legitimizing claims to political, economic, and social equality and also as the indispensable element in defining national identity. The children and grandchildren of the European immigrants of the early twentieth century in due course became ardent adherents to traditional American middle-class values. In addition, the more culturally pluralistic the nation becomes, particularly if cultural pluralism encompasses linguistic pluralism, the more essential the political values of the Creed become in defining what it is that Americans have in common. At some point, traditional American ideals—liberty, equality, individualism, democracy—may lose their appeal and join the ideas of racial inequality, the divine right of kings, and the dictatorship of the proletariat on the ideological scrap heap of history. There is, however, little to suggest that this will be a twentieth-century happening.

If the gap between ideals and institutions remains a central feature of

[13] Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* 65 (December 1971): 991–1017.

[14] Samuel P. Huntington, "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" *Comparative Politics* 6 (January 1974): 188–89.

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American politics, the question then becomes: What changes, if any, may occur in the traditional pattern of responses to this gap? Three broad possibilities exist. First, the previous pattern of response could continue. If the periodicity of the past prevails, a major sustained creedal passion period will occur in the second and third decades of the twenty-first century. In the interim, moralism, cynicism, complacency, and hypocrisy will all be invoked by different Americans in different ways in their efforts to live with the gap. The tensions resulting from the gap will remain and perhaps increase in intensity, but their consequences will not be significantly more serious than they have been in the past. Second, the cycle of response could stabilize to a greater degree than it has in the past. Americans could acquire a greater understanding of their case of cognitive dissonance and through this understanding come to live with their dilemma on somewhat easier terms than they have in the past, in due course evolving a more complex but also more coherent and constant response to this problem. Third, the oscillations among the responses could intensify in such a way as to threaten to destroy both ideals and institutions.

In terms of the future stability of the American political system, the first possibility may be the most likely and the second the most hopeful, but the third is clearly the most dangerous. Let us focus on the third.

Lacking any concept of the state, lacking for most of its history both the centralized authority and the bureaucratic apparatus of the European state, the American polity has historically been a weak polity. It was designed to be so, and traditional inheritance and social environment combined for years to support the framers' intentions. In the twentieth century, foreign threats and domestic economic and social needs have generated pressures to develop stronger, more authoritative decision-making and decision-implementing institutions. Yet the continued presence of deeply felt moralistic sentiments among major groups in American society could continue to ensure weak and divided government, devoid of authority and unable to deal satisfactorily with the economic, social, and foreign challenges confronting the nation. Intensification of this conflict between history and progress could give rise to increasing frustration and increasingly violent oscillations between moralism and cynicism. American moralism ensures that government will never be truly efficacious; the realities of power ensure that government will never be truly democratic.

This situation could lead to a two-phase dialectic involving intensified efforts to reform government, followed by intensified frustration when those efforts produce not progress in a liberal-democratic direction, but obstacles to meeting perceived functional needs. The weakening of government in an effort to reform it could lead eventually to strong demands for the replacement of the weakened and ineffective institutions by more authoritarian structures more effectively designed to meet historical needs. Given the perversity of reform, moralistic extremism in the pursuit of liberal democracy could generate a strong tide toward authoritarian efficiency. "The truth is that," as Plato observed, "in the constitution of society . . . any excess brings about an equally violent reac-

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tion. So the only outcome of too much freedom is likely to be excessive subjection, in the state or in the individual; which means that the culmination of liberty in democracy is precisely what prepares the way for the cruelest extreme of servitude under a despot."[15]

American political ideals are a useful instrument not only for those who wish to improve American political institutions but also for those who wish to destroy them. Liberal reformers, because they believe in the ideals, attempt to change institutions to approximate those ideals more closely. The enemies of liberalism, because they oppose both liberal ideals and liberal institutions, attempt to use the former to undermine the latter. For them, the gap between ideals and institutions is a made-to-order opportunity. The effectiveness of liberal-democratic institutions can be discredited by highlighting their shortcomings compared to the ideals on which they are supposedly modeled. This is a common response of foreigners critical of the American polity, but this approach is not limited to liberalism's foreign enemies. The leading theorists of the American Southern Enlightenment, for instance, took great delight in describing the inequality and repression of the Northern "wage slave" system not because they believed in equality and liberty for all workers but because they wished to discredit the economy that was threatening the future of slavery in the South. "Their obvious purpose [was] to belabor the North rather than to redeem it."[16]

Those who have battered liberal institutions with the stick of liberal ideals have, however, more often been on the left than on the right. There is a reason for this, which is well illustrated by the attitudes of conservatives, liberals, and revolutionaries toward political equality. Traditional conservatives oppose equality. They may perceive American political institutions as embodying more equality than they think desirable. In this case, they normally opt out of American society in favor of either internal or external emigration. Traditional conservatives may also perceive and take comfort in the realities of power and inequality that exist in the United States behind the facade and rhetoric of equality. Liberal defenders of American institutions embrace the hypocritical response: they believe that inequality does not exist and that it should not exist. Both the perceptive conservatives and the liberal hypocrites are thus, in some sense, standpatters, satisfied with the status quo, but only because they have very different perceptions of what that status quo is and very different views about whether equality is good or bad. The ability of traditional conservatives and liberal hypocrites to cooperate in defense of the status quo is hence very limited: neither will buy the others' arguments. In addition, articulate traditional conservatives have been few and far between on the American political landscape, in large part because their values are so contrary to those of the American Creed (see Table 1).

[15] Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 290.

[16] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), p. 181.

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TABLE 1

Political Beliefs and Political Equality

	Traditional conservative	*Liberal*		*Marxist revolutionary*
		Hypocrite	*Moralist*	
Perception of political equality	Does not exist	Does exist	Does not exist	Does not exist
Judgment on political equality	Bad	Good	Good	Good
	Standpatters		Radicals	

On the other side of the political spectrum, a very different situation exists. Like hypocritical liberals, moralist liberals believe that inequality is bad. Unlike the hypocrites, however, they perceive that inequality exists in American institutions and hence vigorously devote themselves to reform in an effort to eliminate it. To their left, however, the Marxist revolutionaries have views and beliefs that, on the surface at least, coincide with those of moralistic liberals. Marxist revolutionaries hold inequality to be bad, see it as pervasive in existing institutions, and attack it and the institutions vigorously. At a deeper and more philosophical level, Marxist revolutionaries may believe in the necessity of the violent overthrow of the capitalist order, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a disciplined Leninist party as the revolutionary vanguard. If they blatantly articulate these beliefs, they are relegated to the outermost fringes of American politics and foreswear any meaningful ideological or political influence. It is, moreover, in the best Leninist tradition to see reform as the potential catalyst of revolution.[17] Consequently, major incentives exist for Marxist revolutionaries to emphasize not what divides them from the liberal consensus but what unites them with liberal reformers, that is, their perception of inequality and their belief in equality. With this common commitment to reform, liberal moralists and Marxist revolutionaries can cooperate in their attack on existing institutions, even though in the long run one group wants to make them work better and the other wants to overthrow them.

The role of Marxism in the consensus of society of America thus differs significantly from its role in the ideologically pluralistic societies of Western Europe. There the differences between liberal and Marxist goals and appeals are sharply delineated, the two philosophies are embraced by different constituencies and parties, and the conflict between them is unceasing. In the United States, the prevalence of liberalism means a consensus on the standards by which the institutions of society should be judged, and Marxism has no choice but to employ those standards in its own cause. Philosophical differences are blurred as reform liberalism and revolutionary Marxism blend into a nondescript but politically relevant radicalism that serves the immediate interests of both. This convergence, moreover, exists at the individual as well as

[17] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 362–69.

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the societal level: particular individuals bring together in their own minds elements of both liberal reformism and revolutionary Marxism. American radicals easily perceive the gap between American ideals and American institutions; they do not easily perceive the conflict between reform liberalism and revolutionary Marxism. With shared immediate goals, these two sets of philosophically distinct ideas often coexist in the same mind.

This common ground of liberal reformer and revolutionary Marxist in favor of radical change contrasts with the distance between the liberal hypocrite and the traditional conservative. The hypocrite can defend American institutions only by claiming they are something that they are not. The conservative can defend them only by articulating values that most Americans abhore. The Marxist subscribes to the liberal consensus in order to subvert liberal institutions; the conservative rejects the liberal consensus in order to defend those institutions. The combined effect of both is to strengthen the attack on the established order. For, paradoxically, the conservative who defends American institutions with conservative arguments (that they are good because they institutionalize political inequality) weakens those institutions at least as much as the radical who attacks them for the same reason. The net impact of the difficulties and divisions among the standpatters and the converging unity of the liberal and Marxist radicals is to enhance the threat to American political institutions posed by those political ideas whose continued vitality is indispensable to their survival.

Two things are thus clear. American political institutions are more open, liberal, and democratic than those of any other major society now or in the past. If Americans ever abandon or destroy these institutions, they are likely to do so in the name of their liberal-democratic ideals. Innoculated against the appeal of foreign ideas, America has only to fear its own.

America versus the World?

The gap between ideals and institutions poses two significant issues with respect to the relations between the United States and the rest of the world. First, what are the implications of the gap for American institutions and processes concerned with foreign relations and national security? To what extent should those institutions and processes conform to American liberal, individualistic, democratic values? Second, what are the implications of the gap for American policy toward other societies? To what extent should the United States attempt to make the institutions and policies of other societies conform to American values? For much of its history when it was relatively isolated from the rest of the world, as it was between 1815 and 1914, the United States did not have to grapple seriously with these problems. In the mid-twentieth century, however, the United States became deeply, complexly, and seemingly inextricably involved with the other countries of the world. That involvement brought to the fore and gave new significance and urgency to these two long-standing and

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closely related issues. These issues are closely related because efforts to reduce the ideal-versus-institutions gap in the institutions and processes of American foreign relations reduce the ability of the United States to exercise power in international affairs, including its ability to reduce that gap between American values and foreign institutions and policies. Conversely, efforts to encourage foreign institutions and practices to conform to American ideals require the expansion of American power and thus make it more difficult for American institutions and policies to conform to those ideals.

Foreign-Policy Institutions

The relation of its institutions and processes concerned with foreign relations to the ideals and values of its political ideology is a more serious problem for the United States than for most other societies. The differences between the United States and Western Europe in this respect are particularly marked. First, the ideological pluralism of Western European societies does not provide a single set of political principles by which to judge foreign-policy institutions and practices. Those, as well as other institutions and practices, benefit in terms of legitimacy as a result of varied strands of conservative, liberal, Christian Democratic, and Marxist political thought that have existed in Western European societies. Second, and more important, in most European societies at least an embryonic national community and, in large measure, a national state existed before the emergence of ideologies. So also did the need to conduct foreign relations and to protect the security of the national community and the state. National security bureaucracies, military forces, foreign offices, intelligence services, internal security and police systems were all in existence when ideologies emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although the ideologies undoubtedly had some implications for and posed some demands on these institutions, their proponents tended to recognize the prior claims of these institutions reflecting the needs of the national community in a world of competing national communities. European democratic regimes thus accept a security apparatus that exists, in large part, outside the normal process of democratic politics and that represents and defends the continuing interests of the community and the state irrespective of the ideologies that may from one time to another dominate its politics.

In Europe, ideology—or rather, ideologies—thus followed upon and developed within the context of an existing national community and state. In America, ideology in the form of the principles of the American Creed existed before the formation of a national community and political system. These principles defined the identity of the community when there were no institutions for dealing with the other countries of the world. It was assumed that the foreign-policy institutions, like other political institutions, would reflect the basic values of the preexisting and overwhelmingly preponderant ideology. Yet precisely these institutions—foreign and intelligence services, military and police

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forces—have functional imperatives that conflict most sharply and dramatically with the liberal-democratic values of the American Creed. The essence of the Creed is opposition to power and to concentrated authority. This leads to efforts to minimize the resources of power (such as arms), to restrict the effectiveness of specialized bureaucratic hierarchies, and to limit the authority of the executive in the conduct of foreign policy. This conflict manifests itself dramatically in the perennial issue concerning the role of standing armies and professional military forces in a liberal society. For much of its history, the United States was able to avoid the full implications of this conflict because its geographic position permitted it to follow a policy of "extirpation"—that is, almost abolishing military forces and relegating those that did exist to the distant social and geographic extremities of society.[18] Similarly, the United States did not seem to need and did not have an intelligence service, a professional foreign service, or a national police force.

In the twentieth century the impossibility of sustained isolation led the United States to develop all these institutions. Much more so than those in Western Europe, however, these institutions have coexisted in uneasy and fundamentally incompatible ways with the values of the prevailing ideology. This incompatibility became acute after World War II when the country's global role and responsibilities made it necessary for the government to develop and to maintain such institutions on a large scale and to accord them a central role in its foreign policy. During the 1950s and early 1960s Americans tended to be blissfully complacent and to ignore the broad gap between ideals and institutions that this created in the foreign-policy and defense sectors of their national life. At the same time, various theories—such as Kennan's ideal of the detached professional diplomat and Huntington's concept of "objective civilian control"—were developed to justify the insulation of these institutions from the political demands of a liberal society.[19] In the end, however, the liberal imperatives could not be avoided, and the late 1960s and 1970s saw overwhelming political pressure to make foreign-policy and security institutions conform to the requirements of the liberal ideology. In a powerful outburst of creedal passion, Americans embarked on crusades against the CIA and FBI, defense spending, the use of military force abroad, the military-industrial complex, and the imperial presidency (to use Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s phrase), attempting to expose, weaken, dismantle, or abolish the institutions that protected their liberal society against foreign threats. They reacted with outraged moralistic self-criticism to their government engaging in the type of activities—deception, violence, abuse of individual rights—to protect their society that other countries accept as a matter of course.

This penchant of Americans for challenging and undermining the authority

[18] See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), esp. pp. 143–57.

[19] George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 93–94; and Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 80–97.

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of their political institutions, including those concerned with the foreign relations and security of the country, produces mixed and confused reactions on the part of Europeans and other non-Americans. Their initial reaction to a Pentagon Papers case, Watergate, or investigation of the CIA is often one of surprise, amazement, bewilderment. "What are you Americans up to and why are you doing this to yourselves?" A second reaction, which often follows the first, is grudging admiration for a society that takes its principles so seriously and has such effective procedures for attempting to realize them. This is often accompanied by somewhat envious and wistful comments on the contrast between this situation and the paramountcy of state authority in their own country. Finally, a third reaction often follows, expressing deep concern about the impact that the creedal upheaval will have on the ability of the United States to conduct its foreign policy and to protect its friends and allies.

This last concern over whether its liberal values will permit the United States to maintain the material resources, governmental institutions, and political will to defend its interests in the world becomes more relevant not just as a result of the inextricable involvement of the United States in world affairs but also because of the changes in the countries with which the United States will be primarily involved. During the first part of the twentieth century, American external relations were largely focused on Western Europe, where in most countries significant political groups held political values similar to American values. Even more important, lodged deeply in the consciousness of Western European statesmen and intellectuals was the thought, impregnated there by Tocqueville if by no one else, that American political values in some measure embodied the wave of the future, that what America believed in would at some point be what the entire civilized world would believe in. This sympathy, partial or latent as it may have been, nonetheless gave the United States a diplomatic resource of some significance. European societies might resent American moral or moralistic loftiness, but both they and the Americans knew that the moral values set forth by the United States (sincerely or hypocritically) would have a resonance in their own societies and could at times be linked up with internal social and political movements that would be impossible for them to ignore.

In the mid-twentieth century the widespread belief in democratic values among younger Germans and, to a lesser degree, among younger Japanese provided some support for the convergence thesis. At a more general level, however, the sense that America was the future of Europe weakened considerably. More important, in the late twentieth century, the countries with which the United States was having increasing interactions, both competitive and cooperative, were the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. The partial sense of identification and of future convergence that existed between the United States and Europe are absent in American relations with these three countries. Like the United States, these countries have a substantial degree of consensus or homogeneity in social and political values and ideology. The content of each country's consensus, however, differs significantly from that of the United States. In all three societies, the stress, in one form or another, is on the per-

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vasiveness of inequality in human relationships, the "sanctity of authority,"[20] the subordination of the individual to the group and the state, the dubious legitimacy of dissent or challenges to the powers that be. Japan, to be sure, developed a working democracy after World War II, but its long-standing values stressing hierarchy, vertical ranking, and submissiveness leave some degree of "disharmony" that has resemblances to, but is just the reverse of, what prevails in American society. The dominant ideas in all three countries stand in dramatic contrast to American ideas of openness, liberalism, equality, individual rights, and freedom to dissent. In the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, the prevailing political values and social norms reinforce the authority of the central political institutions of society and enhance the ability of these nations to compete with other societies. In the United States the prevailing norms, insofar as Americans take them seriously, undermine and weaken the power and authority of government and detract, at times seriously, from its ability to compete internationally. In the small world of the West, Americans were beguiling cousins; in the larger world that includes the East, Americans often seem naïve strangers. Given the "disharmonic" element in the American political system—the continuing challenge, latent or overt, that lies in the American mind to the authority of American government—how well will the United States be able to conduct its affairs in this league of powers to whose historical traditions basic American values are almost entirely alien?

Foreign-Policy Goals

In the eyes of most Americans, not only should their foreign-policy institutions be structured and function so as to reflect liberal values, but American foreign policy should also be substantively directed to the promotion of those values in the external environment. This gives a distinctive cast to the American role in the world. In a famous phrase, Viscount Palmerston once said that Britain did not have permanent friends or enemies, it only had permanent interests. Like Britain and other countries, the United States also has interests, defined in terms of power, wealth, and security, some of which are sufficiently enduring as to be thought of as permanent. As a founded society, however, the United States also has distinctive political principles and values that define its national identity. These principles provide a second set of goals and a second set of standards—in addition to those of national interest—by which to shape the goals and judge the success of American foreign policy.

This heritage, this transposition of the ideals-versus-institutions gap into foreign policy, again distinguishes the United States from other societies. Western European states clearly do not reject the relevance of morality and political ideology to the conduct of foreign policy. They do, however, see the goal of foreign policy as the advancement of the major and continuing security and economic interests of their state. Political principles provide limits and

[20] Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968), p. 91.

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parameters to foreign policy but not to its goals. As a result, European public debate over morality versus power in foreign policy has, except in rare instances, not played the role that it has in the United States. That issue does come up with the foreign policy of Communist states and has been discussed at length, in terms of the conflict of ideology and national interest, in analyses of Soviet foreign policy. The conflict has been less significant there than in the United States for three reasons. First, an authoritarian political system precludes public discussion of the issue. Since the 1920s debate of Trotsky versus Stalin over permanent revolution, there has been no overt domestic criticism concerning whether Soviet foreign policy is at one time either too power oriented or at another time too ideologically oriented. Second, Marxist-Leninist ideology distinguishes between basic doctrine, on the one hand, and strategy and tactics, on the other. The former does not change; the latter is adapted to specific historical circumstances. The twists and turns in the party line can always be justified as ideologically necessary at that particular point in time to achieve the long-run goals of communism, even though those shifts may in fact be motivated primarily by national interests. American political values, in contrast, are usually thought of as universally valid, and pragmatism is seen not as a means of implementing these values in particular circumstances but rather as a means of abandoning them. Third, Soviet leaders and the leaders of other Communist states that pursue their own foreign policies can and do, when they wish, simply ignore ideology when they desire to pursue particular national interest goals.

For most Americans, however, foreign-policy goals should reflect not only the security interests of the nation and the economic interests of key groups within the nation but also the political values and principles that define American identity. If these values do define foreign-policy goals, then that policy is morally justified, the opponents of that policy at home and abroad are morally illegitimate, and all efforts must be directed toward overcoming the opponents and achieving the goals. The prevailing American approach to foreign policy thus has been not that of Stephen Decatur ("Our country, right or wrong!") but that of Carl Schurz ("Our country, right or wrong! When right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right!"). To Americans, achieving this convergence between self-interest and morality has appeared as no easy task. Hence, the recurring tendencies in American history either to retreat to minimum relations with the rest of the world and thus avoid the problem of reconciling the pursuit of self-interest with the adherence to principle in a corrupt and hostile environment, or the opposite solution, to set forth on a "crusade" to purify the world, to bring it into accordance with American principles and, in the process, to expand American power and thus protect the national interest.

This practice of judging the behavior of one's country and one's government by external standards of right and wrong has been responsible for the often substantial opposition to the wars in which the United States has engaged. The United States will only respond with unanimity to a war in which both national

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security and political principle are clearly at stake. In the two-hundred years after the Revolution, only one war, World War II, met this criterion, and this was the only war to which there was no significant domestic opposition articulated in terms of the extent to which the goals of the war and the way in which it was conducted deviated from the basic principles of the American Creed. In this sense, World War II was, for the United States, the "perfect war"; every other war has been an imperfect war in that certain elements of the American public have objected to it because it did not seem to accord with American principles. As strange as it may seem to people of other societies, Americans have had no trouble conceiving of their government waging an "un-American" war.

The extent to which the American liberal creed prevails over power considerations can lead to hypocritical and rather absolutist positions on policy. As Seymour Martin Lipset pointed out, if wars should only be fought for moral purposes, then the opponents against which they are fought must be morally evil and hence total war must be waged against them and unconditional surrender exacted from them. If a war is not morally legitimate, then the leaders conducting it must be morally evil and opposition to it, in virtually any form, is not only morally justified but morally obligatory. It is no coincidence that the country that has most tended to think of wars as crusades is also the country with the strongest record of conscientious objection to war.[21]

The effort to use American foreign policy to promote American values abroad raises a central issue. There is a clear difference between political action to make American political practices conform to American political values and political action to make *foreign* political practices conform to American values. Americans can legitimately attempt to reduce the gap between American institutions and American values, but can they legitimately attempt to reduce the gap between other people's institutions and American values? The answer is not self-evident.

The argument for a negative response to this question can be made on at least four grounds. First, it is morally wrong for the United States to attempt to shape the institutions of other societies. Those institutions should reflect the values and behavior of the people in those societies. To intrude from outside is either imperialism or colonialism, each of which also violates American values. Second, it is difficult practically and in most cases impossible for the United States to influence significantly the institutional development of other societies. The task is simply beyond American knowledge, skill, and resources. To attempt to do so will often be counterproductive. Third, any effort to shape the domestic institutions of other societies needlessly irritates and antagonizes other governments and hence will complicate and often endanger the achievement of other, more important foreign-policy goals, particularly in the areas of national security and economic well-being. Fourth, to influence the political development of other societies would require an enormous expansion of the military

[21] Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Banality of Revolt," *Saturday Review*, 18 July 1970, p. 26.

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power and economic resources of the American government. This, in turn, would pose dangers to the operation of democratic government within the United States.

A yes answer to this question can, on the other hand, also be justified on four grounds. First, if other people's institutions pose direct threats to the viability of American institutions and values in the United States, an American effort to change those institutions would be justifiable in terms of self-defense. Whether or not foreign institutions do pose such a direct threat in any given circumstance is, however, not easily determined. Even in the case of Nazi Germany in 1940, there were widely differing opinions in the United States. After World War II, opinion was also divided on whether Soviet institutions, as distinct from Soviet policies, threatened the United States.

Second, the direct-threat argument can be generalized to the proposition that authoritarian regimes in any form and on any continent pose a potential threat to the viability of liberal institutions and values in the United States. A liberal-democratic system, it can be argued, can only be secure in a world system of similarly constituted states. In the past this argument did not play a central role, because of the extent to which the United States was geographically isolated from differently constituted states. The world is, however, becoming smaller. Given the increasing interactions among societies and the emergence of transnational institutions operating in many societies, the pressures toward convergence among political systems are likely to become more intense. Interdependence may be incompatible with coexistence. In this case, the world, like the United States in the nineteenth century or Western Europe in the twentieth century, will not be able to exist half-slave and half-free. Hence, the survival of democratic institutions and values at home will depend upon their adoption abroad.

Third, American efforts to make other people's institutions conform to American values would be justified to the extent that the other people supported those values. Such support has historically been much more prevalent in Western Europe and Latin America than it has in Asia and Africa, but some support undoubtedly exists in almost every society for liberty, equality, democracy, and the rights of the individual. Americans could well feel justified in supporting and helping those individuals, groups, and institutions in other societies who share their belief in these values. At the same time, it would also be appropriate for them to be aware that those values could be realized in other societies through institutions significantly different from those that exist in the United States.

Fourth, American efforts to make other people's institutions conform to American values could be justified on the grounds that those values are universally valid and universally applicable, whether or not most people in other societies believe in them. For Americans not to believe in the universal validity of American values could, indeed, lead to a moral relativism: liberty and democracy are not inherently better than any other political values; they just happen to be those that for historical and cultural reasons prevail in the United States. This relativistic position runs counter to the strong elements of moral ab-

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solutism and messianism that are part of American history and culture, and hence the argument for moral relativism may not wash in the United States for relativistic reasons. In addition, the argument can be made that some element of belief in the universal validity of a set of political ideals is necessary to arouse the energy, support, and passion to defend those ideals and the institutions modeled on them in American society.

Historically, Americans have generally believed in the universal validity of their values. At the end of World War II, when Americans forced Germany and Japan to be free, they did not stop to ask if liberty and democracy were what the German and Japanese people wanted. Americans implicitly assumed that their values were valid and applicable and that they would, at the very least, be morally negligent if they did not insist that Germany and Japan adopt political institutions reflecting those values. Belief in the universal validity of those values obviously reinforces and reflects those hypocritical elements of the American tradition that stress the United States's role as a redeemer nation and lead it to attempt to impose its values and, often, its institutions on other societies. These tendencies may, however, be constrained by a recognition that although American values may be universally valid, they need not be universally and totally applicable at all times and in all places.

Americans expect their institutions and policies that are devoted to external relations to reflect liberal standards and principles. So also, in large measure, do non-Americans. Both American citizens and others hold the United States to standards that they do not generally apply to other countries. People expect France, for instance, to pursue its national self-interests—economic, military, and political—with cold disregard for ideologies and values. But their expectations with respect to the United States are very different: people accept with a shrug actions on the part of France that would generate surprise, consternation, and outrage if perpetrated by the United States. "Europe accepts the idea that America is a country with a difference, from whom it is reasonable to demand an exceptionally altruistic standard of behaviour; it feels perfectly justified in pouring obloquy on shortcomings from this ideal; and also, perhaps inevitably, it seems to enjoy every example of a fall from grace which contemporary America provides."[22]

This double standard is implicit acknowledgment of the seriousness with which Americans attempt to translate their principles into practice. It also provides a ready weapon to foreign critics of the United States just as it does to domestic ones. For much of its history, racial injustice, economic inequality, and political and religious intolerance were familiar elements in the American landscape, and the contrast between them and the articulated ideals of the American Creed furnished abundant ammunition to generations of European critics. "Anti-Americanism is in this form a protest, not against Americanism,

[22] Peregrine Worsthorne, "America—Conscience or Shield?" *Encounter*, no. 14 (November 1954): 15.

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but against its apparent failure."[23] This may be true on the surface. But it is also possible that failure—that is, the persistence of the ideals-versus-institutions gap in American institutions and policies—furnishes the excuse and the opportunity for hostile foreign protest, and that the true target of the protest is Americanism itself.

Power and Liberty: The Myth of American Repression

The pattern of American involvement in world affairs has often been interpreted as the outcome of these conflicting pulls of national interest and power, on the one hand, and political morality and principles on the other. Various scholars have phrased the dichotomy in various ways: self-interest versus ideals, power versus morality, realism versus utopianism, pragmatism versus principle, historical realism versus rationalist idealism, Washington versus Wilson.[24] Almost all, however, have assumed the dichotomy to be real and have traced the relative importance over the years of national interest and morality in shaping American foreign policy. It is, for instance, argued that during the Federalist years, realism or power considerations were generally preponderant, whereas during the first four decades of the twentieth century moral considerations and principles came to be uppermost in the minds of American policymakers. After World War II, a significant group of writers and thinkers on foreign policy—including Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann, and Robert Osgood—expounded a "new realism" and criticized the moralistic, legalistic, "utopian," Wilsonian approaches, which they claimed had previously prevailed in the conduct of American foreign relations. The new realism reached its apotheosis in the central role played by the balance of power in the theory and practice of Henry Kissinger. A nation's foreign policy, he said, "should be directed toward affecting the foreign policy" of other societies; it should not be "the principal goal of American foreign policy to transform the domestic structures of societies with which we deal."[25]

In the 1970s, however, the new realism of the 1950s and 1960s was challenged by a "new moralism." The pendulum that had swung in one direction after World War II swung far over to the other side. This shift was one of the most

[23] Henry Fairlie, "Anti-Americanism at Home and Abroad," *Commentary* 60 (December 1975): 35.

[24] See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), and idem, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," *American Political Science Review* 46 (December 1952): 961–88; Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), and idem, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952); Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950*; Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1953); and Richard H. Ullman, "Washington versus Wilson," *Foreign Policy*, no. 21 (Winter 1975–76): 97–124.

[25] Henry A. Kissinger, quoted in Raymond Gastil, "Affirming American Ideals in Foreign Policy," *Freedom at Issue*, no. 38 (November–December 1976): 12.

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significant consequences of American involvement in Vietnam, Watergate, and the democratic surge and creedal passion of the 1960s. It represented the displacement onto the external world of the moralism that had been earlier directed inward against American institutions. It thus represented the first signs of a return to the hypocritical response to the gap between American values and American institutions. The new moralism manifested itself first in congressional action, with the addition to the foreign assistance act of Title IX in 1966 and human rights conditions in the early 1970s. In 1976 Jimmy Carter vigorously criticized President Ford for believing "that there is little room for morality in foreign affairs, and that we must put self-interest above principle."[26] As president, Carter moved human rights to a central position in American foreign relations.

The lines between the moralists and the realists were thus clearly drawn, but on one point they were agreed: they both believed that the conflict between morality and self-interest, or ideals and realism, was a real one. In some respects it was. In other respects, particularly when it was formulated in terms of a conflict between liberty and power, it was not. As so defined, the dichotomy was false. It did not reflect an accurate understanding of the real choices confronting American policymakers in dealing with the external world. It derived rather from the transposition of the assumptions of the antipower ethic to American relations with the rest of the world. From the earliest years of their society, Americans have perceived a conflict between imperatives of governmental power and the liberty and rights of the individual. Because power and liberty are antithetical at home, they are also assumed to be antithetical abroad. Hence, the pursuit of power by the American government abroad must threaten liberty abroad even as a similar pursuit of power at home would threaten liberty there. The contradiction in American society between American power and American liberty at home is projected into a contradiction between American power and foreign liberty abroad.

During the 1960s and 1970s this belief led many intellectuals to propagate what can perhaps best be termed the "myth of American repression"—that is, the view that American involvement in the politics of other societies is almost invariably hostile to liberty and supportive of repression in those societies. The United States, as Hans Morgenthau put it, is "repression's friend": "With unfailing consistency, we have since the end of the Second World War intervened on behalf of conservative and fascist repression against revolution and radical reform. In an age when societies are in a revolutionary or prerevolutionary stage, we have become the foremost counterrevolutionary status quo power on earth. Such a policy can only lead to moral and political disaster."[27] This statement, like the arguments generally of those intellectuals supporting the myth of American repression, suffers from two basic deficiencies.

[26] Jimmy Carter, address, B'nai B'rith convention, Washington, D.C., 8 September 1976.
[27] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Repression's Friend," *New York Times*, 10 October 1974.

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First, it confuses support for the Left with opposition to repression. In this respect, it represents another manifestation of the extent to which similarity in immediate objectives can blur the line between liberals and revolutionaries. Yet those who support "revolution and radical reform" in other countries seldom have any greater concern for liberty and human dignity than those who support "conservative and fascist repression." In fact, if it is a choice between rightist and Communist dictatorships, there are at least three good reasons in terms of liberty to prefer the former to the latter. First, the suppression of liberty in right-wing authoritarian regimes is almost always less pervasive than it is in left-wing totalitarian ones. In the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, infringements of human rights in South Korea received extensive coverage in the American media, in part because there were in South Korea journalists, church groups, intellectuals, and opposition political leaders who could call attention to those infringements. The absence of comparable reports about the infringements of human rights in North Korea was evidence not of the absence of repression in that country but of its totality. Right-wing dictatorships moreover are, the record shows, less permanent than left-wing dictatorships; Portugal, Spain, and Greece are but three examples of right-wing dictatorships that were replaced by democratic regimes. As of 1980, however, no Communist system had been replaced by a democratic regime. Third, as a result of the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, right-wing regimes are normally more susceptible to American and other Western influence than left-wing dictatorships, and such influence is overwhelmingly on the side of liberty.

This last point leads to the other central fallacy of the myth of American repression as elaborated by Morgenthau and others. Their picture of the world of the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by the image of an America that was overwhelmingly powerful and overwhelmingly repressive. In effect, they held an updated belief in the "illusion of American omnipotence" that attributed the evil in other societies to the machinations of the Pentagon, the CIA, and American business. Their image of America was, however, defective in both dimensions. During the 1960s and 1970s American power relative to that of other governments and societies declined significantly. By the mid-seventies the ability of the United States to influence what was going on in other societies was but a pale shadow of what it had been a quarter-century earlier. When it had an effect, however, the overall effect of American power on other societies was to further liberty, pluralism, and democracy. The conflict between American power and American principles virtually disappears when it is applied to the American impact on other societies. In that case, the very factors that give rise to the consciousness of a gap between ideal and reality also limit in practice the extent of that gap. The United States is, in practice, the freest, most liberal, most democratic country in the world with far better institutionalized protections for the rights of its citizens than any other society. As a consequence, any increase in the power or influence of the United States in world affairs generally results—not inevitably, but far more often than not—in the promotion of liberty and human rights in the world. The expansion of American power is not

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synonymous with the expansion of liberty, but a significant correlation exists between the rise and fall of American power in the world and the rise and fall of liberty and democracy in the world.

The single biggest extension of democratic liberties in the history of the world came at the end of World War II, when stable democratic regimes were inaugurated in defeated Axis countries: Germany, Japan, Italy, and, as a former part of Germany, Austria. In the early 1980s these countries had a population of over two-hundred million, and included the third and fourth largest economies in the world. The imposition of democracy on these countries was almost entirely the work of the United States. In Germany and Japan, in particular, the United States government played a major role in designing democratic institutions. As a result of American determination and power, the former Axis countries were "forced to be free."[28] Conversely, the modest steps taken toward democracy and liberty in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were quickly reversed and Stalinist repression instituted, once it became clear that the United States was not able to project its power into Eastern Europe. If World War II had ended in something less than total victory, or if the United States had played a less significant role in bringing about the victory (as was, indeed, the case east of the Elbe), these transitions to democracy in central Europe and eastern Asia would not have occurred. But—with the partial exception of South Korea—where American armies marched, democracy followed in their train.

The stability of democracy in these countries during the quarter-century after World War II reflected, in large part, the extent to which the institutions and practices imposed by the United States found a favorable social and political climate in which to take root. The continued American political, economic, and military presence in Western Europe and eastern Asia was, however, also indispensable to this democratic success. At any time after World War II the withdrawal of American military guarantees and military forces from these areas would have had a most unsettling and perhaps devastating effect on the future of democracy in central Europe and Japan.

In the early years of the cold war, American influence was employed to ensure the continuation of democratic government in Italy and to promote free elections in Greece. In both cases, the United States had twin interests in the domestic politics of these countries: to create a system of stable democratic government and to ensure the exclusion of Communist parties from power. Since in both cases the Communist parties did not have the support of anything remotely resembling a majority of the population, the problem of what to do if a party committed to abolishing democracy gains power through democratic means was happily avoided. With American support, democracy survived in Italy and was sustained for a time in Greece. In addition, the American victory in World War II provided the stimulus in Turkey for one of the rarest events in

[28] See John D. Montgomery, *Forced To Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

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political history: the peaceful self-transformation of an authoritarian, one-party system into a democratic, competitive party system.

In Latin America, the rise and fall of democratic regimes also coincided with the rise and fall of American influence. In the second and third decades of this century, American intervention in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic produced the freest elections and the most open political competition in the history of those countries. In these countries, as in others in Central America and the Caribbean, American influence in support of free elections was usually exerted in response to the protests of opposition groups against the repressive actions of their own governments and as a result of American fears that revolution or civil war would occur if significant political and social forces were denied equal opportunity to participate in the political process. The American aim, as Theodore Wright made clear in his comprehensive study, was to "promote political stability by supporting free elections" rather than by strengthening military dictatorships. In its interventions in eight Caribbean and Central American countries between 1900 and 1933, the United States acted on the assumption that "the only way both to prevent revolutions and to determine whether they are justified if they do break out, is to guarantee free elections."[29] In Cuba, the effect of the Platt Amendment and American interventions was "to pluralize the Cuban political system" by fostering "the rise and entrenchment of opposition groups" and by multiplying "the sources of political power so that no single group, not even the government, could impose its will on society or the economy for very long. . . . The spirit and practices of liberalism—competitive and unregulated political, economic, religious, and social life—overwhelmed a pluralized Cuba."[30] The interventions by United States Marines in Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in these years often bore striking resemblances to the interventions by federal marshals in the conduct of elections in the American South in the 1960s: registering voters, protecting against electoral violence, ensuring a free vote and an honest count.

Direct intervention by the American government in Central America and the Caribbean came to at least a temporary end in the early 1930s. Without exception, the result was a shift in the direction of more dictatorial regimes. It had taken American power to impose even the most modest aspects of democracy in these societies. When American intervention ended, democracy ended. For the Caribbean and Central America, the era of the "Good Neighbor" was also the era of the bad tyrant. The efforts of the United States to be the former give a variety of unsavory local characters—Trujillo, Somoza, Batista—the opportunity to be the latter.

In the years after World War II, American attention and activity were primarily directed toward Europe and Asia. Latin America was, by and large,

[29] Theodore P. Wright, *American Support of Free Elections Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), pp. 137–38.

[30] Jorge I. Dominguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 13.

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neglected. This situation began to change toward the late 1950s, and it dramatically shifted after Castro's seizure of power in Cuba. In the early 1960s Latin America became the focus of large-scale economic aid programs, military training and assistance programs, propaganda efforts, and repeated attention by the president and other high-level American officials. Under the Alliance for Progress, American power was to be used to promote and sustain democratic government and greater social equity in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. This high point in the exercise of United States power in Latin America coincided with the high point of democracy in Latin America. This period witnessed "the Twilight of the Tyrants": it was the age in which at one point all but one of the ten South American countries (Paraguay) had some semblance of democratic government.[31]

Obviously, the greater prevalence of democratic regimes during these years was not exclusively a product of United States policy and power. Yet the latter certainly played a role. The democratic governments that had emerged in Colombia and Venezuela in the late 1950s were carefully nurtured with money and praise. Strenuous efforts were made to head off the attempts of both left-wing guerrillas and right-wing military officers to overthrow Betancourt in Venezuela and to ensure the orderly transition to an elected successor for the first time in the history of that country. After thirty years in which "the U.S. government was less interested and involved in Dominican affairs" than at any other time in history—a period coinciding with Trujillo's domination of the Dominican Republic—American opposition to that dictator slowly mounted in the late 1950s. After his assassination in 1961, "the United States engaged in the most massive intervention in the internal affairs of a Latin American state since the inauguration of the Good Neighbor Policy."[32] The United States prevented a return to power by Trujillo's family members, launched programs to promote economic and social welfare, and acted to ensure democratic liberties and competitive elections. The latter, held in December 1962, resulted in the election of Juan Bosch as president. When the military moved against Bosch the following year, American officials first tried to head off the coup, and then, after its success, attempted to induce the junta to return quickly to constitutional procedures. But, by that point, American "leverage and influence [with the new government] were severely limited," and the only concession the United States was able to exact in return for recognition was a promise to hold elections in 1965.[33]

Following the military coup in Peru in July 1962, the United States was able to use its power more effectively to bring about a return to democratic government. The American ambassador was recalled; diplomatic relations were suspended; and $81 million in aid was canceled. Nine other Latin American

[31] See Tad Szulc, *The Twilight of the Tyrants* (New York: Henry Holt, 1959).

[32] Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 7.

[33] Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 16.

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countries were induced to break relations with the military junta—an achievement that could only have occurred at a time when the United States seemed to be poised on the brink of dispensing billions of dollars of largesse about the continent.[34] The result was that new elections were held the following year, and Belaunde was freely chosen president. Six years later, however, when Belaunde was overthrown by a coup, the United States was in no position to reverse the coup or even to prevent the military government that came to power from nationalizing major property holdings of American nationals. The power and the will that had been there in the early 1960s had evaporated by the late 1960s, and with it the possibility of holding Peru to a democratic path. Through a somewhat more complex process, a decline in the American role also helped produce similar results in Chile. In the 1964 Chilean elections, the United States exerted all the influence it could on behalf of Eduardo Frei and made a significant and possibly decisive contribution to his defeat of Salvador Allende. In the 1970 election the American government did not make any comparable effort to defeat Allende, who won the popular election by a narrow margin. At that point, the United States tried to induce the Chilean Congress to refuse to confirm his victory and to promote a military coup to prevent him from taking office. Both these efforts violated the norms of Chilean politics and American morality, and both were unsuccessful. If, on the other hand, the United States had been as active in the popular election of 1970 as it had been in that of 1964, the destruction of Chilean democracy in 1973 might have been avoided.

All in all, the decline in the role of the United States in Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s coincided with the spread of authoritarian regimes in that area. With this decline went a decline in the standards of democratic morality and human rights that the United States could attempt to apply to the governments of the region. In the early 1960s in Latin America (as in the 1910s and 1920s in the Caribbean and Central America), the goal of the United States was democratic competition and free elections. By the mid-1970s, that goal had been lowered from the fostering of democratic government to attempting to induce authoritarian governments not to infringe too blatantly on the rights of their citizens.

A similar relationship between American power and democratic government prevailed in Asia. There, too, the peak of American power was reached in the early and mid-1960s, and there, too, the decline in this power was followed by a decline in democracy and liberty. American influence had been most pervasive in the Philippines, which, for a quarter-century after World War II, had the most open, democratic system (apart from Japan) in east and southeast Asia. After the admittedly fraudulent election of 1949 and in the face of the rising threat to the Philippine government posed by the Huk insurgency, American military and economic assistance was greatly increased. Direct American intervention in Philippine politics then played a decisive role not only in pro-

[34] Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, *The Alliance that Lost Its Way* (Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 81–82.

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moting Ramon Magsaysay into the presidency but also in assuring that the 1951 congressional elections and 1953 presidential election were open elections "free from fraud and intimidation."[35] In the next three elections the Philippines met the sternest test of democracy: incumbent presidents were defeated for reelection. In subsequent years, however, the American presence and influence in the Philippines declined, and with it one support for Philippine democracy. When President Marcos instituted his martial law regime in 1972, American influence in southeast Asia was clearly on the wane, and the United States held few effective levers with which to affect the course of Philippine politics. In perhaps even more direct fashion, the high point of democracy and political liberty in Vietnam also coincided with the high point of American influence there. The only free national election in the history of that country took place in 1967, when the American military intervention was at its peak. In Vietnam, as in Latin America, American intervention had a pluralizing effect on politics, limiting the government and encouraging and strengthening its political opposition. The defeat of the United States in Vietnam and the exclusion of American power from Indochina were followed in three countries by the imposition of regimes of almost total repression.

The American relationship with South Korea took a similar course. In the late 1940s, under the sponsorship of the United States, U.N.-observed elections inaugurated the government of the Republic of Korea and brought Syngman Rhee to power. During the Korean War (1950–1953) and then in the mid-1950s, when American economic assistance was at its peak, a moderately democratic system was maintained, despite the fact that South Korea was almost literally in a state of siege. In 1956, Rhee won reelection by only a close margin and the opposition party won the vice-presidency and swept the urban centers.

In the late 1950s, however, as American economic assistance to Korea declined, the Rhee regime swung in an increasingly authoritarian direction. The 1960 vice-presidential election was blatantly fraudulent; students and others protested vigorously; and, as the army sat on the sidelines, Rhee was forced out of power. A democratic regime under the leadership of John M. Chang came into office, but found it difficult to exercise authority and to maintain order. In May 1961, this regime was overthrown by a military coup, despite the strong endorsement of the Chang government by the American embassy and military command. During the next two years, the United States exerted sustained pressure on the military government to hold elections and return power to a civilian regime. A bitter struggle took place within the military over this issue; in the end, President Park Chung Hee, with American backing and support, overcame the opposition within the military junta, and reasonably open elections were held in October 1963, in which Park was elected president with a 43 percent plurality of the vote. In the struggle with the hard-line groups in the military, one reporter observed, "the prestige and word of the United States have been

[35] H. Bradford Westerfield, *The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1963), p. 416.

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put to a grinding test"; by insisting on the holding of elections, however, the United States "emerged from this stage of the crisis with a sort of stunned respect from South Koreans for its determination—from those who eagerly backed United States pressures on the military regime and even from officers who were vehemently opposed to it."[36] Thirteen years later, however, the United States was no longer in a position to have the same impact on Korean politics. "You can't talk pure Jefferson to these guys," one American official said. "You've got to have a threat of some kind or they won't listen. . . . There aren't many levers left to pull around here. We just try to keep the civil rights issue before the eyes of Korean authorities on all levels and hope it has some effect."[37] By 1980, American power in Korea had been reduced to the point where there was no question, as there was in 1961 and 1962, of pressuring a new military leadership to hold prompt and fair elections. The issue was simply whether the United States had enough influence to induce the Korean government not to execute Korea's leading opposition political figure, Kim Dae Jung, and even with respect to that, one Korean official observed, "the United States has no leverage."[38] Over the years, as American influence in Korea went down, repression in Korea went up.

The positive impact of American power on liberty in other societies is in part the result of the conscious choices by presidents such as Kennedy and Carter to give high priority to the promotion of democracy and human rights. Even without such conscious choice, however, the presence or exercise of American power in a foreign area usually has a similar thrust. The new moralists of the 1970s maintained that the United States has "no alternative" but to act in terms of the moral and political values that define the essence of its being. The new moralists clearly intended this claim to have at least a normative meaning. But, in fact, it also describes a historical necessity. Despite the reluctance or inability of those imbued with the myth of American repression to recognize it, the impact of the United States on the world has, in large part, been what the new moralists say it has to be. The nature of the United States has left it little or no choice but to stand out among nations as the proponent of liberty and democracy. Clearly, the impact of no other country in world affairs has been as heavily weighted in favor of liberty and democracy as has that of the United States.

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. American power is no exception; clearly it has been used for good purposes and bad in terms of liberty, democracy, and human rights. But also in terms of these values, American power is far less likely to be misused or corrupted than the power of any other major government. This is so for two reasons. First, because American leaders and decision makers are, inevitably, the products of their culture, they are themselves generally committed to liberal and democratic

[36] A. M. Rosenthal, *New York Times*, 8 April 1963.
[37] Quoted by Andrew H. Malcolm, *New York Times*, 11 June 1976.
[38] *The Economist*, 30 August 1980, pp. 27–28.

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values. This does not mean that some leaders may not at times take actions that run counter to those values. Obviously, this happens: sensibilities are dulled; perceived security needs may dictate other actions; expediency prevails; the immediate end justifies setting aside the larger purpose. But American policymakers are more likely than those of any other country to be sensitive to these tradeoffs and to be more reluctant to sacrifice liberal-democratic values. Second, the institutional pluralism and dispersion of power in the American political system impose constraints—unmatched in any other society—on the ability of officials to abuse power and also to ensure that those transgressions that do occur will almost inevitably become public knowledge. The American press is extraordinarily free, strong, and vigorous in its exposure of bad policies and corrupt officials. The American Congress has powers of investigation, legislation, and financial control unequaled by any other national legislature. The ability of American officials to violate the values of their society is therefore highly limited, and the extent to which the press is filled with accounts of how officials have violated those values is evidence not that such behavior is more widespread than it is in other societies but that it is less tolerated than in other societies. The belief that the United States can do no wrong in terms of the values of liberty and democracy is clearly as erroneous abroad as it is at home. But so alas is the belief—far more prevalent in American intellectual circles in the 1970s—that the United States could never do right in terms of those values. American power is far more likely to be used to support those values than to counter them, and it is far more likely to be employed on behalf of those values than is the power of any other major country.

The point is often made that there is a direct relation between the health of liberty in the United States and the health of liberty in other societies. Disease in one is likely to infect the other. Thus, on the one hand, Richard Ullman argued that "the quality of political life in the United States is indeed affected by the quality of political life in other societies. The extinction of political liberties in Chile, or their extension in Portugal or Czechoslovakia, has a subtle but nonetheless important effect on political liberties within the United States." Conversely, he also goes on to say, "just as the level of political freedom in other societies affects our own society, so the quality of our own political life has an important impact abroad."[39] This particular point is often elaborated into what is sometimes referred to as the "clean hands" doctrine—that the United States cannot effectively promote liberty in other countries so long as there are significant violations of liberty within its borders. Let the United States rely on the power of example and "first put our house in order," as Hoffmann phrased it. "Like charity, well-ordered crusades begin at home."[40]

Both these arguments—that of the corrupting environment and that of the shining example—are partial truths. By any observable measure, the state of liberty in countries like Chile or Czechoslovakia has, in itself, no impact on the

[39] Ullman, "Washington versus Wilson," pp. 117, 123.

[40] Stanley Hoffmann, "No Choice, No Illusions," *Foreign Policy*, no. 25 (Winter 1976–77): 127.

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state of liberty in the United States. Similarly, foreigners usually recognize what Americans tend to forget—that the United States is the most open, free, and democratic society in the world. Hence, any particular improvement in the state of liberty in the United States is unlikely to be seen as having much relevance to their societies. Yet these arguments do have an element of truth in them, when one additional variable is added to the equation. This element is power.

The impact that the state of liberty in other societies has on liberty in the United States depends upon the power of those other societies and their ability to exercise that power with respect to the United States. What happens in Chile or even Czechoslovakia does not affect the state of liberty in the United States because those are small, weak, and distant countries. But the disappearance of liberty in Britain or France or Japan would have consequences for the health of liberty in the United States, because they are large and important countries intimately involved with the United States. Conversely, the impact of the state of liberty in the United States on other societies depends not upon changes in American liberty (which foreigners will, inevitably, view as marginal), but rather upon the power and immediacy of the United States to the country in question. The power of example works only when it is an example of power. If the United States plays a strong, confident, preeminent role on the world stage, other nations will be impressed by its power and will attempt to emulate its liberty in the belief that liberty may be the source of power. This point was made quite persuasively in 1946 by Turkey's future premier, Adnan Menderes, in explaining why his country had to shift to democracy:

> The difficulties encountered during the war years uncovered and showed the weak points created by the one-party system in the structure of the country. The hope in the miracles of [the] one-party system vanished, as the one-party system countries were defeated everywhere. Thus, the one-party mentality was destroyed in the turmoil of blood and fire of the second World War. No country can remain unaffected by the great international events and the contemporary dominating ideological currents. This influence was felt in our country too.[41]

In short, no one copies a loser.

The future of liberty in the world is thus intimately linked to the future of American power. Yet the double thrust of the new moralism was, paradoxically, to advocate the expansion of global liberty and, simultaneously, to effect a reduction in American power. The relative decline in American power in the 1970s has many sources. One of them assuredly was the democratic surge (of which the new moralism was one element) in the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s. The strong recommitment to democratic, liberal, and populist values that occurred during these years eventually generated efforts to limit, constrain, and reduce American military, political, and economic power abroad. The intense and sustained attacks by the media, by intellectuals, and by congressmen on the military establishment, intelligence agencies, diplomatic of-

[41] Adnan Menderes, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 July 1946, quoted in Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 140, n. 10.

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ficials, and political leadership of the United States inevitably had that effect. The decline in American power abroad weakened the support for liberty and democracy abroad. American democracy and foreign democracy may be inversely related. Due to the mediating effects of power, their relationship appears to be just the opposite of that hypothesized by Ullman.

The promotion of liberty abroad thus requires the expansion of American power; the operation of liberty at home involves the limitation of American power. The need in attempting to achieve democratic goals both abroad and at home is to recognize the existence of this contradiction and to assess the tradeoffs between these two goals. There is, for instance, an inherent contradiction between welcoming the end of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and, at the same time, deploring the intensification of repression in Latin America. It is also paradoxical that in the 1970s those congressmen who were most insistent on the need to promote human rights abroad were often most active in reducing the American power that could help achieve that result. In key votes in the Ninety-fourth Congress, for instance, 132 congressmen consistently voted in favor of human rights amendments to foreign aid legislation. Seventy-eight of those 132 representatives also consistently voted against a larger military establishment, and another 28 consistent supporters of human rights split their votes on the military establishment. Only 26 of the 132 congressmen consistently voted in favor of both human rights and the military power whose development could help make those rights a reality.

The new realism of the 1940s and 1950s coincided with the expansion of American power in the world and the resulting expansion of American-sponsored liberty and democracy in the world. The new moralism of the 1970s coincided with the relative decline in American power and the concomitant erosion of liberty and democracy around the globe. By limiting American power, the new moralism promoted that decline. In some measure, too, the new moralism was a consequence of the decline. The new moralism's concern with human rights throughout the world clearly reflected the erosion in global liberty and democratic values. Paradoxically, the United States thus became more preoccupied with ways of defending human rights as its power to defend human rights diminished. Enactment of Title IX to the foreign assistance act in 1966, a major congressional effort to promote democratic values abroad, came at the midpoint in the steady decline in American foreign economic assistance. Similarly, the various restrictions that Congress wrote into the foreign assistance acts in the 1970s coincided with the general replacement of military aid by military sales. When American power was clearly predominant, such legislative provisions and caveats were superfluous: no Harkin amendment was necessary to convey the message of the superiority of liberty. The message was there for all to see in the troop deployments, carrier task forces, foreign-aid missions, and intelligence operatives. When these faded from the scene, in order to promote liberty and human rights Congress found it necessary to write more and more explicit conditions and requirements into legislation. These legislative provisions were, in effect, an effort to compensate for the decline of American

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power. In terms of narrowing the ideals-versus-institutions gap abroad, they were no substitute for the presence of American power.

Contrary to the views of both "realists" and "moralists," the contradiction arising from America's role in the world is not primarily that of power and self-interest versus liberty and morality in American foreign policy. It is, rather, the contradiction between enhancing liberty at home by curbing the power of the American government and enhancing liberty abroad by expanding that power.

The Promise of Disappointment

The term "American exceptionalism" has been used to refer to a variety of characteristics that have historically distinguished the United States from European societies—characteristics such as its relative lack of economic suffering, social conflict, political trauma, and military defeat. "The standing armies, the monarchies, the aristocracies, the huge debts, the crushing taxation, the old inveterate abuses, which flourish in Europe," William Clarke argued in 1881, "can take no root in the New World. The continent of America is consecrated to simple humanity, and its institutions exist for the progress and happiness of the whole people." Yet, as Henry Fairlie pointed out in 1975, "there now *are* standing armies of America; there now *is* something that, from time to time, looks very like a monarchy; there now *is* a permitted degree of inherited wealth that is creating some of the elements of an aristocracy; there now *is* taxation that is crushing."[42] In the same year, Daniel Bell came to a similar conclusion by a different path. The "end of American exceptionalism," he argued, is to be seen in "the end of empire, the weakening of power, the loss of faith in the nation's future. . . . Internal tensions have multiplied and there are deep structural crises, political and cultural, that may prove more intractable to solution than the domestic economic problems."[43]

In the late twentieth century, the United States surely seemed to confront many evils and problems that were common to other societies but that it had previously avoided. These developments, however, affected only the incidental elements of American exceptionalism, those of power, wealth, and security. They did not change American political values and they only intensified the gap between political ideals and political institutions that is crucial to American national identity. They thus did not affect the historically most exceptional aspect of the United States, an aspect eloquently summed up and defended by a Yugoslav dissident.

> The United States is not a state like France, China, England, etc., and it would be a great tragedy if someday the United States became such a state. What is the difference? First of all, the United States is not a national state, but a multinational state. Second,

[42] Fairlie;, "Anti-Americanism at Home and Abroad," p. 34, quoting William Clarke, 1881.

[43] Daniel Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," in *The American Commonwealth 1976*, eds. Nathan Glazer and Irving Kristol (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 197.

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the United States was founded by people who valued individual freedom more highly than their own country.

And so the United States is primarily a state of freedom. And this is what is most important. Whole peoples from other countries can say, Our homeland is Germany, Russia, or whatever; only Americans can say, My homeland is freedom.[44]

Americans have said this throughout their history and have lived throughout their history in the inescapable presence of liberal ideals, semiliberal institutions, and the gap between the two. The United States has no meaning, no identity, no political culture or even history apart from its ideals of liberty and democracy and the continuing efforts of Americans to realize those ideals. Every society has its own distinctive form of tension that characterizes its existence as a society. The tension between liberal ideal and institutional reality is America's distinguishing cleavage. It defines both the agony and the promise of American politics. If that tension disappears, the United States of America, as we have known it, will no longer exist.

The continued existence of the United States means that Americans will continue to suffer from cognitive dissonance. They will continue to attempt to come to terms with that dissonance through some combination of moralism, cynicism, complacency, and hypocrisy. The greatest danger to the gap between ideals and institutions would come when any substantial portion of the American population carried to an extreme any one of these responses. An excess of moralism, hypocrisy, cynicism, or complacency could destroy the American system. A totally complacent toleration of the ideals-versus-institutions gap could lead to the corruption and decay of American liberal-democratic institutions. Uncritical hypocrisy, blind to the existence of the gap and fervent in its commitment to American principles, could lead to imperialistic expansion, ending in either military or political disaster abroad or the undermining of democracy at home. Cynical acceptance of the gap could lead to a gradual abandonment of American ideals and their replacement either by a Thrasymachusian might-makes-right morality or by some other set of political beliefs. Finally, intense moralism could lead Americans to destroy the freest institutions on earth because they believed they deserved something better.

To maintain their ideals and institutions, Americans have no recourse but to temper and balance their responses to the gap between the two. The threats to the future of the American condition can be reduced to the extent that Americans:

- —continue to believe in their liberal, democratic, and individualistic ideals and also recognize the extent to which their institutions and behavior fall short of these ideals;
- —feel guilty about the existence of the gap but take comfort from the fact that American political institutions are more liberal and democratic than those of any other human society past or present;

[44] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Prospects for the Post-Tito Era," *New America* 17 (January 1980): 7.

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- attempt to reduce the gap between institutions and ideals but accept the fact that the imperfections of human nature mean the gap can never be eliminated;
- believe in the universal validity of American ideals but also understand their limited applicability to other societies;
- support the maintenance of American power necessary to protect and promote liberal ideals and institutions in the world arena, but recognize the dangers such power could pose to liberal ideals and institutions at home.

Critics say that America is a lie because its reality falls so far short of its ideals. They are wrong. America is not a lie; it is a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope.

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Mass Asylum and Human Rights in American Foreign Policy

JOHN A. SCANLAN
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From 1948, when the United States began admitting European displaced persons, until 1980, when the so-called Cuban freedom flotilla arrived in Florida, the standard method of admitting refugees to this country was first to screen them abroad and then to permit them entry according to their place on rank-order waiting lists. Although nearly 2 million aliens entered the United States in this manner, the political problems associated with large-scale refugee movements, and with applications from individuals fleeing repressive regimes diplomatically tied to the United States, were minimized. In this way, U.S. officials could regulate the flow of refugees to avoid unacceptable levels of domestic backlash and to keep international embarrassments to a minimum. It was possible, in other words, to maintain without much difficulty a refugee admissions system almost entirely independent of U.S. immigration law, under the direct control of the executive rather than the legislative branch, and dedicated to a few consistent, but limited, foreign-policy ends.

Those ends were not divorced from humanitarian considerations, but neither were they dominated by them. The statutory definition of refugee adopted in 1965, which—with the exception of certain victims "of catastrophic natural calamity"—included only those fleeing persecution "from a Communist-dominated country or area, or from any country within the general area of the Middle East,"[1] reflected a cold war policy choice that directed the nation's

[1] 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1153(a)(7), Immigration and Nationality Act [I.N.A.] Sec. 203(a)(7) (repealed).

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generosity toward the victims of many, but certainly not all, of the most severe refugee-producing situations of the last thirty years. Of the millions of African refugees displaced by intertribal terrorism, famine, and war since 1960, only a few thousand ever reached the United States. No equivalent to the "open arms" extended to Cubans fleeing Castro from 1961 to April 1980 was ever extended to Chileans fleeing Pinochet, Haitians fleeing Duvalier, or those fleeing the current bloodshed in El Salvador. The admission of some 400,000 displaced persons from post-World War II Europe, 35,000 Hungarians from Austria in 1957–1958, and nearly 500,000 Indochinese from Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines from 1975 to 1980 had as a common theme American concern over the destabilizing effect of large refugee populations in parts of the world deemed vital for national security. The admission of over 800,000 Cubans from 1961 to 1 April 1980 and of 50,000 Soviet Jews from 1973 to the present was predicated not only on the existence of political persecution abroad and on the presence of vocal pressure groups in the United States, but also on continuing anti-Communist sentiment in the foreign-policy community and a continued interest in seeing those opposed to communism "vote with their feet."

Nothing the Reagan administration has done or said suggests any dissatisfaction with these traditional ends of American refugee admissions policy. Yet two events in the spring of 1980 affecting the flow of refugees into the United States, and the nation's ability to control that flow, have substantially altered the context in which admissions decisions must be made. The first of these events was the passage of a new Refugee Act in March; the second was the beginning of a mass asylum crisis in April, when the Cuban "freedom flotilla" began. Together, they have created practical and political difficulties that cannot be resolved unless the nation turns more of its attention to the refugee problem in this hemisphere, responds to that problem in a manner that places predominant emphasis on human rights rather than on ideology, and enlists more multilateral and bilateral cooperation in an attempt both to minimize the number of refugees and more equitably resettle those who cannot be repatriated.

The Effect of the Refugee Act of 1980

The new Refugee Act incorporates into domestic law for the first time a definition that is not ideologically or geographically limited. Under the new law, any person from any part of the world is eligible for refugee status, provided that he or she can demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."[2] The new law, of course, is subject to different interpretations: "Merely because an individual or group of refugees comes within the definition will not guarantee resettlement in the United States. . . . the new definition does not create a new and expanded means of entry, but instead regularizes and for-

[2] Section 201(a), Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 101, adding 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42), I.N.A. Sec. 101(a)(42).

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malizes the policies and the practices that have been followed in recent years."[3] For individuals outside of the United States seeking refuge, this analysis of the law is substantially correct. For those reaching the borders of the United States before seeking refuge, however, the new definition does appear to provide "a new and expanded means of entry." The new Refugee Act affords protection for the first time to many fleeing right-wing repression in this hemisphere and expands upon the protections traditionally afforded to refugees seeking withholding of deportation.[4] The effect of these changes is to prevent the United States from expelling or returning any alien who, having reached the United States, can demonstrate he or she fits within the new refugee definition.

When Congress passed the new Refugee Act, it apparently believed that no more than 5,000 aliens per year would enter the United States with potentially valid asylum claims. Given the fact that nearly 20,000 such claims were pending in November, 1979, and that at least as many potential claims were being administratively bypassed at the time the Refugee Act was enacted, such an estimate may have been overly optimistic.[5] At any rate, it became quickly inoperative in April 1980 when the first wave of the "freedom flotilla," eventually bringing 130,000 Cubans to Florida in a five-month period, hit American shores. By the end of 1980, these Cubans had been joined by over 11,000 Haitian "boat people" and by an indeterminate number of Ethiopians, Nicaraguans, Iranians, and Salvadorans seeking political asylum. Perhaps 150,000 to 160,000 aliens entered the United States in 1980 with potential asylum claims.

The bureaucracies charged with regulating refugee flow were overwhelmed by this massive influx. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) lacked the personnel to interview expeditiously each person seeking asylum, much less to evaluate each applicant's claim properly. The Department of State, charged with issuing an "advisory opinion" as to the probable good faith of each applicant's "well-founded fear," was even more understaffed.[6] The Carter administration therefore sidestepped the question of which applicants would be granted asylum by creating on 20 June 1980 the temporary status of

[3] U.S., Congress, House, Judiciary Committee, *H.R. Report no. 608*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., November 1979, p. 10.

[4] 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h), I.N.A. Sec. 243(h) has been amended to make such withholding mandatory when probable persecution exists. "Excludable aliens," who make up a significant percentage of those seeking asylum, are now also protected by this statutory provision.

[5] Figures on pending asylum claims were obtained from internal INS memoranda that were not available when the new Refugee Act was first reported in 1979. In 1978 and 1979, INS avoided processing most Nicaraguan and Ethiopian asylum claims by granting applicants "extended voluntary departure," thereby permitting continued short-term residence without the immediate threat of deportation. A similar strategy was employed in 1979 and 1980 for Iranians, even though President Carter had proscribed granting them formal "extended voluntary departure" status.

[6] During the height of the Cuban influx, only one State Department officer was assigned full time to handling asylum claims. By August 1980, this number had risen to three. Interviews conducted with State Department and INS officials by G.D. Loescher and John A. Scanlan, 18–19 May and 12–13 August 1980.

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"Cuban/Haitian entrant." Meanwhile, potential asylum-seekers continued to flow into the United States in unprecedented numbers, creating immense difficulties in local host communities and generating a significant backlash in the public and in the press. On the whole, this surge of asylum-seekers into the United States and the governmental and nongovernmental response to that surge constituted the mass asylum crisis of 1980, the second and most important event challenging the traditional, ideological basis of American refugee admissions policy.

Mass Asylum: A Chronic International Problem

Brought about because of a large-scale refugee flow not contemplated or addressed by the new Refugee Act, the mass asylum crisis of 1980 has raised fundamental questions about the ability of the United States to regulate the flow of refugees to its borders and about the principles that should govern the regulatory power it does possess. Much of that concern to date has centered on domestic factors, such as those limiting the ability of the government to effectively screen refugees before they enter the mainstream of American society and those contributing to backlash after the refugees are resettled. The Carter-appointed Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, in its *Final Report to the Congress and the President*, made a number of recommendations that, if adopted, should streamline the processing of massive numbers of asylum claims, aid in the resettlement of those granted asylum, and marginally reduce the number of individuals entering the United States with the hope of remaining indefinitely by dragging out patently nonmeritorious claims.[7]

A more aggressive approach has been taken by the Reagan administration to discourage the flow of refugees seeking asylum. Among the steps already taken have been the stopping of Haitian vessels at sea by the United States Coast Guard and the delivery of their passengers to the Haitian government; the establishment of remote and harsh detention camps for asylum applicants designed to discourage entry and encourage "voluntary" deportation; a new "hard line" toward Cuba; and the introduction of several restrictive immigration bills in Congress.[8] Yet, there is little consensus among legal scholars, legislators, and immigration authorities about what legal changes can or should be made, and the problems posed by "mass asylum" clearly defy simplistic legal solutions. Aggressive punitive measures directed at asylum-seekers may retard their influx, but will not stem it so long as the underlying reasons for that flow remain intact.

The United States, with the highest standard of living in the Western Hemisphere and a tradition of political freedom, will draw many aliens to its

[7] See Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, *U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 165–76.

[8] As of 15 November 1981, bills had been introduced or proposed in the Senate that would strip asylum-seekers of many of their due-process rights and make them subject to interdiction at sea in violation of customary rules of international law; change the current refugee definition; and put an overall "cap" on immigration that would effectively limit refugee flow.

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borders. Determining which are bona fide refugees is an absolutely essential domestic enterprise; yet to the extent that such a determination is made after asylum applicants have reached the United States, and particularly after they have reached the United States in large numbers, it is of limited value. The difficulties the nation faces in returning Cuban criminals to Cuba, or in finding any other country willing to take them, are illustrative of the problems that ensue, as is the long history of American efforts to exclude or deport Haitians not deemed refugees by the INS or by the Department of State. These difficulties are significantly increased whenever an asylum applicant comes from a country where segments of the population suffer severe economic deprivation as a result of governmental policy. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to determine if the government's conduct constitutes a form of "persecution" and, thus, to determine if those entering the United States are "political refugees" or "economic migrants." Although this problem is acute in evaluating the claims of many migrants from the Caribbean basin, it is not due simply to the permissive language of the Refugee Act of 1980. Since 1948, the great majority of "refugees" who have been welcomed to the United States, whether from Western Europe, Vietnam, or Cuba, have entered with mixed political and economic motives. Since 1968, the United States has been obligated by international treaty to determine, on an individual basis, whether particular applicants are in danger of persecution and whether they can be legally returned to their country of origin.[9]

As long as large numbers of undocumented aliens enter the United States with such mixed motives, the government—as recent class-action suits involving Cubans, Haitians, and Salvadorans illustrate[10]—will find it difficult to summarily turn them away. Yet the current political climate of the region, as well as the standards of conduct of foreign governments that the United States often tacitly supports, makes such large numbers inevitable. The arrival of perhaps 160,000 of these aliens in the United States at the country's borders in 1980 was unprecedented; yet it can be reasonably expected that somewhat smaller, but still very large, numbers of such applicants will arrive in the United States in 1981 and the years following.

The basis for such an expectation is both historical and political. Although most refugees have traditionally entered the United States after being processed abroad, since at least 1965, when "freedom flights" from Cuba were preceded by the arrival of some 2,500 Cubans in boats, some have arrived each year as asylum-seekers. And an increasingly large number have entered the United States illegally from countries in Central America or the Caribbean. An

[9] Article 33, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, incorporated by 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577(1968).

[10] See, for example, *Fernandez-Roque* v. *Smith*, no. C81-1084A (Northern District, Ga.) (20 August 1981) (Cuban internees held in federal prisons ordered released); *Haitian Refugee Center* v. *Civiletti*, 503 F. Supp. 442 (Southern District, Fla., 1980) (Haitian deportation orders set aside). A campaign has recently been initiated by several public-interest law groups to bring similar actions on behalf of Salvadorans detained in the Southwest.

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estimated 25,000 Nicaraguans, for instance, were in the United States just prior to the fall of the Somoza regime; and 30,000 Haitians have entered the United States by boat in the last fifteen years, with the 1980 flow triple that of any prior year. Recent news accounts indicate that perhaps 70,000 Salvadorans have entered the United States since the beginning of 1980, many by crossing the Mexican border. It is quite possible that in the near future the United States will experience some new flows from Cuba and Nicaragua, sudden movements of large numbers of people from Jamaica and Guatemala, and greatly increased numbers of Haitians, both from Haiti and from the Bahamas, where officials have recently attempted to repatriate many of the Haitians living there (although the Duvalier regime has been uncooperative). Increasing political tension in the region is not likely to abate soon, and unless peaceful changes in the relationship between the landed and the unlanded classes are initiated or carried further, that tension, on a country-by-country basis, is likely to explode into violence and to lead to overt persecution of all political opposition. Others, threatened by the strife, although not themselves political targets, will also flee. While any prediction is speculative, the potential thus appears to exist for an annual flow of perhaps 50,000 asylum applicants to the United States, with larger numbers arriving in years of heightened conflict.

A Hard Look at the "Hard Line"

The Reagan administration has not yet fully developed its response to events in this hemisphere that have the potential to affect refugee flow. Yet a "hard line" with the following characteristics appears to be emerging: confrontation, rather than negotiation, with Cuba; identification of all left-wing revolutionary trends in the region with the policies and goals of Cuba and the Soviet Union, rather than with such local concerns as land reform; extension of broad support, including stepped-up military aid, to regimes, such as those in El Salvador, Chile, and Argentina, attempting to stamp out "leftists"; isolation and destabilization of regimes, such as the one in Nicaragua, that have supported "leftists" in other countries; deemphasis of concerns about human-rights violations by regimes in power in favor of opposition to revolutionary "terrorism"; resumption of the deportation of Haitian asylum applicants illegally in the United States; interdiction by force of vessels carrying undocumented aliens to the United States; detention of asylum applicants pending resolutions of their claims; and continuation of a refusal to grant either asylum or "extended voluntary departure"—a temporary expedient used by President Carter for Nicaraguans during 1978 and 1979—to applicants from El Salvador. The primary emphasis of this emerging policy is ideological, reflecting viewpoints similar to those that were used to justify both the U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the U.S.-supported attempt to destabilize the Allende regime in Chile in 1971. This hard-line policy will have relatively short-term, direct effects on refugee flow into the United States and the potential for indirectly affecting the volume and nature of that flow well into the future.

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The short-term effects will derive, in large part, from the Cuban government's response to the United States's more belligerent attitude toward it and from efforts of the INS to repatriate Haitians and exclude Salvadorans. In all probability, the flow of refugees from nations in the Western Hemisphere into the United States will be reduced quite substantially. At least three-quarters of all potential asylum-seekers entering the United States in 1980 were Cubans, many of whom had political reasons for leaving. Yet the large-scale sea migration could not have occurred without the Castro regime's active intervention, and clearly was manipulated for that regime's own political ends. As a result, the regime was able both to profiteer and to export some undesirable Cubans who had spent time in criminal or mental institutions and who did not meet any of the criteria of the current definition of refugee.

The Reagan administration has reportedly admonished Castro not to unleash another exodus of boat people to Florida and has demanded a commitment from Havana to take back hundreds of the undesirable Cubans who emigrated to the United States during 1980.[11] In its attempt to curb Cuban activities in the hemisphere, including the provision of military aid to the insurgents in El Salvador, the United States has threatened Cuba with a variety of reprisals, including possible military action or a naval quarantine. To date, this tough stance seems to have prevented any repetition of last year's orchestrated exodus. In marked contrast to its activities surrounding the 1980 occupation of the Peruvian embassy when the Cuban government granted almost unlimited access to embassy grounds and took no active steps to expel Cuban nationals, the Cuban government acted swiftly in February 1981 to evict aliens attempting to obtain asylum on the Ecuadoran embassy grounds. Nor was there any repetition in 1981 of the wide-spread granting of exit visas that characterized the 1980 episode.

The current treatment of Salvadorans and Haitians may discourage some of their friends or relatives from seeking to enter the United States. For potential refugees from El Salvador, the prospects appear to be for a greater, rather than a lesser, flow from that country, since Salvadoran refugees need only cross inadequately patrolled land borders to enter the United States. The number of persons displaced by fighting in El Salvador or targeted for extermination by right- and left-wing death squads has grown rapidly in the last year. U.S. pressure against Cuba and Nicaragua may decrease the flow of arms to left-wing insurgents; yet additional U.S. military aid specifically designed to help the present government to extend its control over the rugged countryside is certain to produce more refugees.

The volume of Haitian refugees seeking asylum in the United States is also likely to rise steadily. Since the summer of 1980, the situation in Haiti has worsened: Hurricane Allen further impoverished the poorest country in the hemisphere; the government's crackdown on the press and imprisonment of

[11] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Reagan Chooses Caribbean as Target Area," *Washington Post*, 25 February 1981.

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human-rights activists in late 1980 demonstrated again how deep the disregard for human rights is in Haiti; and the government's unwillingness to repatriate any of its nationals illegally in the Bahamas left some thirty thousand unwanted Haitians with no place to go. By establishing its detention program and enlisting the diplomatic support of the Haitian government in the interdiction of vessels containing Haitians, the Reagan administration has sought to counterbalance these increased migration pressures. The impact of these measures will not be determined until the spring and summer of 1982, when the weather will be most favorable for the traffic of small boats. Yet it is already clear that successful legal attacks on portions of the detention program have undercut the administration's ability to regulate the flow. The Coast Guard's presence off the coast of Haiti is minimal and is not likely to increase. Equally important, the government of Haiti has nothing to gain from cooperating enthusiastically in the repatriation of its dissidents and its poor, and the United States, given its unwillingness to undercut its allies in the ideological struggle against the "totalitarian" left, lacks a credible "tough" response to force such cooperation.

Even if the United States currently possessed the means to exclude Haitian or Salvadoran refugees as effectively as it may be able to exclude Cubans, it is doubtful in the long run whether such exclusion either could be maintained or would prove beneficial. Barriers to entry will be only partially effective, particularly along the porous Mexican border, and the cost of a gunboat diplomacy to keep that flow away from U.S. shores may be prohibitive, not only in dollars and cents, but also in terms of maintaining good relationships with other "receiver" or "conduit" nations and of upholding the country's international reputation generally.[12] Under these circumstances, pressures to limit the entry of refugees will always be competing with, and sometimes be outweighed by, international pressures. Such pressure will frequently be intensified by strongly voiced domestic sentiment for the admission of particular groups of refugees who appeal to the humanitarian or ethnic sensibilities of certain segments of the U.S. population.

For these reasons, unless the U.S. government addresses refugee-producing situations directly, it will grow increasingly difficult to exclude asylum-seekers, not only those coming from El Salvador and Haiti, but also from other countries in the region. It is probable that among these asylum-seekers will be a substantial number of Cubans. Current governmental responses to the Castro regime may have stemmed the tide, but cannot be expected to hold it back indefinitely. It is hardly accidental that the United States resettled over 900,000 Cubans in the first twenty years of Castro's rule. Geographical proximity, a

[12] According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO), it would require "an increase of $125 million in the [INS] $250 million annual operating costs" to obtain the personnel, fencing, helicopters, and so forth, necessary "to secure about 10 percent of the 2,000-mile Mexican border" (Comptroller General of the United States, *Prospects Dim for Effectively Enforcing Immigration Laws: Report to the Congress of the United States* [Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1980], p. iii). Moreover, the President's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy estimates that an 85 percent effective interdiction program by the Coast Guard would cost $425 million annually.

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large and vocal Cuban community in the United States, periodic economic distress in Cuba, and genuine opposition to Castro's brand of communism, both here and in Cuba, are all factors promoting refugee flow. The Reagan administration's "hard line" is predicated in part on an antidétente strategy that permits rough treatment of the Soviet Union's client state and in part on a perception of regional politics that believes the United States can take a strong stance on Cuba without endangering relationships with countries in the hemisphere who have been traditional allies. Global political considerations may require another East-West "thaw," or otherwise militate against making Cuba a confrontation point with the Soviet Union. State Department personnel have already voiced concern that the current administration's anti-Castro campaign may backfire by provoking another mass exodus, which the United States will be powerless to prevent.[13] If recent Mexican and Venezuelan responses to current U.S. Cuban policy are at all indicative of relationships between the United States and other countries in the hemisphere, then strong regional reasons already exist for the United States to modify its stance. Thus, global and regional factors may well combine to deprive the United States of much of the leverage it has against Castro and force it to seek other methods of limiting refugee flow.

Human Rights and an Effective Admissions Policy

In the long run the only effective way of reducing the flow of refugees to the United States from countries in this hemisphere is to address concretely the conditions that create refugees. To do so the United States will have to maintain a foreign policy that raises the issue of persecution abroad, provides the means to at least partially reduce the political and economic tensions that lead to such persecution, and takes concrete nonmilitary action against those nations that persist in persecuting their own citizens.

To date, the Reagan administration's approach to persecution abroad has not deterred refugee flow to the United States. President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig have given priority to strengthening the United States's resolve and resources to defend allies the administration considers threatened by totalitarian aggression or subversion. The White House has expressed its belief that by exercising U.S. power, deterring war, and preventing the expansion of Communist rule, they are protecting such basic international human rights as freedom from foreign domination, internal security, and the freedom of person. The administration's relationship with the governments of Guatemala, Haiti, Argentina, and Chile in this hemisphere, as well as with the governments of South Korea and the Philippines, falls within this framework. Aid to such regimes, including the provision of weapons that can be used against domestic dissidents, is regarded as good public policy. For this reason, President Reagan

[13] Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Dissent on Radio Plan," *New York Times*, 29 October 1981.

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fought—unsuccessfully—to prevent any tie-in between the human-rights situation in El Salvador and U.S. military assistance.[14] A recent memorandum by former Deputy Secretary of State William Clark and approved by Secretary Haig commits the administration to "acknowledg[ing]" and "oppos[ing]" all violations of human rights, whether perpetuated by friends or by foes.[15] Yet the administration has not, to date at least, taken concrete action in support of such a commitment. And as military governments get the message that the democratization process supported by the Carter administration can slow down, it seems certain that refugee flow to the United States will increase.

It is necessary, therefore, that the United States develop bilateral and multilateral arrangements that better address and alleviate the conditions that create refugees. In particular, the United States should pursue a set of foreign-policy objectives designed, first, to open lines of communication with sender nations; second, to discourage the practice of persecution in these nations; and third, to convince these nations that it is not in their best interest internationally to expel undesirables and political opponents, including those who are not genuine refugees.

Bilateral Diplomacy

Without direct and continuous communication, the means of influencing countries in this hemisphere to stop either persecuting dissidents or expelling undesirables, or both, is decidedly limited. It seemed an article of faith of the Carter administration that the United States was "stuck" with all of the recent boat people from Cuba, nonrefugees as well as refugees, because Castro was totally unwilling to take any of them back. As things stand at present, such a belief is probably justified. Yet the United States's attempts to isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically over the last twenty years have certainly been major factors contributing to America's current limited diplomatic leverage with Castro. By pursuing a policy favoring confrontation rather than compromise, the United States has encouraged unilateral activity on Castro's part, some of which reflects long-standing political antagonisms. Adverse effects of this activity in the United States frequently have been compounded because the closing of direct diplomatic channels has had as one of its results the denial of intelligence information to American planners. The recent Cuban migration was unexpected; if further migration occurs, its magnitude is likely to remain a mystery until the last boat docks.

Full and adequate diplomatic relations with Cuba are likely to provide a firmer and more satisfactory basis for reaching an accommodation with the Castro regime than the current hard line ever can. This fact was apparently

[14] See "Reagan Plan Rejected: Senate Votes Terms for Salvadoran Aid," *Washington Post*, 25 September 1981.

[15] "Excerpts from State Department Memo on Human Rights," *New York Times*, 5 November 1981.

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recognized by the Carter administration, which attempted during its first years in office to secure a better diplomatic modus vivendi with the Castro regime than had existed since 1959. The failure of that effort, which anticipated by only a few months the onset of the 1980 Cuban boatlift, does not detract from the importance of the goal. Normalized relationships between the two countries will give the United States the opportunity to enter into direct negotiations with Cuba concerning the status of Cuban prisoners and mental defectives currently confined in American institutions. Such improved relations will also permit the United States to explain more clearly its concerns about unregulated refugee flow and the conditions that promote it and will have the added advantage of providing the kinds of information required to predict problems before they become insurmountable. Normalized relations will also provide a better, less inherently threatening way of raising the issue of human-rights violations that create refugees than is possible through other vehicles, such as the propaganda broadcasts that the Reagan administration currently plans to beam into Cuba. Similarly, it must be the goal of the United States government to maintain full and adequate diplomatic relationships with every nation in Central America and the Caribbean, whatever their political tendencies, since each has the potential either to send refugees seeking asylum to the United States or to act as a conduit during periods of economic or political upheaval.

Bilateral and Multilateral Development Assistance

A point that is too seldom emphasized is the *indirect* nature of the relationship between the level and type of development assistance and the expansion or contraction of refugee flow. For example, money given or lent to Haiti to build roads or irrigate farms is not the equivalent of money used to purchase food or shelter or medical supplies for those fleeing from persecution in Ethiopia or Cambodia. In the latter instance, the expected benefit, although frequently substantial, is short term: to give temporary aid to starving, homeless, diseased people; if these people are placed in refugee camps, those camps are not self-sustaining, and the aid must be constantly renewed. In contrast, the expected benefit of development assistance is characteristically long term, and positive results may not begin to emerge until long after the money is spent: for example, the road in Haiti may remain unused until a cement plant is built at its terminal point.

Associated with the short-term nature of refugee relief are fairly immediate indicators of success, which are closely tied to the *results* of persecution or want. Thus, relief aid can be deemed successful if people no longer starve, have a roof over their heads, and no longer contract various diseases in large numbers. Measuring the success of development assistance is always difficult. It becomes even more so when such assistance is linked to policy expectations in the human-rights and refugee areas.

The lack of a direct, general relationship between development assistance and

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persecution does not mean, however, that all types of assistance are equally likely to be used for persecution as for nonpersecutive ends. For example, military aid, especially programs directed to support police or internal security forces of repressive regimes, is liable to be used to suppress dissent. Nonmilitary aid directed to traditional holders of power and wealth may "trickle down" to farmers and laborers, slowly bettering their standard of living, but actually widening the disparity between the living conditions of the rich and the poor. In the long run, such aid is likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate the tensions between the haves and have-nots, and thus, make persecution more, rather than less, likely. Nonmilitary aid directed toward the disadvantaged is likely to offend traditional elites and thus could trigger repression. Yet in the long run, it is only this type of aid that is likely to defuse the explosive mix of privilege and poverty endemic in so many countries of the Caribbean and Central America. Periodically ignited by political events common to the region, such as the spread of Castro's theories of social revolution, or specific to a particular country, such as the assassination in January 1978 of Nicaragua's leading opposition spokesman, that mix, unless reformulated, will continue to produce refugees who are victimized by recurrent waves of repression and thus are anxious to come to the United States.

Development assistance directed toward the poor of the region can therefore serve a significant, although indirect, role in eventually reducing refugee flow. Yet because the effect of such aid is indirect, and thus may take a number of years to unfold fully, such programs as are developed with the objective of reducing the flow of refugees should be given ample opportunity to work before being curtailed or terminated. Because it is clear that the United States lacks the resources to finance sweeping social changes throughout the Caribbean and Central America, it should choose its target countries carefully, focusing most of its attention on nations that are either already refugee senders or likely to become so. U.S. policymakers should also make a special effort to promote social reform at the grass-roots level in Haiti and Jamaica, both of which are likely to be significant refugee senders in the 1980s.

For many of the same considerations that warrant the "targeting" of bilateral development assistance, the United States should also become more heavily involved in multilateral development programs than it has in the recent past. The Reagan administration's approach to date is highly equivocal. On one hand, it has offered increased economic assistance to the government of El Salvador and joined in the multilateral North-South dialogue initiated at the Cancun conference held on 22–23 October 1981. Yet at that conference, Reagan made no pledge to a new international aid program, much less to the "New International Economic Order" favored by the poorer participating nations. The present administration has also reached an understanding with Mexico and Venezuela to cooperate in devising aid programs for the nations of the Western Hemisphere. The only aid contemplated by the administration, however, appears to be loan guarantees that, among other things, will enable U.S. businesses to expand their markets throughout the region.

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It is through lending agencies such as the World Bank and through regional development institutions that the appropriate type and level of aid can best be initiated, and the cost and risks associated with such aid best distributed. Although these institutions are hardly apolitical, they can be expected to put greater emphasis on long-term development goals than on short-term trade advantages to the lender. Linking these development goals to current concerns about human rights in desperately poor countries such as Haiti, however, is likely to prove as difficult for international assistance authorities as it is for the United States Congress. Clearly, recipient nations must not only meet requirements for financial accountability, they must also give reasonable assurances that this assistance will not be used to strengthen their repressive capabilities. Yet properly designed and monitored aid programs can both contribute very materially to the economic and social well-being of a population and substantially strengthen ground-level participatory institutions despite efforts of a repressive regime to misuse them.

Bilateral Military Assistance

Perhaps the most obvious source of bilateral leverage is with regard to U.S. military assistance. In general, the United States should seek to dissociate itself from repression by denying exports of arms, munitions, and military or police equipment to the military or police forces in countries where human rights are known to be violated or where the record is questionable. Such sanctions are already required by U.S. law; yet such legislation has been applied inconsistently, particularly in cases where other U.S. interests such as the regional balance of power, U.S. base rights, and continued constructive bilateral relations are perceived to be at stake.

Many of the countries in this hemisphere have a long tradition of military rule, sometimes only intermittently replaced by more democratic forms of government. Individuals such as Pinochet, Batista, Trujillo, and the Somozas have all demonstrated how the military can be turned into an instrument of systematic persecution. Thus, military power in all of Latin America, although sometimes relatively benign, has the potential to be used, not to counter external threats, but to repress internal dissent. The recent spread of terrorism, in some instances clearly supported from abroad, has tended to obscure the boundary between the two. As recent events in Argentina, El Salvador, and Guatemala illustrate, the military reaction to such terrorism, however much it may be motivated by fears of Marxist revolution, can seriously and systematically undermine political and other human rights and help create large numbers of potential refugees.

Military dictatorships will continue to seize power in Latin America and they will continue to exercise that power according to their own political views whether or not the United States provides military assistance. Yet the scope of that power, and the regimes' ability to use it directly against domestic dissidents, will often depend on the amount and nature of U.S. military assistance being

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received. In general, U.S. programs that support police or internal security forces of repressive regimes contribute to the capacity of—and serve to legitimize the efforts of—those regimes to control and suppress dissent. Despite recent efforts made by the Congress to curb U.S. military assistance to repressive regimes, undemocratic leaders such as Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran were able to purchase unlimited quantities of gas masks, gas riot grenades, and riot control munitions through the U.S. Commercial Sales program to maintain power and repress political dissent right up to the closing days of their rule. It was not lack of weapons, but rather internal discord and disregard of basic rights, that brought about the downfall of both men.

Renewed U.S. concern with what it perceives as traditional threats to its national security may create a political environment in Latin America in which human rights and anticommunism are seen as synonymous. To regard events in Central America and the Caribbean primarily in terms of minimizing Soviet and Cuban influence is to pay little heed to local political factors and to look upon conflicts in the Third World as abstract units in a global contest for military power. Such an approach to regional problems presages a return to the position the United States took during the post-World War II years when, in the name of the unity of the "free world," successive American administrations recruited and embraced regimes of the authoritarian right in the effort to contain the totalitarian left.

Military support for repressive and unpopular regimes is bad foreign policy because such regimes cannot stand on their own when internal and external pressures mount. Such regimes almost inevitably produce large numbers of refugees. It is important, therefore, that U.S. assistance not directly or indirectly strengthen the repressive capabilities of the governments of Latin America. Future proposals for transfers of military and security items should be scrutinized with great care to determine if their use would contribute to the repressive functions of official or unofficial internal security forces.

Multilateral Pressures on Sender Nations

More cooperation among nations receiving refugees, through new multilateral arrangements or through existing regional and world organizations, is both possible and advisable. Yet a key element of an effective asylum policy must be the recognition that there is no magical "international" solution to the problem of uncontrolled refugee flow. Areas in which international cooperation is likely to prove most effective include the creation, funding, and implementation of development assistance programs and the exertion of concerted pressure on countries that are expelling their undesirables or persecuting their citizenry. It is unlikely, however, that other nations or international agencies could play a significant role in helping to screen and resettle refugees and other asylum applicants seeking admission to the United States. Nonetheless, national govern-

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ments and international agencies should actively explore ways to effect better arrangements for channeling and distributing the future flow of refugees.

The United Nations meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons, held in Geneva on 20–22 July 1979, provides a valuable example of the possibilities—and pitfalls—of international attempts to influence the behavior of sending nations. The primary topic addressed at that meeting concerned the problems posed by the massive outflow of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos into neighboring countries. The sixty-five countries in attendance pledged resettlement aid totaling some $160 million, and several governments increased their resettlement commitments, raising the total number of placements from 125,000 to 260,000. Conference members also planned a new processing center in the Philippines and pledged international cooperation in effecting sea rescues.

The attending nations also gave a "general endorsement" to the principles of asylum and non-*refoulement* (forcible return) set forth in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, apparently to emphasize their concern about threats to turn refugee boats back to their country of origin and the manner by which the Thai government summarily repatriated some 50,000 Cambodians. Conference members more than offset this weak concern for the rights of refugees to leave their country of origin, however, by expressing a strong desire to reduce refugee flow, a desire that resulted in an announcement that Vietnam "for a reasonable period of time. . .will make every effort to stop illegal departures."[16] That announcement contained neither a general condemnation of Vietnamese persecution of ethnic Chinese nor a reassertion of the principles of Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which ensures freedom of travel. Therefore, although significant positive steps were taken to alleviate the plight of existing refugees, the final results of the 1979 Geneva meeting were, at best, mixed. Practical control of a difficult situation was obtained only by undercutting the basic philosophical commitment of the United Nations to guarantee to peoples facing persecution the freedom to move out of danger.

There are obvious parallels between recent events in this hemisphere and those that prompted the Geneva meeting: the large-scale movements of refugees by land and sea into neighboring territories; the consequent use of force to intercept emigrant vessels; the detention of asylum-seekers in harsh holding camps; and the summary repatriation of the refugees to their homelands with only a minimum of due process. Clearly, the time has come to reassert the principles of asylum and non-*refoulement*. In addition, the recent expulsion of large

[16] "Statement of the Secretary General at the Opening of Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons," United Nations Press Release, Department of Public Information, 20 July 1979, cited in "Refugees—United Nations Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia, July 20–21, 1979," *Harvard International Law Journal* 21 (Winter 1980):292.

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numbers of Cuban undesirables to the United States bears an uncanny resemblance to the conduct of the Vietnamese toward ethnic Chinese. Thus, there is strong justification for a coordinated effort among nations of the Western Hemisphere to bring concerted regional pressure against Castro in order to avoid such conduct in the future.

Yet a conference on refugees and displaced persons can do a great deal of harm if those in attendance avoid the difficult issue of human-rights violations in the country of origin and choose to approach the refugee problem, not by seeking to minimize persecution, but by diligently finding more efficient ways to cut off avenues of escape. Any international attempt to control the expulsion of undesirables by a country should keep two principles firmly in mind: "orderly departure" is a permissible goal, but ought not be confused with denying all egress to those who are in fact refugees; and it is essential to determine which individuals being expelled are in fact refugees and which are common criminals, or are mentally impaired, or are otherwise social misfits.

Multilateral Refugee Aid and Resettlement

In order to deal adequately with increased refugee flow in this hemisphere, it is essential that multilateral aid be made available to other countries in the region that serve as countries of first asylum and, in many instances, as conduits to the United States. Failure to provide aid to the thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans streaming across Mexico's southern border will encourage additional migration farther north. Although neither the Bahamas nor the United States, except perhaps in the most extraordinary circumstances, is currently willing to regard Haitians as refugees, it appears that many of those now fleeing Haiti could fall within the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Consideration should be given to the establishment of an international refugee aid program in the Bahamas. Such a program could pave the way for a more humanitarian evaluation of the Haitian situation in the financially overburdened Bahamas and could ultimately slow the flow of refugees to the United States.

To the fullest extent possible, efforts should also be made to share the burden of resettling refugees, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere. The recent record, however, is not very encouraging. When some 10,000 Cubans occupied the Peruvian embassy grounds in April 1980, efforts were made to resettle them. The plan initially had called for nearly all the refugees to go to Costa Rica, but before the airlift to Costa Rica ceased to function, the United States promised to take in 3,500 Cubans; Peru said it would accept 1,000; and Costa Rica, Spain, Ecuador, Argentina, Canada, and Belgium offered homes to another 1,750; this left several thousand Cubans with no place to go.

The subsequent mass migration of Cubans, beginning in April of 1980, had as its exclusive object resettlement in the United States. Migration of Haitian boat people to the United States began in the 1960s and has periodically increased in

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volume. Unlike recent Cuban migration, however, the movement of Haitians to the United States as potential asylum-seekers has been part of a larger migration that has long-standing economic origins and that has sent sizable numbers of Haitians to various countries in the Caribbean and North America. Thus, although the opportunities for legal emigration are limited, hundreds of thousands of Haitians have left Haiti, often without any documentation, to seek work in the Bahamas, Canada, and the United States. Perhaps a million others have crossed the land border into the Dominican Republic to seek employment. The actual Haitian migration to the United States is undoubtedly much greater than that involving the boat people arriving in southern Florida. Yet it is only a small portion of the actual migration of Haitians generally, and its volume depends heavily on the Haitian refugees reception in other countries. Thus, whenever the Bahamian government has threatened to "crack down" on its illegal Haitian population and has begun repatriating Haitians, Haitian boat people have arrived in the United States in much greater numbers.

These migration patterns have significance well beyond their historical interest. Although a substantial number of Cubans fled to Spain and Mexico during the early years of the Castro era, the United States, only ninety miles away—and with its massive Cuban community in Miami, its former colonial ties, and its twenty-year history of receiving refugees—has become, in the region's eyes, the most natural recipient of Cuban refugees. The recent unmanageable level of Cuban flow gave the United States good reason to seek international assistance, but it did not give other countries in the region good reason to assume a larger share of refugee resettlement responsibilities. Future large-scale migration of Haitians, should it occur, stands on a somewhat different footing. The United States will have stronger grounds for insisting on a more equitable sharing of resettlement responsibilities among countries with geographical, historical, and linguistic ties to Haiti. Similarly, arguments for shared responsibilities will be stronger when dealing with applicants from other countries in the region who have identifiable ties to countries other than the United States.

Steps should be taken now, however, before the next refugee crisis begins, to determine the depth of commitment that particular countries in the region have to their neighbors. To the fullest degree possible such commitments should be intensified by bringing other countries into the planning and implementation of development assistance programs targeted on probable sender nations and by developing aid programs specifically keyed to the problems of other receiver nations. Steps should also be taken now to establish a program for screening refugee applicants either in their country of origin or in some other locality not likely to be chosen as a country of final asylum. In this way, it will be possible to distribute refugees among various countries according to some mutually agreeable plan without necessitating overly extensive involvement by chosen countries of final asylum.

Even if a means of processing refugees in their country of origin, or at some

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third-country holding center, is developed, it is unlikely that the individual countries receiving applications will choose to surrender their power to determine the *bona fides* of particular claims to a collective body. This is not to say that actual processing may not be affected by decisions reached through multilateral negotiations or that UNHCR determinations may not be afforded great weight. Actual screening by the United States may well prove to be a formality in many cases. Yet the same political considerations that favor recommending that new U.S. asylum procedures give the UNHCR only an observor's role—namely, that domestic sentiment appears strongly to favor the maintenance of direct governmental control of refugee admissions—apply with even greater force to out-of-country applicants.

Control of applicants for mass asylum will continue to pose difficult political and moral choices for the United States. These difficult choices are not going to disappear soon, but they can be alleviated somewhat if the nation pursues a vigorous foreign policy designed to minimize persecution abroad, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. The primary focus must be on the reduction of refugee flow by eliminating "well-founded fear," rather than on an orchestrated international blindness to those facing imprisonment, torture, or death simply because they belong to the wrong profession or because they happen to express contrary political views.

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Another Look at Plutocracy and Politics in Antebellum New York City

AMY BETH BRIDGES

In 1860, reflecting on a decade of corruption and misrule, Horace Greeley asked why New York City could not return to government by its "best citizens." The wealthy, he argued, had been allowed to abandon the ship of state for too long, and it was time that they were pressed back into service.[1] Henry J. Raymond lamented, in the *New York Times*, that businessmen were too busy making money to pay attention to politics.[2] When August Belmont and others formed the Fifth Avenue Hotel Committee in October 1859, James Gordon Bennet's *Herald* applauded the "revolt of the awakened respectability and integrity of the Democratic party in New York" against "the atrocious tyranny of ruffian plunderers" from Tammany Hall.[3] Later observers too have thought that the chaotic politics of the 1850s might have been avoided if the best men had not turned from public to private pursuits. The main thesis of this article, however, is that wealthy men did not abandon local politics in the antebellum years and that city politics in that period makes most sense when the political activity of these wealthy men is taken into account.

[1] *New York Tribune*, 16 October 1860.
[2] *New York Times*, 11 November 1857.
[3] *New York Herald*, 1 October 1859.

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"An Attitude of Contempt for Politics"

The exodus of wealthy men from politics is a familiar theme in the literature of the antebellum city. Robert Dahl presented one version of this theme in *Who Governs?*, in which he argued that patricians, entrepreneurs, and ex-plebes successively governed the nineteenth-century city.[4] Sam Bass Warner, Jr., saw the emergence of the career politician in Philadelphia as part of a more general process of specialization and the division of labor. Businessmen "abandoned the city's affairs" to turn their attention to national and regional matters as the larger environment became more relevant to their profit making.[5]

Gabriel Almond's *Plutocracy and Politics in New York City* matched a list of the wealthy against municipal officeholders and congressmen, senators, state legislators, and governors from the city from 1835 to 1860 and found that of 1,035 men with net assets valued at $100,000 or more in 1855, only 3 percent had held office.[6] Supplementing his statistical findings with contemporary commentary on the values of the wealthy, Almond concluded that the "wealthier classes not only retired generally from political struggles, but developed an attitude of contempt for politics."[7] Using more refined data on class and status, Edward Pessen documented a decline in the wealth and social standing of local officeholders within the antebellum period.[8]

Frank Otto Gatell pointed out the vulnerable logic of these studies: although men of wealth were less prominent among officeholders in the antebellum period than earlier, a study of the political activities of the wealthy properly begins with the wealthy themselves. Gatell did so by starting with Moses Beach's *Wealth and Biography of the Wealthy Citizens of New York City* (also used by Almond) to investigate the partisan affiliations of New York's wealthiest men. Gatell identified the party preference of 642 of the men listed in Beach's 1845 edition and discovered 64 percent of them to have been Whigs, thereby verifying the "basic assumption" of "olden times" that the Whigs were the party of wealth.[9]

Gatell's study, however, also suffers from methodological problems. First, a more recent construction of lists of New York's wealthiest men reveals that Beach's *Wealth and Biography* "omits most of the 1,000 wealthiest New Yorkers of 1845," and only 44 percent of Beach's list actually belongs there.[10] Second,

[4] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), chap. 1.

[5] Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), p. 86.

[6] Gabriel Almond, *Plutocracy and Politics in New York City* (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1938), pp. 52–53.

[7] Ibid., p. 48.

[8] Edward Pessen, *Riches, Class, and Power before the Civil War* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co, 1973), pp. 283–87.

[9] Frank Otto Gatell, "Money and Party in Jacksonian America: A Quantitative Look at New York City's Men of Quality," *Political Science Quarterly* 82 (June 1967): 235–52, 243.

[10] Pessen, *Riches*, pp. 311, 317.

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Gatell identified as Whigs men "who apparently were not lured into participating in political meetings but who publicly opposed Democratic policies, such as the removal of deposits and the refusal to charter a new national bank."[11] The newspapers report many meetings where merchants expressed sentiments that may be construed as partisan, but the very fact that these meetings were not openly partisan suggests a bipartisan attendance.

Merchants were studied more exhaustively by Brian Danforth. Danforth searched in political records for the activities of 1,075 merchants he had identified from city directories. More than half—563—were found on the ward committees of one of the major parties between the years 1828 and 1844.[12] Not all of these merchants, of course, were wealthy, but wealth did not distinguish the active from the inactive. Moreover, across distinctions of wealth, merchants were almost evenly divided between the Whig and Democratic parties. Partisan preference was largely determined by the extent of the merchant's trade with the South: the more heavily dependent on Southern trade a merchant's business was, the more likely he was to be a Democrat. The "decision to forego officeholding did not represent . . . a surrender of local politics to other interest groups," Danforth concluded, "for merchants retained the reigns of political power through their influence in [ward] committees."[13] Thus, Danforth's discussion of partisanship, linking it to business interests, suggests a commonsense observation: the wealthy were likely to be involved in politics if only to further narrower pursuits.

The Exodus Reconsidered

To investigate the role of men of wealth in antebellum New York City I constructed a list of the city's wealthy men and compared it to a list of the city's politicians. Two sources were used to compile the list of the wealthy: Edward Pessen's *Riches, Class and Power before the Civil War*, which provides a list of New York's 200 wealthiest citizens in 1828 and 300 wealthiest citizens in 1845; and *Boyd's New York City Tax Book*, which lists assessor's valuations of personal and real property for those who paid taxes in 1856.[14] The three lists, totaling 700 names, reduce by redundancy and the elimination of a few widows to 470 men.

It is important to appreciate the enormous wealth of the men in this listing. Pessen's 1828 list includes only those estimated to be worth more than $50,000; the 1845 minimum is $100,000 and the 1856 minimum is $250,000. Here are the Astors, August Belmont, the Whitneys, and the "Soap King" Colgate—the city's

[11] Gatell, "Money and Party," p. 242.

[12] Brian Joseph Danforth, "The Influence of Socio-Economic Factors upon Political Behavior: A Quantitative Look at New York City Merchants, 1828–1844" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1974), p. 119.

[13] Ibid., p. 114. For the bases of partisanship, see chap. 5, *passim*.

[14] *Boyd's New York City Tax Book* (New York: William H. Boyd, 1857).

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best-known merchants and bankers, a few industrialists, very nearly all of them men born to families that were comfortable at least, most of them born to wealth. Peter Cooper is one of the very few self-made men to appear here.

Constructing a list of politicians was a more complex task. I gathered 1,067 names from party histories, other secondary sources, diaries and autobiographies, and newspaper accounts of partisan meetings. In addition, I gathered the names of all those who were candidates for alderman or state assemblyman. These generated an additional 916 names. A comparison of the list of wealthy men with the list of politicians—using city directories and contextual description for verification—revealed that 103 of the 470 men of wealth, or 21 percent, were active in party politics. Saloonkeepers and political appointees aside, it would be difficult to find another group in the city that so devoted its energies to partisan combat.

Moreover, the representation of wealth in partisan activities would be greater if the activity or representation of families and firms rather than individuals were examined. While individual Thornes, Rhinelanders, Schermerhorns, and Schieffelins on the list of the wealthiest were not politically active, among their uncles, brothers, sons, and in-laws there were men who were politically prominent. If families were examined the list of the wealthy would decrease from 470 to about 410, and the number active in politics would very likely double. And since the list of politicians is not a complete list of those who were active in party politics there are doubtless other wealthy men who were active but whose participation was overlooked.

Who were the wealthy partisans? The 103 wealthy party activists represent all the important sources of wealth and are not very different from the apolitical men of the same class. Included among the partisans are industrialist James P. Allaire; shipbuilders William Webb and Henry Eckford; bankers Stephen Allen, Saul Alley, J.Q. Jones, James Gore King, and Edward Prime; manufacturers Alonzo Alvord, William Colgate, and Peter Cooper; financiers John J. Astor, William B. Astor, and August Belmont; merchants William H. Aspinwall, Philip Hone, John Hone, Isaac Hone, Samuel Judd, Moses Grinnell, Anson Phelps, and A.T. Stewart; and men of diversified interests like Samuel Ruggles and George Law. As Dahl observed, the entrepreneur-industrialists taking offices abandoned by plutocrats simply did not have as much money as the men on this list.

Which parties did men of wealth belong to? All of them. If all of the affiliations of wealthy partisans are examined (some men changed parties and are counted more than once here) fifty-one were Democrats, thirty were Whigs, two were Workingmen, eleven were American Republicans or Know-Nothings, twenty-two were Reformers, and ten were Republicans; four had run for office before 1834, and since there were no parties then, but only factions, they cannot be properly said to have had a party affiliation. Looking only at that affiliation that lasted longest for each man does not change the distribution a great deal: the 103 activists included forty-six Democrats, twenty-five Whigs, six nativists,

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eighteen Reformers, four Republicans, and the four men without party identification.

The predominance of Democrats here is in part an artifact of the longevity of that party, and a better sense of party affiliations and the shift in affiliations can be gained by looking at partisanship in each decade. In the 1830s, men of wealth, like the city's electorate, favored the Democrats: of the twenty men with party affiliations between 1834 and 1840, twelve were Democrats and eight were Whigs. In the forties, and probably beginning with the revolt of the conservative Democrats against the removal of deposits in 1838, plutocrats distinguished themselves from the electorate as a whole by favoring the Whigs sixteen to nine.

In the 1850s, particularly at the end of the decade when the struggle for control of the national government intensified, Democrats experienced a new infusion of wealth, claiming seventeen of the very wealthy to the four Republicans and one die-hard Whig. This Democratic predominance did not mean unity, however, for during most of the 1850s New York's wealthy partisans were as much affected by the disarray of the national party system as were the city's career politicians. There was a consensus on fundamentals: Philip Foner has documented the fear of "Black Republicanism" among New York's businessmen and their bipartisan efforts to avert a break with the South.[15] The other side of support for the Missouri Compromise, the Union Safety Committee, the petitions to Washington, the assurances to the South, and the great Castle Garden Meetings, however, was a series of *partisan* efforts. For finally, the fate of the Union depended on who ran the national government. Only twice, in the state elections of 1850 and at the last moment, in the presidential election of 1860, did the consensus on fundamentals evince unity on the electoral ticket. For most of the 1850s, men of wealth like other men differed on the best candidate and the party to implement their agreement. John A. Thomas, Myndert Van Schaick, and Prosper Wetmore worked for William Marcy's nomination for the presidency on the Democratic ticket in 1852; Belmont worked for James Buchanan; "steamboat Democrats" supported Stephen A. Douglas.[16] Whigs Ketchum, Grinnell, and Minturn hoped Webster would be their candidate; Henry Brevoort, Shepherd Knapp, and Hugh Maxwell worked for Millard Fillmore.[17] In 1856 some former Whigs so feared a Republican victory that they supported Buchanan; Ruggles and other die-hard anti-Republican Whigs worked for Fillmore.[18] In city contests Francis B. Cutting, Thomas Suffern, and John Anderson supported the Hard Shells; Edward Phillips and Royal Phelps the Soft Shells; and Ruggles and others worked to keep the Silver-Grey

[15] Philip Foner, *Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968).

[16] Ibid., pp. 82–83.

[17] Ibid., pp. 81–82, n. 82; 152, 153.

[18] Ibid., pp. 132, 100.

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Whigs alive.[19] In sum, no party in the antebellum period had a monopoly of plutocratic loyalties.

Activities in the Parties

Wealthy men demonstrated their commitment to party ascendancy in a variety of ways. The frequency with which men on the list of the wealthy ran for office declined from thirty-two during the years 1828 to 1840 to only twelve in the years 1850 to 1863. The presence of wealthy men at public partisan meetings nevertheless demonstrated their support for the party of their choice. At large public meetings, parties generally appointed a group of vice-presidents and secretaries, positions of honor that served to advertise who supported the party. Newspaper coverage (equally partisan) included rosters of those important personages who were present. From the honorary vantage point of secretary or vice-president the man of wealth could demonstrate his approval of the democratization (such as it was) of intraparty processes. Industrialists Stephen Whitney and John L. Lawrence were prominent in this role at Whig meetings in the 1840s, and John G. Rohr and James P. Allaire, both wealthy industrialists, served as vice-presidents of meetings of Whig artisans![20] Saul Alley and John L. Graham in the 1830s, Henry Brevoort in the early 1840s, and Isaac Lawrence and George Law in the 1850s were among those who supported Tammany Hall in this way.[21] J.C. Green and George Folsom lent their energy and prestige to the emergent Republican party in the 1850s.[22] Solomon P. Townsend and Anson Phelps showed their approval of the Temperance party by appearing at its rallies in 1854, and in the succeeding year Phelps appeared at a Know-Nothing meeting.[23] George Law played an active role in the organization of the Know-Nothing party, and the earlier nativist party had also received the help of wealthy men. Edward Prime, Thomas Woodruff, and Waldron Post helped to

[19] *New York Herald*, 2 November 1854, and 26 October 1855. The Whig and Democratic factions mentioned ostensibly had differences of principle on national issues, but in fact may just have differed about spoils.

[20] For Whitney, see *New York Tribune*, 19 March 1845, for Lawrence, *New York Tribune*, 6 April 1842, and 19 March 1845; for Allaire and Rohr, *Journal of Commerce*, 7 February 1838.

[21] Alley, *Evening Post*, 28 March 1834, and Gustavus Myers, *History of Tammany Hall* (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), p. 106. Graham, *Evening Post*, 28 March 1834. Graham was also the second ward candidate for alderman in 1835. Henry Brevoort ran for alderman of the twelfth ward on the Democratic ticket in 1842 and 1843. Isaac Lawrence was an activist in the Tammany faction Mozart Hall, *New York Herald*, 17 November 1859. George Law was a member of the Democratic Vigilant Association in 1860; see *New York Herald*, 27 November 1857; and *New York Tribune*, 1 December 1859.

[22] For Green, see Foner, *Business and Slavery*, p. 248; for Folsom, *New York Tribune*, 2 December 1859.

[23] For Temperance party, see *New York Herald*, 5 November 1854; for Phelps as a Know-Nothing, see *New York Herald*, 8 October 1855.

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found the American Republicans. In addition, Post and one of the Schieffelin brothers ran for alderman on the American Republican ticket.[24]

Just as Woodruff, Prime, Post, and Law worked for the nativist parties, other men of wealth acted as ward leaders and organizers for the major parties. In the 1830s, men of wealth commonly served as chairmen of ward meetings and members of ward committees. Though such grass-roots organizing on the part of wealthy men was on the decline, in the 1840s Richard Carman served as an organizer for the Whigs in the twelfth ward, and in the 1850s Francis B. Cutting worked for Tammany Hall in the nineteenth. In general, however, until the appearance of the City Reform League in the 1850s, men of wealth served their parties less by organizing neighborhoods or wards than by organizing city-wide committees, meetings, and slates, maintaining communications with party members elsewhere in the state or in Washington, and raising money.

For authors who study antebellum parties this activity has been confusing, and the temptation to infer character and status from party activity has not been resisted. For example, Jerome Mushkat's generally unimpeachable history of Tammany Hall portrays Jonathon I. Coddington as a party hack. Coddington, Mushkat contends, was "an organization man who had done yeoman work in the wards," a man whose "ambition" was manipulatively "fostered" by one side of a factional struggle.[25] Actually, Coddington was hardly a career politician who needed the party for material rewards or social status. A very wealthy merchant, he was the son of a Revolutionary War officer and a descendant of the first governor of Rhode Island.[26]

Coddington was nevertheless a party hack. And each party could claim as its own, men of great wealth whose partisan devotion was well known. From the 1830s until the party's demise in the mid-fifties, Whigs could claim Robert Minturn, Samuel Ruggles, Hamilton Fish, the Hones, Richard Blatchford, and Simeon Draper. Similarly, during this period Democrats relied on James Boorman, Moses B. Taylor, James R. Whiting, William B. Astor, Anson Phelps (temporary defections aside), Myndert Van Schaick, Alexander T. Stewart, Francis B. Cutting, Peter Cooper, and, at the end of the period, August Belmont. Richard F. Carman and Gulian C. Verplanck each began as Whigs and later joined the Democrats, the former spending two and the latter three decades in partisan combat.

In addition to donating their time and ability as organizers wealthy men were

[24] For Law as a Know-Nothing, see Louis Dow Scisco, *Political Nativism in New York State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1901), p. 219; for Prime, see *Address of the General Executive Committee of the American Republican Party of the City and County of New York to Their Fellow Citizens* (New York: n.p., 1843), and Ira R. Leonard, "New York City Politics, 1841-1844: Nativism and Reform" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1965), p. 382. Post ran in the fifteenth ward. For Schieffelin, see *New York Tribune*, 19 March 1945. Schieffelin won, Post lost.

[25] Jerome Mushkat, *Tammany: The Evolution of a Political Machine, 1789-1865* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), pp. 115, 215, 225.

[26] Pessen, *Riches*, p. 102.

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of course also a source of funds for their parties—funds that were badly needed for broadsides and newspapers, campaign and travel, subsidy of partisan cousins in less-wealthy areas and states and, sometimes, the payment of voters. Thurlow Weed related, in his autobiography, the story of a trip to Albany, conducted with the greatest secrecy, so that Minturn, Grinnell, Draper, Blatchford, and James Bowen could deliver $8,000 to aid Weed in securing a Whig victory upstate.[27] In 1838 Grinnell, Blatchford, R.C. Wetmore, and others hired an estimated 200 Philadelphians to vote in New York City.[28] Henry Eckford offered to buy the state legislature to insure William H. Crawford's victory in the presidential campaign of 1824.[29] And much later, in addition to coordinating national fund-raising for the Democrats, August Belmont organized the Democratic Vigilant Association to unify the power of wealth in the city and to coerce New York's factious Democratic politicians into line.[30]

Men of wealth, in short, surely did not abandon local politics in the antebellum years. Local government was important for urban real-estate interests, for street railway franchises, and for social control. Moreover, men of wealth like other citizens sometimes cared passionately about democracy, republicanism, religion, slavery, public schooling, temperance, or the immigrant presence. To further their values they engaged in political activity.

The Effects on Party Life

As men of wealth withdrew from officeholding and from the grass-roots aspects of party organization, career politicians took on those populist roles. During the second American party system (1834–1852), there was an amicable division of partisan labor between career politicians—who ran for office, organized local party machinery, and mobilized grass-roots support—and men of wealth, who worked at creating local and national party policy, gathered funds, and labored at maintaining statewide and nationwide party ties. This division of labor was amicable at least in part because wealthy partisans and career politicians shared a commitment to the national parties.[31] Nevertheless, there were tensions within

[27] Harriet Weed, ed., *The Autobiography of Thurlow Weed* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1884), p. 476.

[28] Dixon Ryan Fox, *The Decline of the Aristocracy in the Politics of New York, 1801–1840* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 417, n. 3. In 1840 the Whigs who arranged this escapade were brought into court. Fox relates that when they pleaded "that the Philadelphians had been engaged only to insure the purity of the election against Democratic floaters who were coming from New Jersey" the case was dismissed.

[29] Weed, *Autobiography*, p. 124.

[30] Irving Katz, *August Belmont, A Political Biography* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 62.

[31] Career politicians were committed to the national parties at least in part because locally generated patronage was insufficient to maintain party organization (at least in their view). The federal and state governments employed thousands of workers in New York City, in the Customs House, the Post Office, and so on, and these jobs were for the most part reserved for loyal partisans of the

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each party because each party embraced diverse interests and because there were differences in the goals of men of wealth and career politicians.

Among the Democrats the tensions of maintaining a coalition of diverse interests were apparent both in party organization and in periodic defections over the antebellum years. In the 1830s the Democrats had three governing committees: the Workingmen's General Committee, the Young Men's General Committee, and the Old Men's General Committee. The last advocated the "maxims of sensible, efficient democracy," arguing that the "wise, intelligent, and virtuous" should control the party. The Old Men's Committee and other conservatives, men like Saul Alley, Denis McCarthy, Gideon Lee, and Prosper M. Wetmore, were Jacksonians because their "democracy and their interests had coincided in enthusiastic support of the Jacksonian assault on the 'monster monopoly' . . . but to their minds an attack upon banking in general and the state system in particular was a menace to their own welfare, to the rights of property, and the good order of society."[32]

The Young Men's Committee and the Workingmen's Committee were more radical. When the party denounced radical journalist William Leggett, the Young Men's Committee passed resolutions in his defense. The same committees supported a law making the issuance of small notes by banks illegal, while conservatives sought its repeal.[33] While "Bank Democrats" like Alley, McCarthy, and Eckford reaped the profits of their banking charters, Leggett denounced the charters as the "unclean drippings of venal legislation." When Tammany Hall nominated Wetmore for state assemblyman in the fall of 1836, other Democrats booed him and other "Bank" nominees;[34] and in the same year the Young Men's and Workingmen's Committees formed the nucleus of a breakaway party, the Locofocos.

As a result, in Governor William Marcy's words, a good number of Bank Democrats ended up "in the foul embrace of the Whigs" in 1836.[35] In 1838 a similar conservative revolt occurred, this time in opposition to Van Buren's proposal for an Independent Treasury. Another set of desertions by "men of quality" ensued, and with Van Buren's aid Locofoco ideology triumphed among the

party in power. In the 1850s, however, as city government expanded, its patronage surpassed that of the federal and state governments in the city for the first time, encouraging career politicians to be enterpreneurs.

[32] For an analysis of the Democratic committees see William Trimble, "Diverging Tendencies in the New York Democracy in the Period of the Locofocos," *American Historical Review* 24 (April 1919): 396–421. The quote is from p. 404. Trimble mentions Lee and Wetmore; for Alley and McCarthy, see Myers, *Tammany*, p. 106. For general discussions of debate on bank policy within the local Democratic party see Myers, *Tammany*, chaps. 12 and 13, and Mushkat, *Tammany*, chap. 7. Trimble's analysis is superior. There is also an excellent discussion in Bray Hammond, *Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 573–74, 584.

[33] Trimble, "Diverging Tendencies," p. 407.

[34] Myers, *Tammany*, pp. 107–8.

[35] Mushkat, *Tammany*, p. 183.

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Democrats.[36] This hardly meant, however, that Tammany was in the hands of radical workingmen, for the "radical" ideology of the day was simply a laissez-faire doctrine that made it impossible, as Bray Hammond observed, "to tell what a tirade against [for example, banks] might mean until one had looked up the speaker's sleeve."[37] Workingmen's advocate Michael Walsh, who was often looking up men's sleeves, complained bitterly in the early 1840s, as had the Locofocos in the 1830s, that party policies deferred to the money received from men of wealth, but not to the hours donated by working men.[38]

The local Whig party was not so torn by faction, but there was conflict between New York City's Whigs and those upstate. Local Whigs were very conservative indeed, insisting on the political leadership of men of means and sympathizing with nativist policies.[39] For their part, upstate career politicians Thurlow Weed and William Seward were making overtures to immigrant voters and attempting to democratize the school system—and, in the end, succeeded in dragging New York City's Whigs kicking and screaming into the nineteenth century.[40]

While their insistence on traditional leadership patterns distinguished New York City's Whigs from other Whigs nationwide in the Age of Jackson, there were areas in which wealthy men of both parties agreed that democratization was inappropriate, with the result that the two parties shared positions that were unpopular. Democrats and Whigs alike, for example, opposed democratization of school management and formed union tickets to keep boards of education at the ward level in the hands of "men of quality." Neither party either supported a popular demand for compensation for aldermen or democratized its internal organization.[41] Nor did either party support the unionization of municipal construction workers, the passage of legislation for a residential building code, or the demand for an end to contract labor.

[36] Gatell, "Money and Party," p. 244; *Journal of Commerce*, 4 January 1838 and the week following; *New York Herald*, 3 January 1838.

[37] Hammond, *Banks and Politics*, p. 576.

[38] *Sketches of the Speeches and Writings of Michael Walsh . . .* (New York: Thomas McSpedon, 1843), p. 12.

[39] The Whigs claimed, for example, "In such a country as the United States or England, the great commercial class, like Samson under the portico of Dagon's temple, cannot be struck down without pulling the ideolatrous fane with him in the general crash" (*New York Herald*, 1 April 1837). For their alliance with the nativists see Leonard, *New York City Politics*.

[40] Martin Shefter, "Party, Bureaucracy, and Political Change in the United States," in *The Development of Political Parties: Patterns of Evolution and Decay*, eds. Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 11, and Elliot Barkan, "The Emergence of a Whig Persuasion: Conservatism, Democratism, and the New York State Whigs," *New York History* 52 (1971): 367–95.

[41] The matter of democratizing internal party procedures also, obviously, involved stakes for career politicians. The parties administered local government similarly to one another, and often as wealthy men desired. It was obvious to wealthy men of both parties, for example, that the city should issue bonds to shore up insurance companies after the great fire of 1835, while relief for the unemployed in the depression of 1837 was, equally obviously, properly a private rather than a public matter. Workingmen understandably tended to see this as class favoritism.

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Parties, however, do not maintain dominance by refusing to recognize popular sentiment. The conflict between popular views and party platforms was mediated by career politicians, who defied those platforms and contradicted themselves in order to get elected. If aldermen agreed to cut back on charity, as candidates the same men offered it. If officials insisted on enforcing temperance legislation, they nevertheless ostentatiously failed to do so. If officials of city government denounced disorder and rowdyism by gangs and volunteer fire companies, as politicians they offered patronage to gang leaders and joined fire companies themselves. While for most of the antebellum period the local parties endorsed governmental frugality, politicians of both parties, once in office, sought to expand the city's payroll. In each case the behavior of career politicians meant taking sides with the "dangerous classes," and against the "respectable element." While this conflict was immanent during the second American party system, it became manifest in the 1850s.

The Birth of Reform

National concerns became more and more pressing over the course of the 1850s, but local politics was not neglected. As early as 1845 there was concern among wealthy men of both parties, and men of neither party, about the direction of city government. This concern focused on three issues: anxiety about the city budget; widespread corruption and bribery; and the "demagoguery" of Tammany politicians and their associations with the "dangerous classes." A primary concern of many New Yorkers at this time was the security of wealth against taxation and the security of investments in city bonds against overissue and overspending. The dimensions of the city budget are not altogether clear (and the standard source on the history of New York's finances argues that this is not accidental), but the general trends are clear. The tax rate more than doubled between 1853 and 1863.[42] Worse, the monies collected from these taxes and other sources of revenue accounted for a shrinking proportion of the money spent by the city government. Increasingly, the difference between income and expenditure was made up by the issuance of "revenue anticipation" bonds. In 1844 those bonds covered 27 percent of the city's expenditures, but by 1856 they accounted for 47 percent of spending.[43]

There was a great deal of talk about corruption in general and bribery in particular. It was surely not the case that the sacrifice of the public interest to private gain was new in the 1850s: as far back as the 1750s city councilmen had sold city land to their friends at bargain prices.[44] Yet the increasing frequency of

[42] E. Danà Durand, *The Finances of New York City* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1889), pp. 372–73.

[43] New York City, Board of Aldermen, *Documents of the Board of Aldermen*, vol. 12 (1845), Document 1, p. 8; Valentine, *Manual of the City of New York, 1844–1845*, p. 167, ibid., *1854*, pp. 198–99, and ibid., *1857*, pp. 180–81. (Commonly referred to as Valentine's *Manual*, this document is an annual publication.)

[44] Milton M. Klein, ed., *The Independent Reflector* . . . (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 118–27, 151–56.

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bribery in the city was testimony that those who were accustomed to receiving favors from their friends were now required to pay for them.[45] Solomon Kipp and Myndert Van Schaick, for example, were involved in bribery efforts to gain franchises for city railroads, as was George Folsom.[46] Other men of wealth paid bribes to keep their tax assessments low.[47] By the 1850s, however, career politicians were in a position to outbid men who had made their fortunes in business; and most offensive of all, a bribe paid did not necessarily guarantee a contract delivered! Reformers might well react with horror when men "guilty of dishonesty in business" ran for office in a city that "looked to commerce for its lifeblood."[48]

There was also opposition to the "demogoguery" of Tammany politicians, as well as to their prominent associations with the "dangerous classes." "We should be ruled by men," it was argued, "instead of muscle."[49] "Your character at home and abroad," one Republican audience was told, "is given not by yourselves, not by the best men in the city, not by the best women in the city, but by the dangerous classes, who are permitted to dominate, because men are so much occupied in their own private affairs and in the making of money that they will not attend to governmental affairs."[50] When, in the depression of 1857, New York's Democratic mayor proposed to offer relief on a large scale to the unemployed, even other Democrats denounced this effort as "a demagogical attempt to array the poor against the rich."[51]

The treachery of career politicians provoked wealthy men to form a party of their very own, abandoning—for the moment—partisanship for class solidarity. In 1853 the City Reform League was organized under the leadership of Peter Cooper. At its city-wide meetings and its ward meetings, in its choice of leadership and of candidates, the League was the party of men of wealth. At the initial public meeting on March 5 the League presented an impressive list of vice-presidents; and in attendance were shipbuilder William H. Webb; president of the Merchant's Exchange Simeon Baldwin; William Colgate; James Boorman; Myndert Van Schaick; leading nativist Thomas R. Whitney; Gerard W. Kipp,

[45] If "much of what we consider . . . corruption is simply the 'uninstitutionalized' influence of wealth in a political system" and if, as Namier pointed out, "no one bribes where he can bully," then corruption is itself testimony to loss of control. James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Co., Inc, 1972), pp. 33, 99.

[46] Harry James Carman, *The Street Surface Railway Franchises of New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1919), pp. 47, 59.

[47] Gustavus Myers, *History of the Great American Fortunes* (New York: Modern Library, Random House, 1937), p. 140, 145.

[48] This was an objection to the candidacy of Fernando Wood, who had been sued by a former business partner.

[49] *New York Herald*, 2 December 1859.

[50] *New York Tribune*, 28 December 1863.

[51] *New York Herald*, 26 October 1859. The mayor had appealed, "Do not let it be said that labor, which produces every thing, gets nothing, and dies of hunger in our midst, whilst capital, which produces nothing, gets every thing, and pampers in luxury and plenty" (New York City, Board of Aldermen, *Documents*, vol. 22, p. 9).

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William Crosby, and Peter Stuyvesant representing the Old Knickerbocker Committee; William Henry Stagg and Gerardus Cushman of the immense Novelty Works; merchants Henry Grinnell, Moses Taylor, George Griswold, William Whitlock, Jr; and the editors of the *Journal of Commerce* and the *New York Times*.[52] Nor was their commitment confined to such ceremonial efforts. Aaron Vanderpoel and Royal Phelps worked for the reformers in the eighteenth ward, Moses Beach in the sixth, Alexander Stuart and Horace Waldo in the third, Henry Erben in the eighth, and Alfred Pell in the twenty-first.[53]

The effort amounted to a declaration of war on career politicians and on existing political parties. Seeing that the power of career politicians lay in the partisan loyalty of the mass of voters, reformers argued over and over that "nothing can be so true than that modern and monstrous instrument known as the political party machine . . . is the source of [governmental] evils." The machine and the party, they said, "crushes honesty and uprightness as effectually as the wheels of the Juggernaut does its victims."[54]

While those arguments were loudly and frequently made, those who voiced them were really of two minds about partisan loyalty. Their opposition to the city's Democratic bosses was unequivocal. At the same time they needed the Democratic party for the votes its candidates could muster to achieve national victory against the Republicans in 1860. There was little chance of reformers achieving local ascendancy on their own. In 1853 the Civic Reform League won thirteen of twenty-two contests for alderman, but they did so with the (more or less secret) support of the Know-Nothings. Once the Know-Nothings went public or fielded their own candidates, the reformers were less successful: in 1854 the League polled only 26 percent of the vote for mayor, and in 1855, only 5 percent.[55]

There were a variety of reasons for the unpopularity of the Reform League. They appealed to taxpayers, but that appeal has a populist ring that is misleading. At most, half of the city's voters, but more likely only a third, had enough property to pay any taxes at all. Denunciation of "demagogues" was denunciation of those who portrayed themselves as the "friend of the working man and the immigrant." Denunciation of the "dangerous classes" had a double edge. No doubt many citizens desired a decrease in the crime rate and an end to collective violence. On the other hand, however, the campaign against the "rule of muscle" was also an attack on popular organizations such as gangs and volunteer fire companies. Moreover, large-scale collective violence, like the antitemperance riots of 1857, not only had popular participation but also broader popular support. (After the antitemperance disturbances not a soul could be

[52] *New York Tribune*, 7 March 1853.

[53] Aaron Vanderpoel and Royal Phelps, *New York Herald*, 28 October 1854; Beach, *New York Herald*, 18 October 1854, and 2 November 1853; Stuart and Waldo, *New York Herald*, 30 October 1854; Erben, *New York Herald*, 16 October 1855; Pell, *New York Herald*, 18 October 1854.

[54] *New York Herald*, 27 November 1861.

[55] *New York Tribune*, 9 and 10 November 1853; Valentine's *Manual, 1857*, pp. 357–58.

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found who would testify against the rioters.) The characteristic Democratic response to the Reform League is captured in the election of 1861: Reformers supported their candidate by forming a Taxpayers Association; Democrats responded by creating a Rentpayers Association.[56] Reformers' lack of sensitivity to popular feelings led one Democratic mayor to declare that wealthy men were merely "a nuisance in politics."[57]

Local ascendancy, thus, and a non-Republican majority in the election of 1860, required reformers to ally themselves with local Democrats, however distasteful such an alliance might be. In 1859 members of the Reform League explained themselves in just these terms. "It has long embarrassed conservative men of worth, standing, and responsibility in the community, to know precisely how to act," stated the Fifth Avenue Hotel Committee, since they opposed both the corruption of Tammany Hall and the "infamous disunion program" of William Seward.[58] In the face of the great national importance of the Democratic party, they could only regret the neglect of men of substance to control the party in the city and resolved to choose its local candidates.[59] The alternatives, after all, were allowing the city to become "a political spoil of the abolitionists" or rule by the "ruffian plunderers of Tammany Hall."[60]

Conclusion

For many years it has been thought that men of wealth abandoned local politics in the antebellum years. There is some truth in those accounts, for men of wealth infrequently held office and their political concerns were largely national. Despite their failure to hold office, and despite—indeed, perhaps because of—their attention to national issues, wealthy men were active in local politics. Moreover, the dynamics of urban political development in the antebellum period are best understood when the political activity of the wealthy is taken into account.

As partisans, men of wealth left an imprint on the platforms of each party and, through the parties, on the policies of city government. Their presence in the parties contributed to certain characteristic tensions in party life. Among the Democrats there were tensions between wealthy partisans and other social groups that were also Democratic. In both the Whig and Democratic parties there were tensions between men of wealth and career politicians. Once the second American party system collapsed those tensions became manifest in a conflict between the "respectable element" on one side and "rings," "machines," "demagogues," and the "dangerous classes" on the other. In this way the

[56] *New York Herald*, 24 November 1861; *Evening Post*, 27 November 1861.

[57] William Havemeyer, quoted in Seymour J. Mandelbaum, *Boss Tweed's New York* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1965).

[58] *New York Herald*, 1 October 1859.

[59] *New York Herald*, 14 October 1859.

[60] *New York Herald*, 23 November 1861 and 1 October 1859.

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dominance of party politics in the Age of Jackson gave way to the class politics of the 1850s, and the long struggle of the reformer against the boss was begun.

By the end of the 1850s, men of wealth had developed a dual set of commitments. In local matters they remained opposed to machine rule and preferred, had it been possible, to regain personal control of city government through the reform movement. In national matters they remained strongly partisan. This would be the pattern of their politics for generations to come. The most egregious sins of Tammany Hall politicians would be challenged by revitalized reform efforts, but those efforts were intermittent and *never* coincided with presidential elections. Nor were they rewarded with victory. As long as reform rhetoric denounced the majority in the name of the few, the Democratic machine remained unbeatable and wealthy men remained "a nuisance in politics."*

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America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950–1957

BARRY RUBIN

During the early years of Gamal Abdul Nasser's regime in Egypt, American policymakers considered the charismatic colonel a potential ally. Yet by the end of the 1950s, he was the key force behind political upheaval and anti-Americanism in the Arab world.

Events belied American expectations. Hopes for Egypt's participation in an anti-Soviet collective security network were dashed as Cairo became Moscow's ally and tried to overthrow the region's remaining pro-Western regimes. Washington tried to convince Egypt to become the first Arab state to make peace with Israel; instead it played a major role in intensifying the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, Nasser's leading position among the Arabs was gained at the expense of, rather than in conjunction with, Western objectives.

The failure of U.S. policy toward Nasser can be understood in the context of historian Albert Hourani's contemporary comment. A great power's policy, he wrote in 1958, "must attempt to reconcile, so far as possible, its relations with all the innumerable groups with which it is brought into contact. . . . Any action it takes must necessarily be a compromise, and sometimes the search for a compromise leads it into a contradiction."[1]

[1] Albert Hourani, "The Middle East and the Crisis of 1956," *St. Anthony's Papers* 4, *Middle East Affairs* 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 19. For background see Barry Rubin, *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), and idem, *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941–1947: The Road to Cold War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1980).

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Washington tried to accomplish a variety of goals, some of them contradictory. On the one hand, it wanted to show a willingness to ally with and then offer partnership to the new Arab nationalism while building a Middle East regional defense against Soviet intrusion. On the other hand, Washington wanted to maintain its important alliance with Britain and France and to promote a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet American policymakers did not see these concerns—Western strategic requirements, local demands for independence and development, and U.S. friendship with European allies and Israel—as innately antithetical. On the contrary, the maintenance of peace and fulfillment of Western interests required the reconciliation of these concerns. They needed plans for defusing hostility to European colonialism, mobilizing cooperation against the USSR, and legitimating U.S.-Israel friendship. Their method was to replace hostile relationships with mutually satisfactory treaty ties, establish a regional defense network, settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, and build bridges to Arab regimes through aid programs.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had a fair comprehension of Arab nationalism and of these diverse issues, but it was still insufficient to cope with the wave of change and self-assertion in the Arab world. He offered too few benefits for Egyptian cooperation and thus heightened the suspicion of Nasser's Free Officers' regime. Between 25 May 1950 and 31 December 1955, the United States exported only $1.2 million in arms and only $6.1 million in spare parts and aircraft to Egypt. Cairo turned to Moscow for help.[2]

Dulles realized the handicaps as well as benefits imposed by the United States's relations with Britain and Israel and by its demand that its allies oppose the USSR. Still, Arab involvement in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 (the name was changed to the Central Treaty Organization [CENTO] in 1959), which proved so costly in relations with Nasser, was due to London's insistence and not to Dulles's "pactomania." Despite domestic pressures over Israel, Dulles seemed quite willing to pressure the Israelis for concessions if any settlement appeared possible.

Egyptian and American Objectives

Even at this distance, it is difficult to evaluate Nasser's early intentions toward the West and Israel. The argument that his ambitions in the Arab arena and pressures at home would have inevitably led him to increased hostility on both fronts seems persuasive. Yet there was a margin for trial; if options had been offered, the future may not have been so predetermined. Nasser might well have been influenced to maintain a much closer relationship with the West. If peace between Egypt and Israel was impossible, avoidance of war might have been an attainable objective.

[2] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions*, vol. 8, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 84.

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Nasser's alliance with Saudi Arabia (against the Iraq-Jordan Hashemite bloc) was certainly not in conflict with U.S. interests, nor was his suggested American sponsorship for an Egypt-led Arab bloc an innately antipathetic notion. While Egypt's antagonism toward Israel was deep-rooted and anti-Israel rhetoric a central part of Arab politics, Nasser did not favor renewed war. Other Arab states, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, preserved links to the United States for decades despite the United States's policy toward Israel.

Egypt's version of nonalignment might also have followed a pro-American rather than pro-Soviet tilt. After all, though Nasser refused a small American military mission in the mid-1950s, later events forced him to accept a massive Soviet presence. His highest priority was strict nonalignment not as an end in itself but rather as a means of strengthening Egypt and of pursuing its primacy in the Arab world.

For his part, Dulles was not always a single-minded, narrow cold warrior. His shift to a "Northern Tier" strategy (based on a pact among non-Arab nations on the USSR's southern border) in response to Arab objections and his attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict showed some capacity for sophisticated dealing with Third World problems. He also understood the potential of a link between the United States and Egypt. Ultimately, however, he misjudged the nature of Middle East politics and of emerging Third World neutralism. He was also hedged in by the policies and priorities of his alliances with Britain and France and by "bureaucratic" factors, including the slow pace of the American aid machinery. Congressional cold war and pro-Israel attitudes also caused problems. Finally, Dulles overestimated American strength and the ability of covert action to shape events.

Washington was well aware that many Arab regimes were quite unstable in the early 1950s. In Egypt, a dissolute king, quarreling politicians, extreme poverty beside a complacent elite, popular dissatisfaction, and growing extremist leftist and Islamic groups combined in a volatile mix. "Talk of a coup d'état is in the air," wrote U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery in November 1950.[3] The West's prime security interest in Egypt was preserving the sprawling British Suez Canal base for use in time of war or crisis. Secretary of State Dean Acheson urged Anglo-Egyptian cooperation rather than confrontation. Egypt, stung by past British interference in internal affairs, preferred the departure of British troops and the transfer of the base to its own control. When Cairo abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in October 1951, Washington supported Britain but urged the British to accept a compromise solution.

Acheson was appalled at Prime Minister Winston Churchill's preference for military responses. When massive riots broke out in Cairo in January 1952, Washington refused Churchill's request for U.S. forces to help squelch the unrest. Acheson replied that the base could not be maintained against the Egyp-

[3] State Department file 774.00/11-650, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C. These files were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

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tians' wishes.[4] To solve the impasse, the United States suggested the creation of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), designed to integrate Egypt and the Suez base into a collective security pact. A "Northern Tier" pact was a fall-back option. Failure to resolve the Anglo-Egyptian stalemate, warned Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade in July 1952, "would lead to riots and disorders which the Egyptian authorities might not be able to control." American influence, he urged, must help produce a compromise. Just forty-eight hours later, Nasser's Free Officers overthrew Egypt's monarchy.[5]

The United States had some knowledge of but little involvement with the coup. The CIA's Kermit Roosevelt visited Cairo shortly after the January riots, and U.S. officials still hoped that a strong prime minister might take matters in hand. In late March, however, Roosevelt learned of the planned revolution and of Nasser's role as leader of the Free Officers, a group that the U.S. embassy had considered a purely reformist organization concerned only with military affairs. A few hours after the takeover, Major Ali Sabry, one of the plotters, contacted his friend Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, a U.S. military attaché, with a message from the new revolutionary council. Its sentiments were pro-Western, Sabry announced, and he requested that the Americans block any British intervention. When King Farouk personally called the American and British embassies to request help, both refused. The revolution had triumphed.[6]

Attempts at Alliance Building

In his first evaluation of the new regime, Ambassador Caffery considered the Free Officers to be an amorphous group without any program, "bound together by common disgust with their superiors." Their figurehead leader, the popular General Muhammad Naguib, was not "a particularly strong or intelligent leader."[7] Nevertheless, the officers seemed friendly to the United States and expressed a desire to take part in the Middle East's defense. Britain quickly offered military aid in exchange for settling the base issue. Caffery was generally optimistic: the United States should not rush Egypt toward an acceptance of MEDO, he suggested, but it should help Cairo build an effective and inexpensive military force for protecting the country.[8]

As predicted, the new Egyptian government began to court the United States. Naguib promised that American arms would not be used against Israel and

[4] Memoranda of Conversations for 16 October 1951 and 27 January 1952, Dean Acheson Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

[5] State Department file 774.00/7-2152.

[6] Interviews, including Kermit Roosevelt, 20 March 1981, Washington, D.C.; William Weathersby, 12 February 1979, Princeton, N.J.; David Evans, 12 January 1979, Washington, D.C.; Wells Stabler, 7 March 1979, Washington, D.C.; and others. See also State Department files 774.00/7-2352 and 774.00/7-2452; Memorandum of 24 July 1952, Dean Acheson Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

[7] Caffery to Acheson, State Department file 774.00/7-2452.

[8] Caffery to Acheson, State Department files 774.00/8-152, 774.00/8-552, and 774.00/8-952.

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voiced willingness to compromise on the Sudan. Two Free Officers' emissaries told Caffery in mid-August, "Egypt is a weak nation and needs a strong friend. We would like the United States for a friend." Their proposed agricultural and social reforms, they suggested, were the best means for combatting Communist subversion, a view shared by the Truman administration.[9]

Caffery praised the revolutionary regime's performance as clearly good from the standpoint of U.S. interests. Eager as the new rulers were to attack corruption and social injustice, Caffery noted, they lacked experience, organization, and a popular base of support, but Naguib wanted to turn first to the United States for help in overcoming these difficulties.[10]

The Israelis were also hopeful. Their secret approach through Paris brought a response from Cairo that the Free Officers would focus on internal affairs and had no aggressive designs against Israel. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion made a conciliatory speech and privately offered technical aid.[11] Encouraged by these developments and by the officers' reform program, Acheson persuaded President Truman to make a favorable statement on the Naguib regime. Despite British reservations, such a declaration, hinting at future American aid, was made on September 3 and was favorably received in Cairo.[12]

The American stance in the midst of a dispute between two of its friends, Britain and Egypt, allowed Washington to work as a mediator, although it posed the danger that both might become antagonistic toward the United States. The first step, U.S. policymakers decided, was to build a bilateral relationship with Cairo. Only then could they seek to solve the Suez base problem and advance toward the establishment of MEDO. U.S. officials considered the extension of American aid and support for Naguib and the Free Officers the best approach toward these ends.[13] As expected, Naguib requested American military supplies and financial assistance, offering in exchange secret commitments to join MEDO. If Washington provided tank parts, armored cars, ammunition, radio sets, and other equipment, Cairo would guarantee that this equipment would not be used against either Britain or Israel. Caffery and Acheson agreed on the importance of quick American assistance, but they wanted more definite Egyptian pledges and public gestures.[14]

For their part, Egyptian representatives said they must be cautious in the face of extremist—particularly Muslim Brotherhood—pressure; they were nevertheless willing to enter a defense pact if Britain evacuated the Suez base. Caffery raised the obvious question with Acheson: Which would come first, British evacuation or Egyptian acceptance of MEDO? Military aid or evidence of Egypt's nonaggressive intentions toward Israel?

[9] Quoted in State Department file 774.00/8-1152.

[10] State Department file 774.00/8-1852.

[11] David Ben-Gurion, *My Talks with Arab Leaders*, trans. Aryeh Rubinstein and Misha Louvish (New York: Third Press, 1972), pp. 269-70.

[12] Memorandum of 8 September 1952, Dean Acheson Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

[13] State Department files 774.00/9-752, 774.00/9-952, and 774.00/9-1152.

[14] State Department files 611.74/9-2652 and 611.74/10-252.

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Equally serious was the Free Officers' ignorance of American aid procedures and Naguib's limited power within the junta. Nasser was more skeptical about an American alliance. He needed arms to ensure the military's loyalty, he said, but was not prepared to alienate supporters by making concessions without firmer prospects of aid. Washington's dispatch of some equipment originally promised to the royal government was not enough to quell Cairo's increasing signs of impatience.[15]

The Truman administration's lame-duck status further delayed matters. In November 1952, Truman's Deputy Secretary of Defense William Foster visited Egypt and invited an Egyptian mission to discuss arms aid. Nasser quickly sent Sabry to Washington. Unfortunately, the U.S. government would make no decision until the newly elected Eisenhower White House organized itself. Sabry returned to Cairo in January, empty-handed and personally embittered. This failure "hurt us a great deal," wrote Free Officer leader Anwar el-Sadat years later, and increased doubts about the sincerity of American promises.[16]

Caffery saw the danger. Naguib, "more cautious and pro-Western" than the younger officers, was slipping, he cabled, and any delay in furnishing aid might destroy his remaining influence. Naguib himself complained that he was being "suffocated by the smell of roses" from America while he preferred the whiff of its gunpowder. By January 1953, Anglo-Egyptian talks over the Sudan and Suez were not going well. Egypt refused any prior commitment to participate in the collective defense of the Middle East; and London warned Washington that U.S. aid for Egypt might jeopardize Anglo-American relations.[17]

The new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, decided to take his time in reviewing the aid issue, despite CIA and State Department requests for speed. The achievement of a solution on Sudan, a U.S. loan for wheat purchases, and steps to declare Egypt eligible for U.S. military training programs would have to suffice for a while.

Covert Contacts

Nasser's frustration led him to his first outspoken public attack on the United States on March 1. America was losing its prestige as a champion of liberty and self-determination, he declared, through its support for "imperialistic powers." Any opposition to the rapid evacuation of British troops would convince Egypt to side with the Soviet camp, he noted, "as an act of revenge for the humiliation which we suffered over seventy years." The Muslim Brotherhood and left-leaning nationalists took similar positions.[18]

[15] State Department files 611.74/9-2652, 611.74/9-2752, 611.74/10-852, 611.74/11-1052, and 611.74/11-1352.

[16] Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 126-27.

[17] E.K. Fryer memorandum 361.2 Naguib X500 TCA, U.S. Embassy files, Washington National Records Center (hereafter WNRC), Washington, D.C.

[18] Quoted in State Department file 611.74/3-253.

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Muhammad Hussanein Heikal, Nasser's trusted adviser, explained that the Arabs wanted a defense against America's friends as well as against its enemies. "You will never be able to get the oil of the Middle East if its people revolt against you, and you will not be able to defend the Middle East if its people do not side with you. . . . Either you win us forever, or you lose us forever."[19] One way of winning friendship, suggested World Bank President Eugene Black, was by providing American aid for building the Aswan Dam. Byroade agreed. For Egypt to serve as Washington's wedge in reconstructing its position in the Arab world, he wrote, the Aswan project could provide "the greatest political and psychological, as well as economic effect."[20]

Dulles decided to see for himself by traveling to the Middle East. British positions were deteriorating, State Department briefing papers told him, and London's "colonial and imperialistic policies are millstones around our neck." America must convince Middle Easterners that it sympathized with their aspirations and must press Britain and France toward orderly change. Naguib believed, Dulles was informed, that once the Suez base issue was solved he could move toward agreement with Israel, as long as Egypt gained a corridor through the Negev to Jordan.[21] Obviously, Dulles accepted these premises. On meeting Nasser, he stressed the importance of an Arab-Israeli settlement while the Egyptian leader explained his view that British domination was the main obstacle.[22]

When Dulles returned home he abandoned the MEDO plan and adopted the Northern Tier option, a pact aimed at blocking any Soviet advance through the bordering non-Arab states. Dulles also increased efforts to win British concessions on the Suez base and promised U.S. aid to Egypt as soon as a treaty was signed to resolve that matter.[23]

While Anglo-Egyptian negotiations dragged, covert Egypt-Israel contacts moved even more slowly. Nasser's speeches on the subject became sharper, but Foreign Minister Muhammad Fawzi, speaking to U.N. official Ralph Bunche, suggested that "Egypt can accept one partition but not two," explaining why Cairo wanted a Negev corridor to link it with the eastern Arab states. These feelers were abandoned when they were leaked to the press, yet Bunche and the State Department agreed that an Arab-Israeli settlement might be within reach.[24]

[19] *Akhir Lahza* (Cairo), 8 April 1953, cited in translation in State Department file 611.74/4-1153.

[20] Black memorandum of 22 April 1953, Ann Whitman File, Box 8, Folder 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDE Library), Abilene, Kan.; see also Byroade to Smith, State Department file 611.74/4-2853.

[21] "Conclusions on Trip" and "Important Points of Trip," John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. (hereafter Dulles Papers).

[22] State Department file 110.11-DU/5-1253 #2417. Naguib told him, "After the British get out, I am pretty sure I can reach an agreement" with Israel.

[23] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions,* vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 439-43; see also Caffery to Dulles, 10 July 1953, Eisenhower to Naguib, 15 July 1953, Dulles to Eisenhower, 15 July 1953, Eisenhower Papers, International Series, Box 8, File Egypt (1), DDE Library.

[24] Reports of 28 August 1953 and 10 September 1953, U.S. Embassy files, Box 2667, file 320 Egypt-Israel, WNRC.

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By the end of 1953, however, Egypt had gone fourteen months without any significant American aid. "America will not please us to infuriate Britain," Nasser complained in a November speech, privately adding that Egypt might adopt "positive neutralism" in the East-West conflict. Another secret request from Naguib seeking badly needed economic assistance met with little response from Washington.[25]

Better contacts were maintained through back channels. Kermit Roosevelt first met Nasser in January 1953, and from that time on CIA officers kept in close contact with him. At one point, the CIA passed $3 million to Nasser, a grant he saw as an attempted bribe. Nasser used the money to build a tower in Cairo, as a sign of his contempt for the bid. According to one participant, Miles Copeland, the CIA gave the Free Officers a great deal of organizational, logistical, and even ideological advice through 1953 and 1954. Several firsthand sources play down the extent and importance of these covert operations. Still, the effect of this special relationship was to feed American hopes that a de facto alliance was within reach.[26]

Yet with Anglo-Egyptian negotiations dragging on into 1954, this covert relationship could lead nowhere. Ostensibly, only minor issues separated the two sides, but Egyptian domestic pressures against concessions and British confidence that Cairo would soon yield prompted intransigence on both sides. Nasser increasingly complained that the United States had joined with Britain to squeeze him, a view reinforced by Washington's sloth in meeting even his requests for economic aid.[27] "It is all very well to speak of extending aid in conjunction with the Suez Base agreement," explained Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein, "but are we to delay all our plans indefinitely because the British are not prepared to make an agreement at this time?"[28]

Nasser's Hopes of Aid

While Britain's friendship was a higher priority for American foreign policy than was Egypt's favor, the United States did not want to see Nasser weakened, even after he displaced Naguib from power. "Nasser is the only man in Egypt with strength enough and guts enough to put over an agreement with Britain," wrote Ambassador Caffery on March 31. He was quite right. Despite continued opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser finally cleared the last barriers to an agreement. On July 27 the Anglo-Egypt treaty was finally initialed. The moment seemed ripe for the long-awaited and long-promised American aid program to begin.[29]

[25] State Department files 611.74/9-453, 744.13/11-2153, 774.00/12-353, and 774.00/12-1853.

[26] Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), pp. 64-108.

[27] State Department files 774.00/2-2654, 774.00/2-2754, 774.00/3-254, 774.00/3-354, 774.00/3-454, and 774.00/3-2354.

[28] Reports of 3 January 1954, 21 January 1954, and 23 January 1954, U.S. Embassy files, Box 2672, file 500 Economic Aid to Egypt, WNRC.

[29] State Department file 774.00/3-3154.

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Once again, Egyptian hopes of American assistance soared. In an August 1954 interview with an American magazine, Nasser gave a very shrewd assessment of U.S. foreign policy and suggested a basis for U.S.-Egypt cooperation. Like Naguib, Nasser argued that alignment with the West must proceed slowly. He favored an independent Arab bloc that would receive Western arms alongside a separate Northern Tier pact without any Arab members. In a bow to American sensibilities, he promised not to recognize the Peking regime in the near future and to consult Washington before taking any such step.

Past imperialism had made the Arabs suspicious of the West, Nasser explained, and defense must be mainly implemented by the area's own people. Too close an alliance would give the Communists the chance to take an ultranationalist line and to overthrow existing governments. Foreign bases symbolized occupation, foreign occupation caused hatred, and hatred meant noncooperation. This is why he could not accept an American military training mission in Egypt, Nasser added, though he was willing to send officers abroad for instruction.

America's handling of the cold war, Nasser concluded, helped the USSR penetrate countries that only accepted its aid to win independence; Western flexibility could avoid this problem. He cautioned against confusing Arab and African nationalist movements with communism. He complained that Americans saw freedom from foreign domination as "the inalienable right of every man, yet balk at supporting these nations for fear of annoying some colonial Power that has refused to move with the times," a view similar to that of liberal State Department analysts.[30]

Even Caffery thought Nasser's policy "well balanced and reasonable." So close was their relationship that Nasser told him, in strictest confidence, of his plan to liquidate the Muslim Brotherhood in the near future. A week later, after an attempt on Nasser's life, the Brotherhood's leaders were arrested and its organization destroyed.[31]

The Suez Treaty and Disappointments

With the treaty signed and Nasser's control secured, Washington began to move toward fulfillment of its aid promises. In early August, $20 million in economic assistance and an equal amount for military help was set aside. President Eisenhower, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Henry Byroade all called for quick action. Although it would be hard to give arms to the Arabs and not to Israel, agreed the secretary of state, he was willing to try.[32] Yet nothing happened. Secretary of State Dulles decided that aid used as leverage to gain an Anglo-

[30] Quoted in *U.S. News and World Report*, 13 August 1954, and in Nasser's article, "The Egyptian Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 33 (January 1955):199-211.

[31] Caffery to Dulles, State Department file 774.00/1023-54.

[32] Telephone memoranda of Dulles to Eisenhower, 6 August 1954, Dulles to Stassen, 24 July 1954, Dulles to Byroade, 24 August 1954, and John Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 24 August 1954, DDE Library.

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Egyptian treaty might also be used as inducement to an Egypt-Israel settlement, an idea that had been planted in his mind by a number of State Department reports over the previous year as well as by his belief that removing this source of friction would eliminate an opportunity for Soviet meddling and would simplify the matter of regional defense.

There was another incentive for solving this problem: The Anglo-Egyptian treaty removed the buffer of British troops along the Suez Canal which, along with the prospect of Western aid for Egypt, heightened the possibility of an Arab-Israeli confrontation in the Sinai peninsula. Byroade suggested to the worried Israelis that a settlement might be worked out involving an Egyptian denunciation of aggressive intentions against Israel and a detailed Western guarantee for Israel's borders. If Nasser did not act soon on Israel during the "honeymoon period," replied Israeli Minister Reuven Shiloah, he would certainly not do so in the future.[33]

Byroade's suggestions were soon incorporated in U.S. policy. A few days later, on August 3, Dulles warned that Israel's insecurity might lead it to a more militant policy. "We have considered Egypt afforded [the] best prospects [of] moving on Arab-Israeli issues not towards formal peace at this time but towards practical arrangements to improve relations," he wrote Caffery, recalling Egyptian hints of such aims. Great expectations had been aroused in Washington.[34] Thus, two weeks after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Dulles and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden agreed to work toward a relaxation of Arab-Israeli tensions. Eden appointed Evelyn Shuckburgh his Middle East affairs director, and Dulles asked Frances H. Russell, a foreign-service officer, to head the State Department's equivalent "Alpha" group.[35]

This ambitious goal was not the only thing holding up U.S. military aid to Egypt. The Mutual Security Act of 1954, under which aid was administered, required recipient countries to accept a U.S. military mission (the Military Assistance Advisory Group—MAAG), a stipulation Nasser rejected because of potential domestic opposition and as an affirmation of Egyptian sovereignty. He "wanted military assistance without any conditions," Caffery later complained, but Caffery himself had agreed to an Egyptian proposal at the end of August 1954 to increase economic aid to free Cairo's funds for military purchases.[36] Nevertheless, direct efforts to reach some compromise failed. Two American colonels, dispatched to convince Nasser to accept the MAAG, could not move him. At about the same time, Caffery retired and was replaced by Byroade, a former general and a State Department holdover from the Truman administration. Dulles hoped that Byroade would get along well with the Egyptian leader, since they were about the same age and were both military men. But

[33] Report of 30 July 1954, U.S. Embassy files, Box 2672, file 500 Economic and Military Aid to Egypt, WNRC; see also U.S. Embassy files, Box 2671, file 320 Israel-Egypt, WNRC.

[34] Report of 3 August 1954, U.S. Embassy files, Box 2671, file 320 Israel-Egypt, WNRC.

[35] Russell to the author, 9 June 1979.

[36] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings,* January-February 1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), pt. 2:785.

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Cairo's refusal to accept the MAAG and his continued hopes of solving the Arab-Israeli conflict led Dulles to decide, on 31 December 1954, against selling arms to Egypt.[37]

Dulles understood that 1955 would be a decisive year in Arab-Israeli relations as well as in Moscow's use of regional conflicts to gain a foothold in the Middle East. Escalating raids against Israel from the Gaza Strip claimed a growing civilian toll—50 killed in 1954, 192 killed in 1955. The Lavon affair, in which Israeli agents sabotaged U.S. installations in Cairo in an effort to damage U.S.-Egypt relations, the replacement of dovish Moshe Sharett by activist Ben-Gurion as prime minister in February 1955, and Israel's Gaza raid that same month all raised the level of tensions. The founding of the Baghdad Pact as a regional security system, with Iraq as a leading member, angered Nasser. The West, he concluded, sought to divide the Arab world and boost Iraq as Egypt's chief rival.

Byroade, arriving in Egypt just after the Gaza attack, was bombarded with aid demands. The Egyptians, already worried by French arms supplied to Israel, were now convinced of Israel's military superiority. Nasser said that only new arms supplies for Egypt could forestall army and popular support for retaliation. Nasser's CIA contacts took up his cause but, despite Allen Dulles's sympathy no help was obtained.[38]

On this issue, Byroade agreed with Allen Dulles. Nothing would be better than for the United States to give the Egyptian air force a squadron of B-26s, he told the secretary of state in April. As the Egyptian leader prepared to go to the Bandung Conference of twenty-nine nonaligned African and Asian countries, however, the ambassador had no satisfactory answer for him. Nasser avidly favored "positive neutralism" at the meeting and asked Chou En-lai to contact the USSR about Egyptian requests for arms. When Nasser returned to Cairo, Secretary of State Dulles ordered Byroade to join the French and British ambassadors in boycotting his arrival. The Soviet ambassador was left occupying the airfield by default.[39]

Whether or not Egyptian-Soviet talks predated Bandung, serious negotiations began with the arrival of Dmitri Shepilov, *Pravda*'s editor-in-chief, in Cairo during July 1955. While the State Department was skeptical about any arms deal, the CIA—with its better sources—disagreed. Byroade, told by Egyptian Ambassador Hussein that Shepilov offered MiGs and other weapons, pressed for approval of $28 million in military equipment, but the State Department

[37] Byroade to Allen, 10 July 1954, George V. Allen Papers, Duke University, Durham, N.C.; see also Copeland, *Game of Nations,* pp. 123–31; Wilbur C. Eveland, *Ropes of Sand* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), pp. 90–92.

[38] Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, pp. 136–38; see also Mohamed Heikal, *The Cairo Documents* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 46–47.

[39] Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, pp. 136–38; see also telephone memoranda, Dulles to Byroade, 27 April 1955, DDE Library; Chester Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 68; John Badeau oral history, Columbia University Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York, p. 298.

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feared an arms race and pointed to Egypt's shortage of hard currency. The Defense Department wanted to offer some planes and tanks for credit or Egyptian currency, though this suggestion was overtaken by events. More important, the Egyptians no longer had confidence in American promises.[40]

Nasser's policies also made Washington suspicious. When Nasser warned that unless he obtained American arms he would turn to Moscow, this was thought a deception to gain U.S. support. Egyptian newspaper reports claiming that Moscow's arms would be supplied for free and the possibility that the USSR might itself be bluffing also raised questions.[41] Secretary of State Dulles shared these doubts, and it was one of the few occasions when he disagreed with his brother. Finally, convinced by Byroade's cables and by the CIA's Roosevelt, he dispatched Roosevelt to try and talk Nasser out of it. But it was too late. In September, it was announced that Czechoslovakia was trading Egypt $200 million in military equipment for Egyptian cotton. This deal included 150 to 200 jet fighters and 35 twin-engine bombers.[42]

This began the arms race that Dulles had feared. Israel thought that Egypt's all-weather bombers could bomb at night using radar, a tactic against which Israel had no defense. Thereafter, the United States secretly supported the sale of French *Mystères* to Israel. By the following year, Washington was helping to make arrangements that later led to Canada's sale of F-86s to Israel.[43] Yet news of the arms deal did not push Dulles into a hard-line shell. On the contrary, he accelerated efforts toward an Arab-Israeli settlement and sped up the Alpha group's work on the project. If the Soviets began to move into the area and to gain support from Egypt, Dulles said privately, it would alter America's position of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict; Washington might even have to back Egypt against Israel.

Dulles thought that Moscow might have intended to jeopardize an Arab-Israeli settlement. Israel might start a war in response to Egypt's rearming, Dulles reasoned, and the United States might have to redress the balance. He had already foreseen the essential issue of the coming Suez war; his efforts were designed to prevent such an explosion.

These considerations were reflected in Dulles's own speech of 26 August 1955 at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. The resolution of the Suez base conflict and the progress made on regional security, he said, now permitted an attempt to settle the Arab-Israeli issue. The Johnston Mission, which tried to encourage Arab-Israeli cooperation over management of water resources, was well advanced, stated Dulles with excessive optimism. This was a plan to develop the Jordan River, reclaim desert lands, generate electricity, provide

[40] Trezise to Dulles and Cabell to Dulles, State Department file 774.56/8-2555.

[41] Interview with Kermit Roosevelt; see also Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, pp. 132-33.

[42] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions*, vol. 9, 1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 154-55. State Department file 774.56/10-655 contains Dulles's letter to Nasser trying to stop the deal; Nasser's reply is in State Department file 774.56/10-155.

[43] Telephone memoranda, Dulles to Johnston, 18 August 1955, DDE Library.

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jobs, and resettle Palestinian refugees. The Arab states, however, opposed even mutually beneficial cooperation with Israel. The United States, Dulles explained, favored a solution based on resettlement of the Palestinian Arab refugees with some repatriated to Israel, compensation based on an international loan to Israel, and a formal treaty guaranteeing borders. The USSR, Dulles seemed to argue, might supply the tools for war, but the United States could offer a more attractive, peaceful resolution of Arab grievances.[44]

British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who had succeeded Churchill, made a parallel, though less favorable to Israel, speech in November at London's Guildhall. Arab reaction was cautiously positive, and the British ambassador met four times with Nasser within two days of the speech. London promised arms aid and pledged that it had no intention to expand the Baghdad Pact, whose inclusion of Iraq had already antagonized Nasser. Other steps taken by the British and Americans to avoid any further rift included Washington's decision not to join the pact.[45]

The Aswan Dam

Dulles had understood Nasser's position two years earlier and had opposed the inclusion of Arab states in the Northern Tier alliance. London's decision to support Iraqi membership and to urge Jordan to join—as a way of putting Britain's relations on a new, less colonial-style basis with those two countries—angered and embittered Dulles. The British, he later said of these events, wanted a "blank check" from Washington on the Middle East. When London got into a mess, Dulles complained, they demanded that the United States be a "true ally" and back everything they had done. The feeling that London was destroying American influence in the region through its heavy-handed policy had much to do with Dulles's behavior during the Suez crisis.[46]

Nevertheless, both Britain and the United States agreed on the importance of financing the Aswan Dam. Eden positively insisted on it and was very agitated on the issue, fearing that failure to do so would irreversibly drive Egypt into Moscow's arms. Nasser was also enthusiastic about the project. During a conversation with Byroade, Nasser pointed out the window to the Nile and said, "Mr. Ambassador, we're worrying about all these details while all that water is flowing by into the Mediterranean. That's more important."[47] Dulles was of course aware that Nasser sought to play off Washington and Moscow, but the secretary of state overestimated American leverage to change this. He apparently believed the Soviets were unable to undertake the Aswan project. While Presi-

[44] Text in U.S., Department of State, *A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 135–39.

[45] State Department file 774.56/10-355 contains the key Anglo-American discussion.

[46] Transcript of *U. S. News and World Report* interview, 21 April 1956, Dulles Papers.

[47] Interview with Charles Cremeans, 23 February 1979, Washington, D.C.

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dent Eisenhower worried that the USSR would outbid Washington, Dulles disagreed.[48]

Anglo-American strategy was to press forward on the financing of the Aswan Dam and on effecting an Egyptian-Israeli peace, believing that the former could be used as bait to gain the latter. Robert Anderson, a former secretary of the navy and a personal friend of President Eisenhower, was sent to visit both Nasser and Ben-Gurion in January 1956. Despite Anderson's and Dulles's optimism, the mission failed. Nasser could not meet the Israelis, he told Anderson, because it might result in his overthrow or assassination. Ben-Gurion, though more positive, insisted on direct talks and balked at making further concessions.[49] Ben-Gurion's concerns prefigured the coming Suez war. Israel faced a six-month time limit, he explained, before Egypt could absorb its new Soviet arms. Nasser was simply stalling, claimed Ben-Gurion, but Israel could not wait too long, nor did it believe in Cairo's sincerity.[50]

While most American military experts still thought Israel was better armed, even after the Czech sale of arms to Egypt, they saw the new Soviet IL-28 bombers as a real threat. Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thought that without outside interference Egypt would be able to defeat Israel.[51]

Yet Nasser still held forth some hope of a settlement, hints that were eagerly received in Washington. "The establishment of Israel in Palestine was the gravest imaginable challenge to the peaceful preoccupation of the Egyptian and Arab people," Nasser wrote to Eisenhower in February 1956. "But, despite the sense of injustice evoked by this development, in the interest of peace Egypt recognizes the desirability of seeking to eliminate the tensions between the Arab States and Israel." Eisenhower eagerly replied, "I believe that the present time may offer the best opportunity to work out a settlement. . . ."[52]

Arabs worried about Israel, not the Soviet Union, Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By seeking an Arab-Israeli solution, he explained, the United States was dealing with the real problem. Covert actions were more effective in responding to possible Communist takeovers, as in Syria, than any direct confrontation with Egypt. To calm Israel—and thus prevent border clashes with Egypt from escalating into war—Dulles concurred in the sale of *Mystère* fighters and considered providing Israel with defensive weapons against the new Egyptian bombers, namely antiaircraft guns and radar.[53]

The immediate task was to persuade Congress to support aid for the Aswan

[48] Eisenhower to Dulles, White House telecommunications file, Box 11, file 3, DDE Library.

[49] Eisenhower to Nasser, 9 January 1956 and 7 February 1956, DDE Library.

[50] Ben-Gurion, *My Talks with Arab Leaders*, pp. 294–325.

[51] Testimony by Admiral Arthur Radford before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 27 February 1956, RG 46, Box 3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[52] Nasser to Eisenhower, 6 February 1956, Presidential Papers, International Series, Box 8, Egypt (1), DDE Library; see also Eisenhower to Nasser, 27 February 1956, Ann Whitman File, Box 8, Folder 4, DDE Library.

[53] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions*, vol. 8, pp. 10–11, 218.

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Dam. Although the American, British, and World Bank commitment would be $1.3 billion over fifteen years, the first phase only required a $56 million grant from Washington. The administration used all the arguments most likely to appeal to the legislators. "The salient fact remains," said Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, that "if the West does not do it . . . the Soviet block will." But Egypt, he added, preferred the West; if the United States helped Cairo devote its resources to domestic needs a local war or arms race could be avoided.[54] Neither the Egyptians nor Congress made Dulles's task easier. The Egyptians wanted firmer assurances and better credit terms. Many members of Congress were not eager to help a country seen as "soft" on the Soviets and as extremely hostile toward Israel.[55]

Anderson's report after his second trip was even more pessimistic. Nasser "is apparently seeking to be acknowledged as the political leader of the Arab world," Eisenhower noted. Fearful of antagonizing his domestic base, Nasser was becoming more vocal in his attacks on Israel. As for the Israelis, the president wrote, they were anxious to talk with Egypt but wanted more arms and were unwilling to give ground. Peaceful settlement seemed remote, despite Anderson's pledge of aid to both Ben-Gurion and Nasser. Johnston's efforts had also failed.[56]

Angry at Nasser for his recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Czech arms deal, and his anti-Israel stance, legislators were not eager to aid Egypt. Joseph Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told Dulles, "I want you to understand, Mr. Secretary, that we will not approve one cent for any dam in Egypt. So please bear that in mind." Senator William Knowland said it would be hard to get votes because increased Egyptian cotton production would compete with American growers. And Cairo's perceived threat to Israel alienated Israel's many supporters. The Senate Foreign Relations and House Appropriations committees were unenthusiastic.

Dulles tried to convince Senator Lyndon Johnson, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, and other congressional leaders that the dam would tie Egypt to America for a decade. Despite the arms deal, he insisted, Egypt was far from being a Soviet tool. On July 16, however, the Senate amended the annual appropriations bill to bar the use of Mutual Security Act money for Aswan. On June 30, time had already run out on the earlier offering.[57]

U.S. Policy Revised

Yet powerful as these blows were, congressional opposition was not the principal reason for abandoning Aswan aid. Dulles and the White House had

[54] Ibid., pp. 46, 49–56.

[55] Hoover to Eisenhower, Ann Whitman File, Box 8, Folder 4, DDE Library.

[56] Diary of Dwight David Eisenhower, 12 March 1956, DDE Library.

[57] See the oral histories given by Henderson, pp. 23–24, 31–32, 41; Stassen, p. 28; Allen, pp. 33–35; Black, pp. 7–19; Sherfield, pp. 6–7; Hollister, pp. 46–48; collected in the Dulles Papers.

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already developed a major new policy: Project Omega, described in the secretary of state's 28 March 1956 memorandum to the president. Efforts to bring Nasser to conciliation with Israel had failed, Dulles reported; now the United States must show him "that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment from the United States. We would want for the time being to avoid any open break which would throw Nasser irrevocably into a Soviet satellite status and we would want to leave Nasser a bridge back to good relations with the West if he so desires." Project Omega, among other measures, denied Egypt arms' export licenses and delayed concluding the Aswan negotiations. The plan also called for the strengthening of Jordan against a pro-Nasser coup, the extension of American support to the Baghdad Pact and its members, the support of pro-Western elements in Lebanon, and the assurance of military aid to Saudi Arabia. If these measures did not suffice, Dulles concluded, "more drastic action" might be taken, by which he meant the covert operations projected by the plan.[58] These would be coordinated with Britain, whose line also hardened. Nasser, London concluded, was the fountainhead of anti-British activities in the Arab world. Syria, which the Western allies thought was heading toward a Communist takeover, was Britain's main battlefield, but Dulles had to restrain British intelligence from trying to overthrow Nasser as well.[59]

While the British and Americans still hoped Nasser would learn his lesson, they had decided to stall indefinitely on aid for Aswan. Rumors of Soviet willingness to lend the money reinforced policymakers' belief that Egypt sought to play off East and West. In the long run, Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 26, the dam might be a "white elephant" causing Egypt a painful period of austerity. The idea that the nation apparently responsible for imposing such austerity "will end up as a country which enjoys the gratitude of the Egyptian people is highly doubtful." Senator William Fulbright agreed he would be tempted to let Moscow try it. In short, Dulles would call Nasser's "bluff," hoping a real break could still be avoided.[60]

Moscow's denial of any intention to finance the dam on July 14 increased Washington's skepticism over Cairo's options. When Ambassador Hussein, who favored U.S.-Egypt cooperation, met with Dulles two days later and brought up an alleged Soviet offer, an angry Dulles told him off. Egypt was incapable of financing the dam, the secretary of state said, and it was unlikely that the United States would do so. Having publicly challenged Nasser, Dulles felt the situation secure enough to leave on a Latin American trip. Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., called him on July 23 and suggested that the Soviet offer had been a bluff. Nobody expected Nasser's bombshell three days later: nationalization of the Suez Canal company.[61]

[58] Dulles to Eisenhower, 28 March 1956, DDE Library.

[59] Eveland, *Ropes of Sand,* p. 168.

[60] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions,* vol. 9, pp. 514–15, 618–19.

[61] Dulles to Hoover, 23 July 1956, White House telecommunications file, DDE Library; see also State Department files 874.2614/7-1356, 874-2614/7-2056, and 874.2614/7-24/56.

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The American press had shared the State Department's overoptimistic assessment. Dulles had shown neutrals "that it was no longer profitable to play the East against the West for economic aid," said *Newsweek*. *Time* praised Dulles's move for its "daring" and "instinctive rightness."[62]

Faced with the startling outcome, Dulles still sought to avoid war. He called the Anglo-French eagerness to use force and to drag the United States with them a "crazy" policy. Washington's main interest, he stressed, was the continued smooth operation of the Suez Canal. While the United States was concerned about Nasser's activities in the Arab world, he explained, it was better to confront those problems in the relevant countries, as envisioned in the Omega plan.

Dulles still saw some chance of winning over Nasser, who he saw as the only Arab leader who could end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both he and his brother Allen realized that a Western-Arab confrontation over the Suez Canal would benefit Moscow not only in the Middle East itself but also as a distraction from the Hungarian revolt.[63] Accordingly, after the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in October-November 1956, Dulles forced their withdrawal and thus played a major role in saving Nasser's regime. Ironically, by the end of the crisis Dulles had been won over by the analysis of his erstwhile allies who had wanted to overthrow the Egyptian leader. The CIA was also now strongly anti-Nasser, and early in 1957 Allen Dulles and George Humphrey bet that Nasser would fall within six months. U.S. intelligence might have been involved in a 1957 British coup plan against Nasser. Certainly, the White House, State Department, and CIA had come to see Nasser as little more than a Soviet tool.[64]

The January 1957 "Eisenhower Doctrine" sought to mobilize the Middle East against the perceived Soviet-Egyptian threat. The United States promised to help nations protect their independence and integrity against overt armed aggression from a Communist or "Communist-dominated" country. This was necessary, Dulles explained, because Britain's unwise attack on Suez destroyed British credibility and crippled the Baghdad Pact.[65] While Dulles refused to cite any "Communist-dominated" country in the Middle East, Admiral Radford identified Egypt and Syria as the states in question. Cairo perceived the new American policy as a virtual declaration of war.[66]

The wide rift between the United States and Egypt, coupled with Cairo's turn toward Moscow, drastically changed the cold war balance of power in the region and played an important role in the area's turbulent history in the following decades. "When the historians of the future come to write the history of our

[62] *Newsweek*, 30 July 1956; see also *Time*, 30 July 1956.

[63] John Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 30 July 1956; Dulles to Nixon, 30 July 1956; Dulles to Mansfield and Dulles to Knowland, 31 July 1956; Dulles to George, 3 August 1956; Dulles to Humphrey, 9 August 1956; John Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 29 October 1956; White House telecommunications file, DDE Library.

[64] Allen Dulles to George Humphrey, 12 September 1957 and 29 September 1957, Allen Dulles Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.

[65] Text in U.S. Department of State, *A Select Chronology*, pp. 144–50.

[66] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions,* vol. 9, pp. 10 and 151.

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times," noted J.C. Hurewitz in December 1956, "they may well select the crucial period from July to September 1955, as marking the turning point in the evolution of the Cold War."[67]

[67] J.C. Hurewitz, "Our Mistakes in the Middle East," *Atlantic Monthly* 198 (December 1956): 46. The comparison between American policy toward Egypt and Iran during these years is quite revealing. Similar elements include the problem of a charismatic, nationalist leader, a dispute with American ally Great Britain, a U.S. attempt to mediate, and a final break with the Third World leader. See Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). For Ambassador Byroade's critique of the Dulles policy and the secretary of state's reply, see State Department files 874.2614/11-2855, 874.2614/5-2656, and 874.2614/6-1656.

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Overtilled and Undertilled Fields in American Politics

R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD

Two questions about the research agendas of scholars who study American politics merit attention. First, what are the events, behaviors, and institutions that political scientists should endeavor to explain? Second, how should they allocate their collective scholarly resources among the various research tasks?

In his recent article in *Political Science Quarterly*, Nelson Polsby addresses the first of these questions.[1] His list of major transformations in contemporary American politics is insightful and comprehensive. There is no doubt that these "small and medium sized transformations" belong on scholars' research agendas, presumably alongside the lesser variations, fluctuations, and incidents that keep them fully employed even in times of great stability.

This ever-growing research agenda, coupled with a stable supply of scholarly labor, makes it even more important to consider how best to deploy collective resources among the various chores to achieve greater understanding of American politics generally. The allocation of scholarly labor takes place in a delightfully free market; each social scientist studies whatever he or she chooses. But all must live with the consequences of everyone else's decisions. What I know about American politics is largely determined by what others have chosen to study. Thus, although scholars can marvel at a system that gives each of them the freedom to manage their own lives, they cannot be indifferent to how others manage theirs.

[1] Nelson W. Polsby, "Contemporary Transformations of American Politics: Thoughts on the Research Agendas of Political Scientists," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Winter 1981-82): 551-70.

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This article argues that scholarly manpower is poorly allocated among the many research tasks in American politics. Some plots are so overtilled that yields are diminishing and, in any event, productivity is low. Other plots have largely been abandoned, although they still offer great promise. Still others have never been well cultivated at all. Not only is labor poorly allocated, but so too are scholars' tools.

These comments about overtilled fields are not meant to be an indictment of the quality of research within these fields. In fact, I have intentionally chosen those where the achievements are demonstrable. Rather I raise two questions. First, have political scientists inadvertently allocated so much labor to these fields that the yields per scholar are abnormally low? Second, is labor now so concentrated that neighboring plots suffer shortages? These are, respectively, questions about labor productivity and opportunity costs.

The examples that follow reflect my own interests within American politics. They are drawn largely from fields where I read widely: congressional politics, national policymaking, elections, bureaucracy, interest groups, quantitative applications generally, and public-choice theory. Undoubtedly, there are similar allocational problems within and between such fields as the presidency, mass media, mass political behavior, public law, and state, local, and urban politics. On these I defer to others.

Overcrowded Plots

At least four plots seem to have attracted a surplus of scholarly labor. Research on the incumbency advantage in congressional elections is particularly crowded. A decade ago few scholars bothered to study congressional elections at all; presidential contests were the elections of choice. Congressional elections were presumed to be less interesting and their outcomes easily explainable in terms of party identification, presidential coattails, and some residual "local" factors. All this changed in the early 1970s when David Mayhew demonstrated that incumbents were becoming safer and safer, and offered a few plausible explanations for the shift.[2] This launched a wide-ranging search for evidence on the matter, a search that has consumed the energies of many. At least forty or fifty scholars have published or unpublished work on this question.

The results of this research have been interesting and important.[3] On that there can be little doubt. But did this quest require the labor of such a large proportion of the scholars who study either Congress or elections? My judgment is that it did not. Most of the work in this area has been based on exactly the same data sets—those collected by the Center for Political Studies at Michigan, and

[2] David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity* 6 (Spring 1974):295–317.

[3] For a recent bibliography of work in this area, see Barbara Hinckley, *Congressional Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), pp. 161–67.

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particularly the 1978 survey that was designed explicitly to answer some puzzles about congressional elections.

A reasonable estimate is that 95 percent of the discoveries here would have been made with less than a third of the labor force. The rest made essentially redundant "discoveries." The scholarly rewards, of course, are reserved for the nimble who get their findings into print first. The laggards contribute to the sense of *déja vu* in the journals as they expound on their variations on an already well-known theme. Eventually someone cries out. "I am convinced," Charles Jones has just written, "that one more article demonstrating that House incumbents tend to win reelection will induce a spontaneous primal scream among all congressional scholars across the nation."[4]

If deciphering congressional elections were the only need, this oversupply of labor would not present a problem. The additional labor does, after all, produce some increment in knowledge, however small by comparison. Unfortunately, the oversupply on this plot diminishes the supply for neighboring fields where shortages now exist. The problem is one of opportunity costs.

A second plot that seems overcultivated is research on the effects of economic conditions on national elections. The story here is similar. A decade ago Gerald Kramer demonstrated what politicians had long known: that voters use the ballot box to reward and punish incumbent politicians for economic performance.[5] This prompted a spate of research, by a labor force similar in size to that for the incumbency advantage, that has explored the basic relationship in great detail, for presidential and congressional elections, at individual and aggregate levels, and cross-nationally.[6] The latest findings are not vastly different from the initial ones, but the extensions and slight modifications have been interesting and important. The redundancies here are probably less than they are for the incumbency effect, largely because scholars have not been restricted to a single data source. But they are not trivial. A reasonable estimate is that 95 percent of the discoveries here would have been made with less than half the labor force.

Other fields that seem overcrowded include issue voting in presidential elections and roll-call voting in Congress. Each tradition has a long history, longer than that for either the incumbency advantage or economics and elections. For each the law of diminishing marginal returns from labor has long since reduced the yield from additional entries.

One cannot in any way "prove" that these four substantive areas have at-

[4] Charles O. Jones, "New Directions in U.S. Congressional Research," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 6 (August 1981):458.

[5] Gerald H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964," *American Political Science Review* 65 (March 1971):131–43.

[6] For citations to recent work on the subject, see James H. Kuklinski and Darrell M. West, "Economic Expectations and Voting Behavior in United States House and Senate Elections," and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues," both in the *American Political Science Review* 75 (June 1981): 436–59.

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tracted an oversupply of scholarly labor. It is merely an impression. It is, however, an impression shared by others, both those within these four fields and those laboring in neighboring fields. It is an impression reinforced by the flow of conference papers across my desk and by a casual examination of journal articles. A quick study of the last eight issues of four leading political science journals reveals that nearly a quarter (22 percent) of all articles on American politics focused centrally on these four narrow substantive areas. The percentages by area were: incumbency advantage (8 percent), economics and elections (6 percent), issue voting (5 percent), and roll-call voting in Congress (3 percent). By journal they were: *American Political Science Review* (33 percent), *American Journal of Political Science* (28 percent), *Journal of Politics* (19 percent), and *Political Science Quarterly* (zero).[7] This level of activity does not suggest editorial bias. Rather it reflects well what scholars have chosen to study.

Abandoned Plots

Scholars have practically abandoned at least two plots: the committee study and the case study. The study of committees was once a central feature of congressional research. Richard Fenno, John Manley, and David Price led the way with their intensive studies of House and Senate committees in the fifties and sixties.[8] Since then, this plot has been left fallow. While committees themselves have been changing drastically, with reform of the seniority system, multiplication of subcommittees, decline of committee chairmen's power, and rise of subcommittee power, scholarship has been very quiet. No one has produced either an in-depth study of a single committee, or, more valuably, a comparative study of decision making across a collection of committees. What is known about committees in the 1970s is largely the incidental consequence of studies of reform, foreign policy, the budget process, or individual legislators.[9] Additionally, there are a few article-length pieces about individual committees.[10]

[7] The criterion for selection was simple: these are the four general journals that I receive regularly. For each I examined two complete years, beginning with the following issues: *American Political Science Review* (September 1979), *American Journal of Political Science* (November 1979), *Journal of Politics* (August 1979), and *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1979). I have counted only those articles that focus specifically on these four subjects.

[8] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), and idem, *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973); John F. Manley, *The Politics of Finance* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1970); and David E. Price, *Who Makes the Laws?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1972).

[9] See Norman J. Ornstein and David W. Rohde, "Shifting Forces, Changing Rules, and Political Outcomes," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, eds. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, 3d ed. (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1977); Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Joel Havemann, *Congress and the Budget* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), and Allen Schick, *Congress and Money* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1980); and Bernard Asbell, *The Senate Nobody Knows* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1978).

[10] The very best is David E. Price, "Policy Making in Congressional Committees," *American Political Science Review* 72 (June 1978): 548–74.

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Why should one mourn the abandonment of the committee study? Committees continue to be the place where most major policy decisions are made, subject to ratification elsewhere. They are, therefore, the place to view interest groups, bureaucrats, and presidents at work, to see legislators balancing conflicting goals and pressures, and to find leaders shaping legislation in anticipation of problems on the floor. They are the very heart of the policymaking process, as they have been since at least the time of Woodrow Wilson. Their structures and procedures may have changed, but their centrality to the legislative process remains. The discipline urgently needs new studies, not only of those committees that others explored a decade or more ago, but also of the major committees that have yet to be subjected to scholarly scrutiny.

The case study was also once a staple of congressional research. Stephen Bailey's study of the Employment Act of 1946 and Bauer, Pool, and Dexter's study of foreign trade legislation are still classics of this genre.[11] The purpose of the case study was to follow a bill through the legislative labyrinth, to see how it evolved, to examine how various participants worked to shape it, and to explain the final product. Its value for an understanding of Congress was similar to that of biography for an understanding of history. But political scientists have largely abandoned the writing of case studies to journalists, students, or the participants themselves.[12]

If case studies are thought of as purely descriptive accounts of the legislative process, then they clearly are not worthy of scholarly labor. Political scientists have no comparative advantage over journalists, students, or participants when it comes to narrative. But case studies can (and should) be something more. They should be analytic and designed in a way that either tests theories about legislative policymaking or contributes to their further development.

There are various approaches to the production of quality case studies. Among the most valuable are the comparative studies of how Congress has handled several policy issues during a common period. James Sundquist's analysis of the evolution of seven major issues during the 1950s and 1960s is a sterling example. So too is David Price's more structured analysis of thirteen bills in the Eighty-ninth Congress which uses a common framework to explore the roles of legislators and the executive in various legislative tasks.[13] There have been no such comparative studies covering any period since 1966.[14]

[11] Stephen K. Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); and Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (Chicago, Ill.: Aldine Atherton, 1963).

[12] See, for example, T. R. Reid, *Congressional Odyssey* (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman, 1980); David J. Garrow, *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978); and Eric Redman, *The Dance of Legislation* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).

[13] James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968); and Price, *Who Makes the Laws?*

[14] There is A. James Reichley's *Conservatives in an Age of Change* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), with its case studies from the Nixon and Ford administrations. But this is largely executive-centered and concerned only with tracing the impact of ideology on policymaking.

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A second approach is to follow a single policy issue through time. Here the objective is to determine how institutions change, how specific policies evolve, and how the two are interrelated. Martha Derthick's superb analysis of fifty years of social security policy sets the standard here. Robert Pastor's book on Congress and foreign economic policy during the same period provides a second example.[15] There are, then, models of how to proceed, but few who have chosen to follow. The study of American politics would be much the richer if there were at least a half dozen more such as these, for example, on taxation, fiscal policy, energy, the environment, urban redevelopment, and social welfare policy.

A third approach is to examine a single policy from different analytic perspectives. John Mendeloff provides a model here with his combination of economic and political analyses of occupational safety policy.[16] The former demonstrates why economists are so enamored with certain policy options; the latter explains why politicians flee those same options for more politically attractive ones. The juxtaposition of the two illustrates well why expert advice often plays a peripheral role in the legislative process.

The flow of committee studies and case studies has slowed to a trickle in the past decade. The tragedy is that these are precisely the research projects that show best how Congress shapes policy decisions, how it competes with the executive, and how legislators respond to the diverse pressures from constituents, interest groups, and each other.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Congress struggled with civil rights, education, and Medicare, plus a host of lesser issues. Dozens of scholars labored mightily doing their committee and case studies, so that today others understand well what political forces initially produced inaction and later delivered great legislative victories that together dramatically changed the federal government's role in American society. Energy and the economy were the dominant domestic issues of the 1970s. Yet there are neither committee nor case studies to help one understand these vastly more complex issues. Policy analysts have filled library shelves with studies of what energy policies the United States should adopt; political scientists have generated little to explain actual congressional actions (and inactions) on these matters. The same is true for economic policy. Surely these two policy areas deserve more than the passing attention of a few scholars. Are the issues here not at least as important as why incumbents are a bit safer today than yesterday?

Unsettled Plots

There are various important plots that few scholars have ever tilled. Congressional nominations and primaries, for example, have attracted little attention.[17]

[15] Martha Derthick, *Policy Making for Social Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979); and Robert A. Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980).

[16] John Mendeloff, *Regulating Safety* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979).

[17] One still must rely on Leo M. Snowiss, "Congressional Recruitment and Representation," *American Political Science Review* 60 (September 1966): 627–39.

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It is all very curious that political scientists have devoted so much to the study of citizens' final choices between the two candidates who make it to the general election and so little to the study of how the thousands of potential candidates are winnowed down to two. The irony deepens with the recent discovery by students of congressional elections that one reason incumbents are so strong is that challengers are so weak.[18] Unfortunately, no one knows much about the recruitment of these challengers or why some are so much weaker than others.

Similarly, there are few scholars who have attempted to show how election outcomes affect policy outcomes. Most do believe that elections matter, but the general preoccupation with explaining electoral outcomes has not contributed to an understanding of their broader effects on policy and government performance. There is, of course, the vast literature on comparative state policymaking that purports to show how unimportant elections are for explaining policy outcomes across the states.[19] But this correlational approach, which replaces political institutions with a black box, is not very illuminating. What is needed are careful studies about how elections affect the composition of legislatures and the choice of executives, how elections also influence the way politicians think about policy, and how these two in turn affect the way politicians actually make policy. David Mayhew has offered an elegant theoretical argument that makes some of the connections for Congress. Edward Tufte has provided an empirical analysis of how politicians manipulate economic policy for electoral gain.[20] There are also various studies of the frequency with which parties keep their preelection promises[21] and several cross-national studies that demonstrate the policy consequences of various electoral outcomes.[22] Despite the quality of some of these entries, they represent a meager investment in what should be a thriving area of research. The question of how much elections really matter is central to an understanding of democracy.

Interest groups also seem to have attracted relatively little scholarly attention given their presumed importance. Here, surprisingly, the field is theory rich and data poor. Mancur Olson and James Q. Wilson, among others, provide a variety of theoretical perspectives.[23] But there are relatively few empirical studies of interest groups as organizations or comprehensive studies of how various groups operate politically.

[18] Thomas E. Mann and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 74 (September 1980): 617–32.

[19] For citations to this vast literature, see Edward T. Jennings, "Competition, Constituencies, and Welfare Policies in American States," *American Political Science Review* 73 (June 1979):414–29.

[20] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); and Edward R. Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[21] See, for example, Gerald R. Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1968).

[22] Douglas Hibbs, Jr., "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977): 1467–87; and David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy," ibid. 72 (December 1978): 1243–61.

[23] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); and James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

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Finally, relatively little is known about how politicians perceive their world and how they reason about politics and policy. Actually, social scientists may know more about how little children see their simple worlds than about how legislators, presidents, or bureaucrats see their vastly more complex worlds. In congressional studies there are but two studies that emphasize politicians' perceptions: John Kingdon's interviews with members of Congress immediately after they had made difficult voting decisions, and Richard Fenno's intensive study of congressmen in their districts.[24] Both are invaluable. Given that institutions are, in part, products of the people within them, however, scholars should do more. Students of Congress need, for example, theoretically informed studies about how legislators think about economics, energy, the environment, and other such issues on which they make judgments daily—not merely how they react to pressure on these issues, but how they think in the absence of overpowering pressures.

The Nature of Social Science

Not everyone would agree that there is an oversupply of labor in some fields and an undersupply in others. The argument is sometimes made that science advances best when labor is heavily concentrated on a few crucial research tasks because this maximizes discussion, interaction, and the probabilities of innovation. Then, when these research tasks are accomplished, scholarly labor can move on (in mass) to solve the next problem. This notion of science as a series of sequential problems is very powerful in the natural sciences. Modern advances in biochemistry, for example, show exactly these patterns.[25]

Although natural science thrives on this model, social scientists should be wary about adopting it for themselves. The work of natural scientists is simplified by the knowledge that the basic building blocks they study—elements, particles, molecules, chemical reactions—do not themselves change overnight. Deferring the examination of some protein for a few years, while everyone solves some other problem, does not diminish the probability of eventually understanding that protein. Social scientists do not enjoy this same freedom. They have no basic building blocks that remain constant over time; the very political and social institutions they study are in constant flux. Imagine how distorted the view of American politics would be if political scientists proceeded sequentially, studying interest groups in the 1940s, congressional elections in the 1950s, congressional committees in the 1960s, presidential influence in the 1970s, and economic policymaking in the 1980s.

The lesson is simple: the study of political science incurs substantial costs

[24] John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1978).

[25] See Horace F. Judson, *The Eighth Day of Creation: The Makers of the Revolution in Biology* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).

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when scholarly labor is poorly allocated. The absence of much research on congressional elections throughout the 1960s has hindered recent research efforts on the incumbency advantage. Political scientists know a great deal about elections in the 1950s and 1970s, but very little about them in the 1960s—exactly the period during which incumbents developed their safer seats. Soon scholars will pay the price for their inattention to congressional committees in the 1970s. None of these lost opportunities can ever be reclaimed. Researchers cannot return to the 1960s to interview voters in congressional elections or to the 1970s to interview committee members. The best scholars can do is hope that they do not repeat their mistakes.

The Choice of Tools

Scholars bring to their work different collections of tools. Some are more adept at statistical analysis, others at interviewing elites. Some know instinctively the art of writing questions for survey research, others excel at finding patterns in mounds of data. Some construct theory inductively, others deductively. All scholars profit from the diversity of tools brought to bear on their subjects.

Regrettably, some tools are poorly deployed. Statistical analyses, for example, are largely concentrated in a few subfields. They are used to study voting in every setting: within legislatures, committees, courts, party conventions, primaries, general elections, and international assemblies. They are used to explore the attitudes and opinions of children, voters, and elites of every variety. They are used to study government spending at every level—local, state, and national.

Statistical tools are used only sporadically in other subfields of American politics. Few studies of bureaucratic decision making, for example, rely on them, yet the setting is near perfect. Bureaucrats make decisions repetitively on a host of similar items, all in an environment structured by law, hierarchy, and often stable relations with legislators and interest groups. These lush gardens are potentially more productive for statistical analysis than are other areas where such tools are routinely applied. But few have even tried.[26]

The same is true for studies of the independent regulatory commissions. Their unique combination of executive, legislative, and judicial functions, their large case loads of similar disputes, and their careful documentation and record keeping make for a paradise of ripe quantitative data. The best studies here, however, continue to rely on interviews—*asking* officials how they decide rather than carefully modeling the decision-making process.[27]

[26] See R. Douglas Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979).

[27] See, for example, James Q. Wilson, ed., *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980); and Paul J. Quirk, *Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). One study that does perform statistical analyses of such decisions is Richard P. Barke, "Political and Economic Determinants of ICC Decisions" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 1981).

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Case studies could also benefit from a small dose of statistical analysis. Invariably one must explain the outcome of some crucial legislative vote along the way, separating out the effects of party, ideology, and constituency. Statistical analysis would do this nicely. Most scholars use more impressionistic means, highlighting how champions of various ideological causes or special interests voted, or sifting through debate for clues. Thus, there is the curious spectacle of a large literature on roll-call voting, all done with elaborate scaling of multiple votes taken out of context, and a much smaller case-study literature, where context is preserved but with only primitive methods to unlock the secrets of crucial votes.

Theory Construction

Social scientists must not be mere chroniclers of political events. They must seek to generalize and to construct theories of political institutions and behavior. This need not transform all social scientists into political theorists. But it does imply that there should be a constant dialogue between empirical research and theory construction. Empiricists need to design their research either to test theory or to contribute to its further development. Theorists need to create testable propositions about interesting political phenomena and to watch carefully empiricists' discoveries. Such dialogues do not always take place.

Public-choice theory, for example, often seems to have a life of its own. The approach, with its emphasis on modeling the behavior of rational, goal-seeking individuals in political institutions, offers great promise for understanding politics. Unfortunately, the past two decades of research in this tradition have produced only modest dividends. The problem stems from a lack of communications between practitioners of this craft and empiricists who actually know the institutions that theorists seek to model. Forcing such a dialogue is no easy task. One recommendation is for public-choice theorists to sacrifice small portions of elegance and abstraction in order to tailor their theories to produce testable propositions about questions that empiricists find intrinsically interesting. A second is for more scholars to bring theory construction and testing together in the same enterprise, so that the needs of one are quickly addressed by the strengths of the other. Some of the most innovative research has actually come from such close collaboration.[28]

The Supply and Demand for Scholarly Labor

How can one account for the maldistribution of labor across the various research tasks in American politics? At one level the answer is easy. Since in-

[28] See Kenneth A. Shepsle, *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978); and Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), for two excellent examples.

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dividuals are free to study what they like, there must be a poor fit between the preferences of individual scholars and the collective needs for a balanced research agenda. That merely redefines the problem, however; it is necessary to account for those preferences. Here I argue that these preferences are, in part, a product of the peculiar incentive system that has developed in political science.

Scholars generally study what interests them. Their interests, of course, are not constants; they shift in response to the findings of others. When scholars make new discoveries, expose contradictions in the literature, or establish paradoxes, they create opportunities for others to move in and debunk the discoveries, explain the contradictions, or solve the apparent paradoxes. This is surely what happened with the incumbency advantage, economics and elections, and issue voting. Overcrowded turf results when too many heed the call for further research. As individuals, their responses are highly rational; only the collective results are not.

Research projects can just as easily go out of fashion. Once the prefix "just" becomes attached to any form of scholarship, the game is over. No serious scholar wants to be known as the producer of "just another case study." The label is highly appropriate for purely descriptive case studies, and the effects laudatory. Unfortunately, the same label drives people away from doing the theoretically interesting case studies.

Next are the effects of subsidies. Some forms of scholarship receive large automatic subsidies that defray most research costs. Others receive little or nothing. Economists have long argued that subsidized (and hence underpriced) goods will be overconsumed, while unsubsidized (and relatively overpriced) goods will be shunned. Economists will no doubt be pleased to learn that political scientists behave as their theories predict! Subsidized forms of scholarship are relatively overcrowded; unsubsidized forms are abandoned or sparsely populated.

The subsidies and their effects are most obvious for research on elections. Survey research is, in the first instance, very expensive, and someone must pay the bill. Once paid, however, it becomes very inexpensive to duplicate the data files and distribute them to interested scholars. Many universities pay for the automatic acquisition of such data through the Inter-University Consortium and then provide free computer time for analyzing them. These are part of the overhead costs for a modern university. From the point of view of the individual scholar, then, doing research on elections is costless. Complete and automatic subsidization eliminates the need for either grants or the investment of personal resources. Small wonder that so many scholars are doing research on the incumbency advantage, economics and elections, or issue voting. It is free.

Compare this with the direct costs of doing case studies, committee studies, or research on interest groups. All require that one travel to Washington and maintain oneself for extended periods of observation and interviewing. Few universities subsidize such costs completely, and most provide nothing. Ordinarily one must raise such funds from foundations or personal sources. The decline of these studies, given the constraints, is really no surprise at all.

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The contrast is most striking in the literature on roll-call voting in Congress. The literature is vast, consisting mostly of statistical analyses of collections of roll-call votes. Typically, scholars attempt to measure the impact of party, ideology, constituency, and the like, and to infer how legislators must have made their decisions. The size of the literature is to be expected, given that the data are collected by Congressional Quarterly, distributed by the Inter-University Consortium, and analyzed on university computers—all three services provided free at most universities. John Kingdon's study stands alone, both for its innovative methodology (interviewing members of Congress immediately after they made difficult voting decisions) and the quality of its execution.[29] The advantage of this approach is that the researcher can see exactly how each legislator perceived both the issues and the positions of various interested parties, rather than having to infer all this from fuzzy voting patterns. The cost of collecting such data, both in time and money, explains the absence of companion studies.

It is somewhat more difficult to explain the concentration of statistical analyses in only three subfields: voting, opinion research, and government spending. One begins with the fact that these were the first areas where statistical methods were used. It may simply have been chance. Once established, however, such patterns can affect how future scholars are recruited. Those with quantitative aptitude gravitate to fields where their skills are seemingly in demand and avoid such traditional fields as public administration where the new techniques seem inappropriate. Moreover, there is the subsidy argument. Quantitative data for these three fields are readily available at low cost, whereas identifying, collecting, and organizing data from bureaucratic files is costly and risky. Third, many scholars appear to believe that multivariate analysis requires an interval (or at best, ordinal) dependent variable. Thus, one cannot analyze a single roll-call vote (as in a case study), but rather must scale many votes to produce an appropriate dependent variable. Similarly, one cannot analyze simple dichotomous bureaucratic decisions, but rather must either combine many such decisions or restrict the analysis to governmental expenditures that occur naturally as interval data. This is false. Probit analysis and other techniques provide all the multivariate tools required to handle these cases, much as regression does for interval data.

Remedies

No simple remedies for the misallocation of scholarly manpower appear on the horizon. Eliminating the subsidies for certain fields is *not* the answer. There can be no guarantee that killing off that goose will produce golden eggs elsewhere. Moreover these have been extraordinarily productive sectors, and I have no wish to end that productivity. My aim is to entice surplus labor from those fields, not to close them down.

[29] Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*.

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The simplest remedy is to raise consciousness about the misallocation and hope for the best. Fortunately, the profession rewards those who stake their claims in new productive territory. Thus, the incentives are there for scholars to reclaim abandoned plots or settle on new ones, once they see the gold they have been overlooking.

But there is still the matter of resources. Gathering new types of quantitative data or conducting intensive interviews in Washington are expensive propositions. Without adequate funds no reallocation of labor can take place, no matter how much one may hope. Presumably, that means scholars also must raise consciousness among those who dispense scarce resources—universities, foundations, and the Washington-based research institutes. What is needed is a large welcome mat to encourage proposals from abandoned or unsettled plots, not merely a grudging acceptance of outstanding unsolicited proposals. The competition, after all, is plenty of free data on magnetic tape that scholars can analyze without ever applying for a grant, spending a dime, or leaving the comfort of the university.

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Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa

JOEL SAMOFF

The analysis of class and class conflict in contemporary Africa is transcending its "shaky history."[1] Although class analysis now appears quite regularly among publications on Africa, for a time it was largely excluded from studies because of the inclination of scholars to concern themselves with imperial history, ethnography, and stability; the apparent unimportance of class as a major cleavage in African society; and in general the anti-Marxist orientation of contemporary Western social science.[2] Yet, however successful class analysis has been in transcending its shaky history and achieving a certain legitimacy, even respectability, in academic circles, it has yet to overcome fully the fetters of the epistemology and methodologies that dominate Western social science. Though rooted in Marx, class analyses of Africa continue to rely heavily on Weber and Parsons.

This article is primarily concerned with analysis and methodology, the latter taken not in the narrow sense of the manipulation of quantified data, but rather in the broader sense of the concrete and practical tasks involved in developing a coherent understanding of society. That, of course, requires attention to the

[1] Immanuel Wallerstein, "Class and Class Conflict in Africa," *Monthly Review* 26 (February 1975):34–42.

[2] There were, of course, earlier authors on Africa who employed class analysis; for an overview, see Otwin Marenin, "Review Essay: Class Analysis in African Studies," *Journal of African Studies* 3 (Spring 1976):133–38. Richard L. Sklar, "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (December 1979):531–52, became available too recently to be included here.

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theoretical underpinnings of the analysis and methodology. The major concern here is to disentangle the study of class, class conflict, and the state from the dominant paradigms in Western social science that continue to impede its elaboration.

It is important to note here that this is a period of paradigmatic change in the study of Africa as well as in Western social science in general.[3] For much of the writing on Africa, the dominant construct can reasonably be labeled *modernization and development.* Although there has been both rich variation and fierce debate within that literature, in general the search for explanations for Africa's situation focused on the backwardness, or missing elements, or incapacities of Africa's institutions, people, and attitudes. That search has led some authors to focus on institutions like parties, others to explore functional inadequacies, and still others to highlight personality and nationality characteristics, or to an effort to combine all of those. The presumption of sequential and usually incremental change implicit in the modernization and development orientation has directed other authors toward crises of inadequate staging and imbalances between pressures and capacities. It is increasingly clear that studies of Africa within this broad framework, despite their nuances and occasionally striking insights, have proved inadequate, in the very least in their inability to explain the persistence of poverty. Their prescriptions have simply not worked. Though it will surely not disappear without a struggle, the modernization and development construct need not concern us further here.[4]

To devote so little attention to the modernization and development orientation is not to ignore its contributions but to transcend them by incorporating them into a more powerful analytic framework. To move beyond that earlier perspective so quickly is also to highlight the gulf between the approaches. For some, who consider underdevelopment and dependence to be epithets of Marxist polemicism, to study them seriously is simply impossible. For others, notions of modernization and development are so intellectually insubstantial, so empirically unsupported, and so ideologically bound that they warrant serious attention only as artifacts of an earlier era. My own sense is that this second group has the stronger case, though some of its proponents, as I shall argue, are more influenced by modernization and development than they realize.

The prime candidate for a successor construct[5] has been labeled *underdevel-*

[3] See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d. ed. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1970), and Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Avon/Equinox, 1970).

[4] The critiques of the modernization and development construct are by now quite numerous, and it would distract from the discussion of the alternative perspective to review either the original construct or the critiques further here. See, among others, Susanne Jonas, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society* 1, no. 3 (1971):327–57, and Susanne Bodenheimer (Jonas), "The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies" (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 1971); J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Comparative Politics* 10 (July 1978):535–57.

[5] I use the word construct here—though others would substitute paradigm or theory—since I am

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opment and dependence, and searches for the explanations for Africa's situation in the intersection of external and internal dynamics, particularly in the operation of a world capitalist economy and in class conflict at both the world-system and nation-state levels. The origins of this alternative clearly lie in the emergence of the Third World as an important political force.[6] Several summaries and critiques of the literature about underdevelopment and dependence are available, and it need not be elaborated here.[7]

Yet, as Colin Leys and others have pointed out, the underdevelopment and dependence perspective is often not an alternative theoretical orientation at all.[8] Rather, much of what is elevated to the level of theory ("dependency theory") is primarily a radical critique of the prevailing perspective. In this view, underdevelopment and dependence are characterizations of the existing situation of the Third World, elevated into theoretical requisites. In fact, one of the major confusions in the current literature stems precisely from taking what is a description of the relationship at a particular historic moment to be a theoretical requisite for the existence of that relationship.[9] To fail to make that distinction

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referring to a conceptualization within the framework of the paradigm prevailing in Western social science. In Kuhn's terms, that paradigm, a large-scale integrating understanding accepted as verified by the academic community, is reasonably labeled positivist. It succeeded a prior theological/metaphysical paradigm for the students of human behavior. Within that paradigm operate the divergent efforts of institutionalists, functionalists, and others, and the differentiated disciplines of modern social science. It is the failure of more recent work to transcend the epistemology and methodology of the positivist paradigm, despite the telling critiques of the findings within that paradigm, that has impeded the elaboration of an alternative and more comprehensive understanding.

[6] See Aidan Foster-Carter, "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment," in *Sociology and Development*, eds. Emanuel de Kadt aud Gavin Williams (London: Tavistock, 1974), pp. 67–105; and Alfred G. Meyer, "The *Aufhebung* of Marxism," *Social Research* 43 (Summer 1976):199–219.

[7] For a start, see Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling, eds., *Structures of Dependency* (Nairobi, Calif.: Nairobi Bookstore, 1973); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); see special issues of *Latin American Perspectives* 1, no. 1 (1974) and 3, no. 4 (1976); James Cockcroft et al., eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday/Anchor, 1972); Richard R. Fagan, "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a *Dependencia* Approach," *Latin American Research Review* 12, no. 2 (1977):3–26; and James A. Caporaso, ed., "Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," *International Organization* 32 (Winter 1978):13–43.

[8] See, among others, Colin Leys, "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7, no. 1 (1977):92–107; Fernando H. Cardoso, "Imperialism and Dependency in Latin America," in *Structures of Dependency*, Bonilla and Girling, pp. 7–16; idem, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the U.S.," mimeographed (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1976), and idem, "Current Theses on Latin American Development and Dependency: A Critique," *Latin America Research Review* 12, no. 3 (1977):7–24.

[9] The examples are many; among them are Robert R. Kaufman, Daniel S. Geller, and Harry I. Chernotsky, "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," *Comparative Politics* 7 (April 1975):303–30; Patrick J. McGowan, "Economic Dependence and Economic Performance in Black Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (March 1976):25–40; and Richard Vengroff, "Dependency, Development, and Inequality in Black Africa," *African Studies Review* 20 (September 1977):17–26, and idem, "Dependency and Underdevelopment in Black Africa: An Empirical Test," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 15 (December 1977):613–30.

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between form and structure greatly compounds the difficulty of the task of understanding the impact on structural interconnections of changes in form. Underdevelopment and dependence will not disappear when Third World countries export fewer raw materials and produce more manufactured goods (as several have done).

As a critique, the underdevelopment and dependence perspective has been eminently successful in forcing the recognition of the inadequacies of the dominant construct. As a description, it has caught something of the essence of the poverty and the frustration in the Third World, all too often lost in the hints of progress communicated by the modernization and development ideology. And as a challenge to the claimed neutrality of scholars (the requirement that within scholarship there be an indifference to outcomes), the underdevelopment and dependence perspective has forced a recasting of the issues scholars consider important. Yet, however successful, descriptions and critiques do not, by themselves, offer the comprehensiveness and complexity an alternative conceptualization (or theory, or paradigm) requires. As well, successful critiques and descriptions are potentially a trap: to the extent that the dominant paradigm is used to show that specific findings are wrong, the debate comes to focus on the findings and not on the paradigm. One very quickly loses sight of why the findings were incorrect—the failure of the paradigm—in the first place.

Clearly, this critique of the underdevelopment and dependence orientation focuses most heavily on some authors and not all, and on early writings in the genre. For much of the more recent work, the alternative theory is, more or less, clearly Marxian,[10] though the opposition to this direction within some disciplines is especially forceful. The works of scholars drawing on the Marxist tradition for their analyses of class, class conflict, and the state have become both more numerous and more widely circulated in recent years. It seems clear, however, that the efforts to rescue Marxist theory from a period of stagnation (in both West and East) have only begun to elaborate the analytic framework necessary to the study of the African reality. As well, since many of these efforts are by scholars whose publications do not circulate widely in the United States, and since many major academic institutions in the United States have resisted recognizing the importance of these efforts, the elaboration of the alternative theory has progressed spasmodically. Hence, much of the debate among American social scientists is either about description and critique or about mechanistic and simplistic formulas cast in the dominant terminology but shorn of the insight and power of their theoretical foundations. This debate obscures the nature of the major intellectual conflict, which has to do with epistemology and methodology, and leaves scholars reluctant to make the break from the dominant paradigm at that level.[11] In Leys's terms, "It is becoming clear that

[10] In these terms, the task is to elaborate a Marxian theory of development; see Anne Phillips, "The Concept of 'Development,'" *Review of African Political Economy* 8 (January–April 1977):2–20.

[11] Note that the notion paradigm is itself a creature of the old paradigm and will be superseded.

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'underdevelopment' and 'dependency' theory is no longer serviceable and must now be transcended."[12]

Class

A case in point is the notion *class*. Although there is a substantial literature on class and class conflict, until recently there has been little effort to use the systematic analysis of class and class conflict in the study of Africa. For class to become a useful construct, several confusions must be eliminated.

First, the image of an undifferentiated and classless Africa before the arrival of outsiders is simply incorrect. As Bernard Magubane and others have shown, as African societies generated surpluses, and as the differentiation of labor proceeded, there emerged competition over the appropriation of the surplus.[13] Class was not the only cleavage in African society, but class conflict did not await the European arrival.

Second, the image of an undifferentiated and classless present-day Africa, however useful to the ideology of African leaders and academics, is also incorrect.[14] Though the ultimate control of the means of production may continue to lie outside Africa, people do organize themselves to contest for the ability to control the appropriation of surplus. That the contest crosses national boundaries does not negate the existence of class conflict, but simply emphasizes the importance of developing an adequate understanding of peripheral capitalism and the integration of the Third World into the capitalist world economy.[15]

Third, the emphasis on cultural pluralism (race and ethnicity as the key factors in human organization and conflict), though it certainly clarifies particular situations, cannot encompass the entire range of behavior to be understood. So-

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Many Marxists prefer the term problematic, indicating that the large-scale and integrating understanding that is employed includes as well a dominant concern and a world view. Unfortunately, the meaning of the French *problematique* is not easily rendered into a single English equivalent. The important point is that while paradigm suggests a neutral position for the scholar, whose preferences for outcomes have no role in the study, the alternative orientation argues that no such neutrality is possible. The very starting point, in its selection of issues and methods, is itself a commitment to the importance of particular ideas and outcomes. The specific objects of study are understood within those ideas and outcomes, which in turn, rather than being ignored, become the subject of scientific and ethical debate.

[12] Leys, "Underdevelopment and Dependency," p. 92.

[13] Bernard Magubane, "The Evolution of the Class Structure in Africa," in *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, eds. Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), esp. pp. 173–75.

[14] See, among others, Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Bernard Magubane, "The Continuing Class Struggle in South Africa," *Studies in Race and Nations* 6, nos. 3 and 4 (1974–1975), and idem, "The Evolution of the Class Structure," pp. 185–93.

[15] See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Class-Formation in the Capitalist World Economy," *Politics and Society* 5, no. 3 (1975):367–75, and idem, "From Feudalism to Capitalism: Transition or Transitions?" *Social Forces* 55 (December 1976):273–83, reprinted with other papers by Wallerstein in his *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

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cieties in Africa *are* organized on racial lines. Leaders *do* rely on ethnic constituencies, and what people call tribe *does* have importance to many Africans. Yet, that is not the whole of it.

What is involved is the question of where the search for an explanation can be considered satisfactorily completed. To observe that a particular conflict over the allocation of a society's resources is organized around the competing claims of different ethnic groups may assist in showing why the resources have been allocated in that way. The strength of a particular ethnic group, either in terms of population, or critical location, or dominance in government, or control over the military, may explain, for example, patterns of land allocation. But why? Why, in this case, have people organized themselves around their ethnic identity, rather than their regional, or religious, or age, or sexual, or even occupational identities? Since all people have multiple identities, it is necessary to continue the inquiry until some explanation can be offered for why a particular identity has been mobilized in this situation. And the answer to that requires reference to something other than the ethnic identity itself.[16]

An example from Africa's past may be useful. Many scholars have asked why the slave trade, which seemed for a while so profitable to the Europeans, was ended. Why did a British Royal Navy captain intercept a slave ship and land its slaves on the African coast? Because he had instructions from the Admiralty, though in any specific case his own values, technical considerations, private profiteering, his psyche, and even chance may have modified the Admiralty's instructions. But why did the Admiralty issue such instructions? That has to do with power in the British Parliament and the orientation of the British government at the time. And why did the British government turn from encouraging slavery to opposing it, and that not only in British colonies and on British ships, but everywhere? It has to do with a transition in the dominant interests within the British government—from merchants and planters who benefited from the slave trade to industrialists and bankers for whom slave production was less advantageous, even an obstacle, to their accumulation of capital. In other words, the specific actions of a particular British naval officer must be understood in the context of class conflicts in the metropole. That, of course, is not the only plausible explanation, but it does suggest that an explanation that may be adequate for the behavior of specific individuals and a specific time (the captain) falls short as an explanation for broader social phenomena (the end of the slave trade).

Put somewhat differently, explanations rooted in cultural pluralism, whether those of liberals concerned with ending discrimination or those of South Africans concerned with protecting and masking the use of power, are unable to

[16] See Joel Samoff, "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Power in Tanzania: The Institutional Context of Class Struggle" (Los Angeles: African Studies Association, 1979); John S. Saul, "The Dialectic of Class and Tribe," *Race & Class* 20 (Spring 1979):347–72, reprinted in Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), pp. 391–423; and Archie Mafeje, "The Ideology of 'Tribalism,' " *Journal of Modern African Studies* 9, no. 2 (1971):253–61.

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transcend the context in which they arise.[17] If it makes sense to conceive of an interconnected world, if it makes sense to understand the last hundred years in Africa in terms of the incorporation of Africa into an expanding world economy,[18] and if, therefore, it makes sense to study African leaders in both national and international settings, then explanations that have to do with tribe are useful, but limited.

Fourth, the notion of competing elites extended from the (interest group) pluralist studies of the United States is also an incomplete explanation for outcomes in Africa, in part for reasons similar to those in the discussion of cultural pluralism.[19]

This is not to discard all of the insights gained from the study of cultural and interest-group pluralism, but to argue that they must be set in the context of some larger understanding. Culture and interests are not superficial or epiphenomenal, but neither are they independent of the material base of society. Nor, even though it is clear that class interests are often expressed in national, racial, or ethnic terms, would it make sense to regard class and class conflict as universal explanations for all phenomena (a view frequently ascribed to Marxian analysis, though all Marxist authors disclaim it). Rather, it is necessary to examine the interrelationships of different forms of organization and conflict, understanding each form both within its own context and in terms of the larger structure.[20]

The Analysis of Class and Class Conflict

Class and class conflict thus are not alien to Africa. But what is class? How can it be identified? How can class be used as an analytical construct? Much of the work on class begins with a notion of inequality, and with the (often unstated) presumption that inequality is undesirable (for both moral and developmental reasons). All societies exhibit inequalities, however, and are likely to continue to do so. If analysts are to focus on inequality, it is important to ask who is disadvantaged, why, and with what consequences. But the major utility of class is not as a tool for the study of inequality, but as a tool for the study of the structural

[17] See Martin Legassick, "The Concept of Pluralism: A Critique," in *African Social Studies,* eds. Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp. 44–50.

[18] See Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World-Economy," in *Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, Gutkind and Wallerstein, pp. 30–57, and Joel Samoff, "Underdevelopment and Its Grass Roots in Africa," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 14, no. 1 (1980):5–36.

[19] On the inadequacies of interest group pluralism, see Isaac Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," *Politics and Society* 1, no. 2 (1971):151–77, and idem, "Ruling Elite Theory vs. Marxist Class Analysis," *Monthly Review* 23 (May 1971):36–46.

[20] For efforts in that direction, see Peter Flynn, "Class, Clientelism, and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 12 (July 1974):133–56; and Robert Molteno, "Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics," in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. William Tordoff (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 62–106.

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sources of change in society.[21] It is in that use, in the search for structural sources of change, that class will contribute to the study of the political economy of Africa.

If the analyst's primary concern is with structures and change rather than with inequality, then it makes little sense to treat class as a thing, as a positive object that can be dissected from its societal context and historical movement. Class is a relationship. Hence, though the definitions of class that pertain to a population with specified characteristics (level of income, socioeconomic status, job category), or a cluster of such characteristics, may refer to important segments of society, it only confuses things to call them classes. Increasing the complexity of the definition of a stratum, for example, by combining income, status, occupation, and even aspirations, does not convert a stratum (which is a slice of a society ordered hierarchically according to some convenient principle) into a class (which is a conflictual relationship that revolves around the creation and appropriation of wealth). Classes may be stratified, and there may be patterns of stratification that seem to cut across classes, but class and stratum are very different analytic constructs, each with its own intellectual origins, theoretical underpinnings, and empirical utility. Since there is a burgeoning literature differentiating studies of stratification from studies of class, that issue need not be examined here. It should be noted, however, that among authors who confuse stratum and class are authors drawing on the Marxist tradition.[22]

For use as an analytic construct, class must be understood as a *relationship*, in fact, two types of relationship simultaneously.[23] On the one hand, class is defined by role in production, as production is organized at any particular moment. On the other hand, at the same time class is defined by opposition: classes exist only in opposition to other classes.[24] That is, *class* is defined by both struc-

[21] This, of course, was Marx's concern: " 'class' was not primarily a category for describing how a particular capitalist society looked at any given point in time, but rather above all an analytic tool for elucidating the sources of structural change within the capitalist system. . . ." (Balbus, "Ruling Elite Theory vs. Marxist Class Analysis," pp. 37–38; see also Balbus, "The Negation of the Negation," *Politics and Society* 3, no. 3 [1972]:49–63). My concern here is not an exegesis of Marx's writing on class. Rather, I am concerned with drawing insights from Marxism as a methodology.

[22] For an introduction, see James Stolzman and Herbert Gamberg, "Marxist Class Analysis versus Stratification Analysis as General Approaches to Social Inequality," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 18 (1973–1974):105–25; Rudolfo Stavenhagen, *Social Classes in Agrarian Societies* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor/Doubleday, 1975), chapter 2; and Erik Olin Wright, "Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure," *Politics and Society* 9, no. 3 (1980):323–70. Among the Marxists who fail to differentiate adequately class from stratum is Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

[23] See Bertell Ollman, "Marxism and Political Science: Prolegomenon to a Debate on Marx's Method," *Politics and Society* 3, no. 4 (1973):491–510.

[24] See Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp. 72–77, 86, and idem, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1974), p. 14; James O'Connor, "Productive and Unproductive Labor," *Politics and Society* 5, no. 3 (1975):298; Terence J. Johnson, "What Is To Be Known? The Structural Determination of Social Class," *Economy and Society* 6 (May 1977):199; Joel Samoff, "Education in Tanzania: Class Formation and Reproduction," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (January 1979):56–57, and idem, "The

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ture and process. Neither is adequate by itself. And both are, in historical terms, ephemeral: ". . . classes do not have some permanent reality. Rather they are formed, they consolidate themselves, they disintegrate or disaggregate, and they are re-formed. It is a process of constant movement, and the greatest barrier to understanding their action is reification."[25]

The problems for empirical study are obvious. What is involved is not only an orientation different from that of the positivist paradigm, but entirely different concepts, categories, definitions, and even rules for scientific inquiry.[26] There is here an analogy to the problems physicists face stemming from the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy (the impossibility of determining precisely both the position and the velocity of a moving electron at the same time). In the study of class, any effort to detach class from its context makes the understanding of its movement impossible. Any effort to focus exclusively on its movement leaves its structural outlines blurred. Like the physicists, social scientists need not throw up their arms and despair of empirical research. Rather, they must devise procedures that are quite different from those currently in vogue, no less empirical and, since they do not require the ahistoricism and loss of contextual specificity of most methods currently in use, more scientific.

One approach is to accept that these phenomena can neither be seen nor grasped directly. A dialectical methodology, applied to a constantly changing and contradictory (in the sense that each major movement includes within it pressure to move in the opposite direction) reality, would seem to require an inferential approach. Efforts to establish fixed definitions and precise boundaries lead into a trap. Analysts must avoid "the need most people feel to focus their attention on something unchanging even when the object of their gaze is change itself. Those who cannot view reality dialectically require hooks on which to hang the dialectic. Unfortunately, once installed, these hooks, which may render some initial service, are almost impossible to remove."[27]

The physics analogy is again appropriate. Analysts are attempting to study units and forces (like quarks and attractions) that they know to exist (in the sense that these units and forces have impact on behavior) but that cannot be seen, or perhaps even hope to be seen. Often theories must take the form of say-

Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and Class Structure in Tanzania," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (January 1979):50–51; and Erik Olin Wright, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies," *New Left Review* 98(July–August 1976):3–41.

[25] Wallerstein, "Class-Formation," p. 369.

[26] A major difficulty in transcending the positivist paradigm—at least for someone trained and socialized within it—is the use of definitions that identify things in terms of themselves. Rather than defining terms (for example, capital, value, labor, class) exclusively and taking them to be the same thing in different organizing frameworks ("problematics"), each phenomenon or relationship must be understood to include the conditions of its own existence. The structural role of a class and the opposition in which it is engaged, which serve to define the class, are themselves part of the class. On this, see Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 3–40 and 256–76, and idem, "Marxism and Political Science."

[27] Ollman, *Alienation*, p. 59n.

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ing, if the gravitational force operates in a certain way, then certain results should occur. To the extent that the expected results do occur, we gain confidence in the theory. To the extent that the expected results do not occur, theories must be either modified or rejected and alternative formulations that can incorporate the perceived events must be developed. In these terms, explanation is concerned less with establishing causality than with clarifying relationships.[28]

The problem is, of course, more complex in the study of human behavior, since quarks, however charmed, are not taken to have will. But the methodology has similarities. Analysts must observe their effects and then make inferences about the nature of class and class conflict. As their understanding improves, their explanations ought to become more comprehensive and more incisive.[29] In this process, there is necessarily a tight link between theory and data, since each is a function of the other. Since classes have to do with opposition, they can be most clearly understood in situations of conflict, particularly when the conflict has to do with the fundamental allocation of resources, or with access to power, or with the definition of the dominant ideology.

The point here is straightforward. If class is not a positive object, then it cannot be studied as one. The methodology required must rely heavily on inference, and it must focus simultaneously on structure and movement.

Class at Different Levels of Analysis

Another problem that often confuses the analysis of class and class conflict is the application of an understanding derived at one level of analysis to an entirely different level. What is missing is the translation process required to move from one level of abstraction to another.

A common occurrence of this confusion is the attempt to apply the characterization of class conflict derived in reference to capitalism as a system (owners versus producers) to the observed situation in particular states, or even local communities. For the understanding of structural sources of change (for example, the emergence of capitalism as a world system), it is important to understand the tension between owners and producers. At that level of abstraction, it is appropriate to speak of the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and to apply those concepts to human societies, fully aware that many groups and individuals will not fit very neatly. For understanding politics within a particular state over time, however, it is important to use class as a more differentiated concept. For the end of the slave trade discussed earlier, for ex-

[28] On explanations in Marxian social science, see Ollman, *Alienation*, p. 65.

[29] Much of the criticism of recent books by African Marxists ignores the nature of their methodology. One can readily locate errors, inconsistencies, and oversimplifications in their work. What is important in their effort, however, is their proposed large-scale explanations of the political economy of an African state. Their errors, though not inconsequential, are less important than their success in capturing the overall orientation of the political economy and in structuring the debate to facilitate the elimination of those very errors.

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ample, successive changes were explained in terms of conflict within the large category owners, between owners with commercial and agricultural interests on the one hand and owners with industrial and financial interests on the other. Similarly, for a shorter time horizon it may be necessary to decompose the large construct still further: to examine, say, the conflict between small-scale manufacturers and large-scale industrialists. That is not to say that the owners-versus-workers and the merchants-versus-industrialists characterizations are wrong and that the small-versus-large scale depiction is correct, but rather to argue that each is appropriate to a different level of analysis (and inappropriate to other levels): "If we confine ourselves to modes of production alone, we find that each of them involves two classes, . . . the exploiting class, which is politically and ideologically dominant, and the exploited class, which is politically and ideologically dominated. . . . But a concrete society (a social formation) involves more than two classes, in so far as it is composed of various modes and forms of production. No social formation involves only two classes. . . ."[30]

This, of course, suggests that it is impossible to compile a standard roster of classes to be applied to all societies at all times (even if the temporary absence of a particular entry in the roster is permitted).[31] Rather, the formation of classes is *itself* a function of specific historical situations and can be understood *only* in terms of that historical specificity.

> The classes of a social formation [concrete society] cannot be "deduced," in their concrete struggle, from an abstract analysis of modes and forms of production which are present in it, for this is not how they are found in the social formation. On the one hand, their very existence is affected by the concrete struggle that takes place within the social formation. . . . On the other hand, the classes of one social formation only exist in the context of the relations of this formation with other social formations. . . .[32]

What this suggests, in turn, is that analysts must examine each specific situation to discern the major tension around which classes form. In one situation the dominant tension may be that which pits one set of owners against another set of owners. In such a situation, each set of owners will seek allies, often (but not always) from among the different sorts of producers. That is not to say that the tension between owners and producers has disappeared, or that it is unimportant, but simply that it is not dominant at that moment. It is entirely plausible, for example, for class conflict to revolve around competition between (African) teachers, civil servants, and aspiring merchants and (Asian) traders in Uganda, while at the same time for class conflict in Kenya to stem from the tension between (African) agricultural interests and (African) aspiring commercial

[30] Poulantzas, *Classes*, p. 22.

[31] See Ollman, "Marx's Use of 'Class,' " *American Journal of Sociology* 5(March 1968):573–80, and Wright, "Class Boundaries," p. 13. Note that there is a potential confusion in the use of class at different levels of analysis: owners and industrialists each termed a class, though obviously the latter is a subset of the former. I prefer this more common usage, despite the potential confusion, to the even more cumbersome use of terms like fraction, or segment, to denote portions of a class.

[32] Poulantzas, *Classes*, p. 23.

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and industrial interests. In each situation, the major tension stimulates class formation, and in each situation, as that particular tension is resolved (for example, by the expulsion of the Asian traders), a new tension will become dominant, stimulating further class formation and organization. Though it is ever present, not always is the tension between producers and owners dominant.

This means that one of the first steps in the analysis of class and class conflict in a particular state must be to identify the dominant tension and to relate it to the other tensions present. To do that, it is essential to understand the organization of production (in fact, the dominant and related patterns of production), an area of analysis that is beyond the scope of this article.[33] It is important to note, however, that the problem of confusing different levels of abstraction occurs in the analysis of the organization of production as well: the similarities among Third World states (in terms of the world system) must not obscure the important differences between and within states.[34]

Since several tensions occur simultaneously, at times class conflict may revolve around efforts to specify which conflict is to be primary. Aspiring African industrialists and traders may attempt to make the tension between periphery and core dominant (and thus secure the cooperation of producers), while peasants may seek to make primary the tension between farmers and traders (or between Africans and Asians). Much of the effort expended may be directed toward preventing some other class from determining the field of conflict. Hence, the specification of the dominant tension is as much a function of class conflict as it is of the organization of production.

This recognition of the inapplicability of abstractions at one level of analysis to other levels of analysis should certainly make clear the inappropriateness of grand abstractions to explanations of individual behavior. The study of the conflict between owners and producers may help scholars understand the dynamics of a world system, or even of a nation-state, but it surely will require a translation theorem to sort out why one particular individual, or a set of individuals, voted in a certain way, or joined a group, or defied a police officer. Developed to understand the behavior of collectivities (of various sizes), the analysis of class conflict can indicate the constraints imposed on individual behavior or explain the proclivities to behave in a particular way, but it cannot by itself fully encompass the actions of specific individuals.[35]

What is involved here are not alternative explanations, but *nested* explana-

[33] For an introduction to the debate on modes of production, see Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy," *New Left Review* 107 (January-February 1978):47–77, and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "The Political Economy of the African Peasantry and Modes of Production," in *Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, Gutkind and Wallerstein, pp. 90–111.

[34] See Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10, no. 4 (1972):502–24.

[35] There is a Marxist literature concerned with bridging that collectivity/individual gap; for an introduction, see Bertell Ollman's work on Reich, reprinted in Ollman's *Social and Sexual Revolution* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), part 2. This volume also includes several of Ollman's other papers cited here.

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tions. Tensions between owners and workers, between merchants and industrialists, between Africans and Asians, and between spouses may *all* be involved in explaining a specific set of events. Each tension has an impact on the others. The identification of one is insufficient. Whether starting at the global level or at the individual level, analysts cannot see clearly until they have understood that level in terms of the others.

Class and Different Dimensions of Analysis

Often, the debate over the utility of analyses drawing on a Marxian theoretical underpinning presumes that there is, and that Marx said that there is, a simple determination by the base (the organization of production, or the economy) of the superstructure (politics, social structure, ideology). Unfortunately, this presumption is scarcely less common among neo-Marxists than it is among anti-Marxists. The inference drawn from this presumption is that the state, as a derived structure, is uninteresting, or at best, of secondary interest. Clearly, the relationships among economy, polity, society, and ideology are much more complex than can be encompassed by such a simplistic determinism. The very notion contradiction would make little sense if there were no tension between economy (base) and polity (superstructure) and if it were not possible for the polity to dominate the economy. And, the critics of Marxist determinism notwithstanding, Marx himself spent a good deal of time studying and conceptualizing human consciousness and individually initiated action.

Here, again, there are problems of confusing different dimensions of analysis and of losing sight of historical and contextual specificity. An analysis of the organization of production may help to explain the political options possible, but it cannot fully explain why a particular option was pursued. Politics, as one dimension of human behavior, requires its own analysis, neither losing sight of its intersection with other dimensions nor subsuming it within other dimensions.[36] "Ideological and political relations cannot then be regarded as in any way 'superstructural' . . . . They are not variables added to some pre-existing

[36] Though Poulantzas's work on the state has offered substantial insights and has been a major stimulus for creative work by others, his effort to preserve the base/superstructure relationship has not been, I think, very fruitful. He asserts that the economy is *ultimately* dominant: different patterns of production may make dimensions other than the economy more or less prominent. It seems to me that this, and much of Poulantzas's work, is searching for a logical rigor and a set of one-to-one correspondences that, however complex, are incompatible with a theoretical orientation that is fundamentally nonlinear. Relational notions cannot be enclosed within logically distinct boxes. Nor do the boxes necessarily contribute to theoretical clarity. For the debate on the political dimension, see Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," and Ralph Miliband, "The Problem of the Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas," both reprinted in Robin Blackburn, ed., *Ideology in Social Science* (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 238–62; Ernest Laclau, "The Specificity of the Political: Around the Poulantzas-Miliband Debate," *Economy and Society* 4 (February 1975):87–110; and Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," *New Left Review* 95 (January-February 1976):63–83.

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economic relations of classes but operate in the determination of those very relations. . . . "[37]

If class, the state, and even ideology are all understood as relationships, then each is necessarily part of the others. The formation of classes embodies within it the organization of power, much as political structures embody class conflict. Each is, in an important sense, determined by the others, but not completely. Hence, each dimension requires its own analysis, and though the various dimensions are independent, the analysis of one dimension does not eliminate the task of analyzing the others.

The analysis of class and class conflict requires a theoretical structure that is neither unidimensional nor unidirectional. Though each dimension must be understood in terms of the others, each is capable of being dominant in a particular situation. Thus, the formation and reproduction of classes may occur, in a particular society at a particular historical moment, within the political dimension. "Social classes and their reproduction only exist by way of the relationship linking them to the state and economic apparatuses; these apparatuses are not simply 'added on' to the class struggle as appendices, but play a constitutive role in it."[38] Similarly, in another concrete situation, ideology and culture may be the pivots around which class conflict (and thus class formation and reproduction) takes place.

Technical Considerations in the Analysis of Class

This article has been concerned thus far with problems of theory in the analysis of class and class conflict. Those problems at the theoretical level, or for some analysts a reluctance to confront the theoretical issues, engender problems of a more technical sort. The widespread failure to recognize, let alone address, these problems means that solutions are not yet developed; the task in this section is to note the confusions and to suggest directions for the further elaboration of the methodology.

One confusion stems from the frequent characterization of class as the sum of individual attributes. Most attitudinal surveys, which discuss the attitudes (or ideology, or behavior) of a class on the basis of interviews with a set of individuals, fall into this trap. So, too, do the stratification studies that take a class to be all individuals with a specified income, or job, or combination of job plus income plus status.

Since most of the methodology employed in contemporary Western social science presumes the individual to be the ultimate unit of analysis, most discussions of collectivities are in fact the studies of aggregates of discrete individuals. It certainly seems easier to go about it that way, and, to some scholars, it seems more scientific. Yet, if the core concept with which analysts wish to work is a collectivity, and if its behavioral characteristics are those of a collectivity, little

[37] Johnson, "What Is To Be Known," p. 198.
[38] Poulantzas, *Classes*, p. 25.

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understanding is gained if researchers presume that collectivity to be decomposable into discrete individuals. That, of course, means that analysts must work on methodologies for the study of collectivities. As suggested above, it is fruitful to study collectivities by inference, especially since (because classes exist only in opposition which is itself constantly changing) the nature of the collectivity itself changes frequently. In practical terms, this means that social scientists are more likely to understand class conflict by observing class action than by interviewing a sample of people presumed to be class members and that the analysts' methodology will require both a conjunction (not disjunction) of theory and observation and successive iterations.

Another confusion arises in the definition of the variables appropriate to the analysis of class and class conflict. If notions such as class, dependence, inequality, alienation, and so on, are important, then analysts must have ways of defining them so they can be studied. Those definitions, however, must be consistent with the underlying theoretical orientation within which the analysts are working. If the key concepts are relationships, then the analysts' definitions must reflect that. If the analysts are concerned with change, they must take care not to reify and rigidify the present. Thus, it should be clear that these notions, and the specific variables derived from them, are likely to be nonlinear and discontinuous. Hence, studies that take the relevant variables to be linear (including multi and curvilinear) and continuous miss the essence of the concept.[39]

Take, for example, the concept of dependence. In the study of the political economy of the Third World, dependence is often taken to be a characterization of the *current* relationship between peripheral and core states. "Dependency, like exploitation, is a relationship: and so it makes no sense to argue that 'external factors' mechanically cause 'internal factors.' "[40] In these terms, dependence has to do with the situation of one set of states in its role in a larger system, at a particular moment in the organization of (monopoly) capitalism. Though the word can of course be used in a variety of ways, the conceptualization at the core of the literature on dependency does not refer to the relationship between a pair of states, or between a particular state and a set of states. Though dependence may well be manifested in the behavior of national leaderships, or in the work of authors and artists, the notion serves best to characterize the entire existing world situation, from the perspective of the periphery. If so, it does not make sense to array African states along a scale of dependence, presume the scale to have the attributes of an interval or a ratio scale, and then apply the sophisticated techniques of data manipulation to the scale.[41] To elevate the

[39] For an informed and well-documented discussion of this problem by a scholar whose own orientation lies within the positivist paradigm and whose efforts to resolve the difficulties lead him toward modeling, see Raymond H. Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory," in *Dependence and Dependency in the Global System,* Caporaso, pp. 51–78.

[40] Tim McDaniel, "Class and Dependency in Latin America," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 21(1976–1977):54.

[41] For one example of that approach, see Kaufman, Geller, and Chernotsky, "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency."

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marginal differences in the concentration of commodities produced or of trade partners of African states into a scalar measure of dependence distorts the structural notion out of all recognition and utility, even when done by authors claiming sympathy to the dependency orientation or claiming to have found empirical support for it.[42]

The same is true for inequality, or for alienation, or for other key concepts. As well, since each of these major variables is a function of the intersection of several different dimensions (economic, political, social, ideological), then analysts surely cannot presume that a quantified expression of one dimension is an adequate surrogate for the complex interactions being studied. The difficulties are compounded when the analyst takes a current characteristic (for example, small contribution of industry to the gross national product), which may well be a reasonable indicator for the present and for a particular nation, to be the phenomenon itself—peripheral capitalism—either over time or across states. Peripheral states (more accurately, classes within them) do industrialize, accumulate capital, change trading partners, and pursue internal redistributive policies. Peripheral states do differ from each other. But they remain peripheral and subordinate to a capitalist world economy.[43] It is important to stress here that though class conflict may well focus on and operate largely within nation-states (at least for the present), the situation of dependence has to do with roles in a world system. Accordingly, only in specific circumstances and times will nation-states be the most useful units for world system analysis.

If researchers are engaged in an analysis at the level of the world system, and if they reject the sequential, incremental, and linear assumptions found in literature on the modernization and development perspective, then they should

[42] For the former, see McGowan, "Economic Dependence and Economic Performance in Black Africa," and for the latter, see Richard Rubinson, "The World Economy and the Distribution of Income within States: A Cross-National Study," *American Sociological Review* 41 (August 1976):638–59. For an elaboration of the methodological critique, see Liz Lyle Kleemeier, "Empirical Tests of Dependency Theory," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16, no. 4 (1978):701–04, and Roger D. Spegele, "Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations," *American Political Science Review* 74 (March 1980):104–22.

[43] On this point, see especially the work of Cardoso, "Imperialism and Dependency." If export of raw materials, trade concentrated with a few large partners, narrow range of goods produced, large gaps between income strata, and so on, are not the content of dependence across states and across time, then where does the core of the concept lie? My own sense is that the central notion has to do with what Cardoso has called "the production of production"—the location, not of industry, but of the creation of new productive capacity (p. 12). A core state can produce and export raw materials, semiprocessed goods, light manufactures, heavy manufactures, and advanced technology, and at the same time import them all. As well, it can tolerate, or acquiesce in, the location of advanced production elsewhere. But the core largely retains and dominates creativity and initiative. Where heavy industry once seemed the seed germ of new production, that seminal role is now played by information processing, which will in turn be superseded. In somewhat different terms, dependence defines a situation in which there are few structural links between production and consumption: states that produce what they do not consume and consume what they do not produce; on this see Samir Amin, "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model," *Review of African Political Economy* 1 (August-November 1974):9–26.

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expect their major variables to be little amenable to ordinal, interval, and ratio scales. Researchers should also expect discontinuities rather than continuities: "In Marx's case, the process of scientific knowledge is considered to have some break points within itself, some concepts [that] cannot be accounted for by means of an alleged generalization, and the categories of the concrete and the abstract express such discontinuities."[44] And if researchers reject the base/superstructure determinism and unidirectionality, then they should expect their major variables (at least sometimes) to have nonlinear relationships.

This does not mean that once again social scientists must throw up their arms in despair. Methodologies for the analysis of discontinuous and nonlinear variables exist. They require elaboration and development. Yet, however convenient, it makes no sense to impose on the data a set of assumptions that is inconsistent with the basic framework within which analysts are working. That inappropriate techniques are particularly sophisticated does not make them useful. Statistics of modern social science must transcend the Euclidean space—where the points on a plane are infinite and where the shortest distances are straight lines—and the discrete, yes/no logic of the digital computer in which it is currently trapped.

A third confusion stems from ignoring the limits of the data that are available. Most authors writing about Africa include early in their work a caveat on the poor quality of the available data and then proceed to ignore their own caveat. If the quality of the data is limited, researchers' analyses must reflect that. The clearest examples of misused data have to do with population statistics for Africa. Much of the quantified data of all sorts ultimately depends on some measure (or estimate, or guess) of the population of African states. Income, gross domestic product (GDP) and GNP, availability of social services, energy consumption, and agricultural and industrial production are all expressed in per-capita terms to permit cross-country and cross-time comparisons. Those data are only as accurate as their divisor: the population figure.

The Nigerian situation suggests how inaccurate that figure may be. Between the 1962 (subsequently suppressed) and the 1963 Nigerian censuses, there was a difference in the population figure of some 10 million (from 46 to 56 million). Since it is impossible for a population to grow by 20 to 25 percent in one year, and since astute observers know there were important political consequences (the apportionment of seats in the federal legislature and thus the security of control by the north), analysts can conclude that human intervention compounded the inaccuracies. The population experts were unconvinced: "Demographers universally reject the 1963 results. . . ."[45] Yet, those are the very

[44] Rafael Echeverria, "Critique of Marx's *1857 Introduction*," *Economy and Society* 7 (November 1978):358. Critiques of the dependence and underdevelopment approach often characterize it as a stage theory, little different in that regard from modernization and development. They base that critique on the notion that Marx developed a linear theory of social change. Marx himself argued for a discontinuous succession of modes of production.

[45] Etienne van de Walle, "Who's Who and Where in Nigeria," *Africa Report* 15 (January 1970):22.

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figures that have subsequently been used as the actual 1963 Nigerian population from which later estimates were extrapolated.[46] Conservatively, therefore, social scientists should report the Nigerian population in 1963 as 56 million ± 20 percent. Since the range of error differs for different African states, and since the distortion of the data is just as likely to be purposeful as random (though analysts may not know and may not have any way of determining which), there is little to be gained by making comparisons among African states that ignore these margins of error. On many indices, the margins of error are greater than the differences between African states. With a possible margin of error of this magnitude, Nigeria may be forty-eighth of all countries on some list, or it may be ninety-seventh. Similarly, Nigeria's position on a graphic representation ought to be shown as an area, not a single point, and thus analysts cannot use the single-point representation in the calculation of regression lines.

The use of aggregate data need not cease. But analysts must be sure they do not fool themselves about the accuracy of their data; they must also take special care not to identify as significant distinctions those differences that fall within the margin of error.

The Study of Class, Class Conflict, and the State

It may be useful at this point to recapitulate the major points of the argument about the study of class and class conflict. Class is a relationship, defined both by its role in production and by its opposition to other classes. Since in the current situation the primary locus of production and, perhaps more important, the structures of the reproduction of capitalist relations are located within nation-states, it is likely that the major locus of class conflict will be within the nation-state. That is, class conflict is a phenomenon of concrete situations, which for most people are defined within nation-state boundaries.[47] In these terms, the operation of the entire world system is reflected *within* the organiza-

[46] The same scenario was apparently repeated for the 1973 census. See Ian Campbell, "The Nigerian Census: An Essay in Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 14 (November 1976):242–54.

[47] On this, see Johnson, "What Is To Be Known," p. 231; O'Connor, "Productive and Unproductive Labor," p. 298n; and Poulantzas, *Classes*, 48–49, 78. To understand capitalism as a world system requires understanding production to be organized on a world basis. Still, the role of small commodity producer, or miner, or kulak is a role that has primarily a national definition. The national focus of identification leads to a national locus of conflict. As the expansion and centralization of monopoly capitalism transcend national boundaries, there may be an increasingly internationalized focus of class action. This understanding helps to clarify the seemingly schizophrenic behavior of African national leaderships—now populist, now neocolonial—in that it suggests the extent to which their class situation has an international as well as a national context. Note also that I assume here that significant struggles within capitalism are as likely to revolve around the *reproduction* of capitalist relations as they are to be concerned with the existence of those relations. See also Nicos Poulantzas, "Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State," *Economy and Society* 3 (May 1974):145–79.

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tion and practices of individual nation-states: "Hence, we need to understand class struggle as having a distinctly *national* form. . . . the class struggle always has a double meaning, or two dimensions, i.e., the class and national dimension, both of which have a definite historical context at any given time or stage in the development and decline of capitalism."[48] This requires that analysts work at a level of abstraction suitable to the study of nation-states, while at the same time not losing sight of the relationship between that level and other levels. In the contemporary situation, it is necessary to understand that the boundaries of production and of the state do not always coincide.

Hence, the state is not a derived or secondary phenomenon, but an appropriate focus for analysis. The state is always relatively autonomous. As a relationship, the state reflects, and thus its study reveals, conflicts within the society. For Africa, and increasingly for all of the world system, the state must assume greater responsibility for insuring continued accumulation and thus become a major actor in the organization of production.[49] The state itself becomes a focus for class conflict.[50]

A sequence of static snapshots can rarely capture the essence of a dynamic process. Social science methodology textbooks often point out the danger of drawing longitudinal inferences from cross-sectional studies. Equally important is to differentiate between on the one hand a dynamic analysis concerned with understanding historic movement from within the flux and on the other, relatively static glimpses spread out over time. Unfortunately, many social scientists equate dynamic analysis with comparative statics.

The study of class and class conflict requires a process of making approximations and drawing inferences, repeated in successive iterations. A hypothesis about the nature of fundamental relationships is matched against the available data (themselves in part a function of that and other hypotheses). The original hypothesis is then corrected, refined, and amended, and again matched against the data. The best-fitting and most-encompassing hypothesis can be accepted as tentatively confirmed and then used to generate further data. Those data then serve for further checking and refinement. Explanation has to do with clarifying relationships. Fit has to do not only with matching reality but also with facilitating movement.

> There does not exist in these analyses [of dependency] a presumption of scientific

[48] O'Connor, "Productive and Unproductive Labor," p. 298n.

[49] See James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), and idem, *The Corporations and the State* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

[50] For an introduction to recent literature on the state, see David A. Gold et al., "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," *Monthly Review* 27 (October 1975):29–43 and (November 1975):36–51; "Special Issue: Imperialism and the State," *Insurgent Sociologist* 7 (Spring 1977); Ralph Miliband, *Marxism and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Martin Shaw, "The Theory of the State and Politics: A Central Paradox of Marxism," *Economy and Society* 3 (November 1974):429–50; Goran Therborn, *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* (London: New Left Books, 1978); and Erin Olin Wright, *Class, Crisis and the State* (London: New Left Books, 1978).

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"neutrality." They are to be considered more "true" because they assume that, upon discerning which are the historical agents capable of propelling a process of transformation, and upon providing those agents with theoretical and methodological tools for their struggle, they will capture the meaning of a historical movement and support the denial of a given order of domination. They are therefore explanatory because they are critical.[51]

On the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie

There have been two major threads running through this article: first, that work within the construct called undevelopment and dependence marks a significant advance beyond earlier efforts; and second, that the advance is not yet a quantum leap, since a good part of the literature on underdevelopment and dependence, though successful as a radical critique, has yet to make the break with the positivist paradigm. Both of these threads can be clarified by a very brief look at discussions of the ruling classes in Africa.

Much of the recent writing on Africa has focused on the national leadership in an attempt to come to grips with its role in both world and national settings.[52] Is the national ruling class a progressive force (as was the bourgeoisie in its challenge to landowners in Europe), or is it fundamentally regressive, achieving only the continuation of foreign domination and African underdevelopment? Issa Shivji characterizes the ruling class in Tanzania as a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie," a term that could well apply to many African states.[53]

The term bureaucratic bourgeoisie certainly seems to capture the essential situation of a leadership that operates the machinery of state but that has little independent base in the national economy and is thus an advance beyond the earlier discussions of classless elites. It is a leadership drawn from the militants of the anticolonial movement and from the ranks of the technical and administrative staffs of the colonial and postcolonial governments that secured power through the imported institutions of and a negotiated arrangement with the former colonial state. Having used politics to prevail, it proceeded to condemn politics as evil. According to Shivji, the Tanzanian leadership's espousal of socialist goals and claim of fostering mass mobilization and participation had little effect on its consolidation of power and formation of neocolonial alliances. As was the case elsewhere in Africa, the Tanzanian leadership used its access to power to begin to build for itself an economic base. Control over the machinery of the state is especially important at the periphery of monopoly capitalism, where the role of the state expands as it assumes a major responsibility not only for insuring the rationalization of production, the mobility of

[51] Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory," p. 16.

[52] For example, Colin Leys, "The 'Overdeveloped' Post Colonial State: A Reevaluation," and John S. Saul, "The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote and General Amin," both in *Review of African Political Economy* 5 (January-April 1976):39–48 and 12–38.

[53] Shivji, *Class Struggles*. See also Samir Amin, *Unequal Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp. 343–50.

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capital, and the availability of labor, but also, in general, for managing the framework for accumulating capital and reproducing capitalist relations. The use of control over state power to create an economic base is perhaps most clearly manifested in the establishment of parastatal organizations: public corporations under the direct supervision of the national leadership, though in fact foreign investment and even foreign initiative and control remain substantial.

Although it does seem to capture some kernel of the situation of the national leadership, the term bureaucratic bourgeoisie introduces other problems that stem from the tendency to detach class analysis from its theoretical origins.[54] First, is the notion of a "bourgeoisie" that does not really own, or even completely control, the means of production. The term bourgeoisie originally referred to a specific class, the owners of industrial production, particularly in the conflict between these owners and the then-ruling class, the landed nobility. Once the new class gained power, bourgeoisie became synonymous with "ruling class," and it is in that sense that it is most often used today.[55] Despite the appeal of the term bureaucratic bourgeoisie, it is more useful to refer to a bureaucratic class, and to reserve bourgeoisie for owners of industry—a small group in Africa.

Second, is the notion of the bureaucracy as a class. The pervasiveness of what appear to be managers and administrators in power and the anti-Marxist thrust of much of the writing on the "managerial revolution" have generated a heated debate on the characterization of the bureaucracy.[56] The bureaucracy ought not be considered necessarily a class, in that while it may have a necessary role in production, it does not have a necessary opposition to other classes. In the context of contemporary Africa, where the state has an expanded role in organizing and managing the internal political economy and where the aspiring indigenous bourgeoisie is in most places weak, the bureaucracy becomes a class. Exercising the powers of ownership and assuming the responsibility for maintaining the political conditions necessary for the reproduction of capitalist relations, the corporate group becomes a class wielding power.

Third, is the concept of the ruling class. In all states, the ruling class is in fact an alliance of classes, combined to exercise control but still in competition among themselves. For African states, the ruling class includes both physically external and indigenous elements to Africa, with the visibility of the latter often serving to mask the role of the former. Hence, the dominant segment of the ruling class, which for most of Africa is transnational corporate capital, is not the governing segment, which may be the bureaucracy, commercial capital, aspiring

[54] See Samoff, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie," pp. 47–51.

[55] It is the case that Marx and other authors whose work is both scientific and polemical have used terms loosely, at times with a carefully defined and precise meaning, at times in a common, everyday sense. Some of the quarrels over interpretation result from the failure to recognize and distinguish the different usages of key terms. On this point, see Ollman, *Alienation,* part 1, esp. pp. 3–11.

[56] For a start, see Poulantzas, *Political Power*, part 5, and idem, *Classes*, pp. 175–89, and Hal Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution,* part 1, *State and Bureaucracy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), chap. 20.

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industrial and financial capital, the military, or some combination. If the dominant class is not the governing class in this alliance, then class power is not coterminous with state power. In fact, classes in the ruling alliance are contending for control over state power.

Finally, there is the notion of the bureaucracy as governors. Where the ruling class suppresses the formal political institutions, representation, organization, and control are shifted from those institutions to the administration. The technical supplants the legal/political as the legitimizing norm, and the monopoly over technology and its application becomes a defining characteristic of the governing bureaucracy. "The ideology of the 'pluralist' state as 'arbiter' between the interests of 'social groups' and bearer of the 'general will' of the 'individual citizens', has been supplanted by that of the state as 'technical' instance in relation to the intrinsic 'requirements' of 'production', 'industrialization' and 'technical progress.' "[57] In this situation, the contradictions within the ruling alliance and within the society as a whole are manifested within the state: between ministries and departments, between central and local institutions, and between pressures for more or less intervention in particular spheres of production.

In these terms, it makes sense to speak of a bureaucratic class, to identify that class as one of the classes within the ruling alliance, and to recognize that in many African states it is the bureaucratic class that governs. This class has an intermediary location, dependent simultaneously on its alliance with transnational capital and on its alliances within the country (which may include an aspiring bourgeoisie, the military, regional and ethnic group leaders,[58] kulaks, or even certain mass institutions, such as trade unions and farmers associations). This intermediary location is an inherently contradictory one, in that it requires at the same time an alliance with and a challenge to transnational capital.[59] It ought not to surprise social scientists, therefore, that this class moves spasmodically in both directions, now allying with transnational capital to further its interests within the state, now forging a populist alliance with a mass base in order to wrest control from transnational capital.

Thus, the analysis of this leadership in terms of its class nature—both role in production and opposition—is a very powerful tool for explaining its observed behavior. It is possible to account for similar actions by leaders in African states that differ in colonial heritage, resource base, commodities produced, trading partners, and internal constellations of power. It is possible to explain the adop-

[57] Poulantzas, *Classes,* p. 173; see also pp. 187–88n.

[58] Traditional is obviously an inappropriate word here (and in most other discussions of Africa), since what appear to be the older patterns of organization often had their origins during the colonial period and were themselves the results of complex interactions between patterns and events internal to Africa and those outside of Africa. There is no pure past, except when it is ideologically useful to create (the myth of) one.

[59] On this, see Samoff, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie," pp. 54–56, and John S. Saul, "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania," and idem, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania," both reprinted in Saul, *The State and Revolution.*

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tion by genuinely nationalist leaders of policies that contribute to the perpetuation of dependence without having to resort to probes of individual psyches, to claims of defects in African social structures, or to assertions about backwardness, corruption, and inexperience. And it is possible to do both of those while remaining firmly grounded in the concrete explanatory power only if we are successful in detaching the analytic construct—class—from the epistemology and methodology of the dominant perspective in Western social science and restoring to it its critical and dialectical theoretical foundations.

Which class governs is both an outcome and a determinant of the orientations, forms, and outcomes of class conflict. Understanding the governing class in terms of its oppositions as well as its role in production clarifies its seemingly contradictory and erratic behavior. To work with the complexities and interdependence of levels and dimensions of analysis, with the intertwining of causes and effects, and with the fluidity of dynamic categories is indeed difficult. But only by taking that challenge can social scientists overcome the obvious disabilities of the mechanical and unidirectional formulations that abound.*

* This is a revised, abridged version of a paper originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Houston, 1977.

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Book Reviews

Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s *by Donald M. Snow. University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1981. 284 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.95.*

The dynamism of the strategic arms race is now beyond dispute. If there was ever any doubt, events of the past decade have demonstrated how dramatically and rapidly the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship can change. Ten years ago the United States deployed its first MIRV warheads and began construction of two ABM complexes. Vulnerability of the Minuteman force was a remote theoretical prospect that troubled only the most inveterate pessimists. The Soviet Union, for its part, had embarked on a massive construction program that, if continued, would challenge traditional American superiority in the number of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). As counterpoint to this competition, there was the encouraging cooperative venture of SALT. Both sides appeared hard at work on an agreement that would end the "mad momentum" of the strategic arms race.

The momentum continued over the next decade, faster on the Soviet side than on the American. By the early 1980s Moscow and Washington had tripled their inventories of deliverable nuclear warheads. The Soviets had achieved superiority not only in the number of ballistic missiles, but in most other comparisons of strategic nuclear might as well. To redress the imbalance, the United States was building a ten-warhead Missile Experimental (MX) missile and a Trident missile with up to fourteen warheads. SALT lay in shambles, the victim of the Soviet move into Afghanistan and the Reagan administration's desire to rethink American strategic policy. Within the American strategic-studies community there was a sense of standing at a nuclear threshold, of awaiting decisions that would shape U.S. nuclear posture for years to come. For good or ill, these decisions—the final choice of a basing mode for MX, plans for a new strategic bomber, the American position in the 1982 ABM Review Conference—would form the broad contours of American nuclear policy for at least the next decade.

A book entitled *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World* sounds like a welcome contribu-

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tion to the debate about the nuclear future. The author's central thesis is that nuclear strategy is "extremely dynamic," and many analysts would argue that a key factor in America's strategic decline during the 1970s was its too static view of the nuclear balance. But this is not a volume of policy recommendations for dealing with the dynamics of the nuclear arms race. Instead, Snow has written a textbook more useful for students who want to find out how we got into the present nuclear muddle than for scholars and analysts seeking ways to get out.

The book is a sturdy and diligent introduction to the arcane world of nuclear strategy, and as such it fills an important and unfilled need. Authors in the field of security studies generally write for each other, with a view to influencing current policy debate. The result is a paucity of texts for the novice in the field. Aside from collections of essays, which are inherently uneven and usually incomplete, *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World* has few competitors among recently published books.

Snow's study flows smoothly from an introductory chapter that sets the context of nuclear strategy to a concluding chapter that raises questions about the strategic environment of the 1980s. The best chapter may be the one on Soviet strategic doctrine and forces. It provides a solid and evenhanded discussion of what Western scholars and analysts know, and what they can reasonably infer, about the Kremlin's vision of nuclear war and deterrence.

Although the book's structure is logical and coherent, many will find the author's writing style distracting. Snow limits his role to providing the narrative glue that binds together an awesome collection of quotations from the literature of strategic studies. He is a popularizer of nuclear strategy, and his standard literary technique is to supply one or two sentences of introduction and then defer to the expert. "As Herman Kahn says," "In the words of Bernard Brodie," "According to Schelling,"—such phrases are scattered across every page. In most cases the quotes are neither memorable nor particularly insightful. Nine times out of ten Snow could have said it better himself.

There is also too formal and mechanistic an approach to the subject matter. At times the book reads like an army field manual, replete with definitions, lists, tables, diagrams, and matrices. Most of this baggage will confuse dull students, bore good ones, and make those in the middle wonder if they should try to memorize it all. Students could spend their time more productively pondering the basic dilemmas and paradoxes of nuclear strategy.

Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World serves a useful need for undergraduate courses on defense strategy. Yet ironically the author's thesis about the dynamism of the arms race is best demonstrated by the obsolescence of his own book. Published in 1981, it appears to have been completed in early 1979—before the signing of SALT II and the ensuing debate over ratification, before Afghanistan, before Presidential Directive-59. It is the author's lamentable misfortune to have finished a book on nuclear strategy at perhaps the most inopportune moment in the past thirty-five years. No one could have predicted in early 1979 the astonishing change in public and official attitudes on defense that took place in little more than a year.

Money for strategic forces is no longer much of a problem. There is new interest in nuclear war-fighting capabilities, renewed interest in ballistic-missile defense, and a profound lack of interest in strategic-arms control. *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World*

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does not reflect this altered environment, but it does offer a good, objective introduction to undergraduates who want to know more about the complex and dangerous nuclear relationship that dominates the world they will inherit.

JOSEPH KRUZEL
Duke University

Strategies for the 1980s: Lessons of Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan *by Philip van Slyck. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 108 pp. $19.95.*

As suggested by the title, the author, a member of Freedom House, casts his analytical eye backward and forward. The United States has lost its military edge since the missile crisis in Cuba in 1962, for in the 1970s it suffered a "defense build-down" of its deterrent and conventional forces; Vietnam led to détente and a euphoria that the cold war was over; and this illusion that the superpower conflict had ceased with the attendant loss of will to compete as in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan (the 1978 coup) ended only when the Soviet Red Army marched into Kabul. Now that America's mood has swung away once again from pseudoisolationism and domestic priorities—a shift represented by the repudiation of Jimmy Carter and election of Ronald Reagan—what should be its policies?

Many of the recommendations are already being implemented: a more assertive U.S. global role, a stronger anti-Soviet stance, a larger defense budget to reduce deterrent vulnerabilities and to enlarge and modernize conventional forces are all part of the new, yet incomplete, consensus. Also recommended are an increase in emphasis on ideological warfare, the creation of a world order in which the Third World would have a stake, an increase in alliance cohesion, and the conduct of negotiations with Moscow from a position of strength on arms control and other issues. One could quibble with topics not considered (for example, the Sino-Soviet split and U.S.-Chinese rapprochement) or only briefly discussed (for example, at a time of increasing pacificism and anti-Americanism in Europe, which raise questions about Europe's will to defend itself, how can NATO be expected to deal with the Soviet Union's growing strength facing it, let alone an extra-European alliance role for the Persian Gulf or Southern Africa?), but in so brief a book it is surprising how many policy relevant subjects are at least mentioned.

But two critiques must be offered. The first addresses the frequent reference to détente as an alternative to cold war. For Kissinger at least, and therefore for Nixon and Ford, this assertion, and the attendant claim that the U.S. policymakers deceived themselves with perceptions of a benign Soviet Union, is wrong. For them, détente was containment for an era of superpower parity, Sino-Soviet schism, and U.S. pseudoisolationism. The problem was how to contain a Soviet Union stronger and more self-confident than before, and when the United States had lost its nerve to compete, shackled its own "imperial presidency," given priority to domestic affairs, felt guilty about Vietnam, and often considered not Soviet expansion but America's international role as the central problem. The Kissinger answer was to use a mixture of sticks and carrots to restrain the Soviet bear.

Second, that this strategy failed raises the question whether the U.S. political system

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can conduct a relationship with elements of both adversary and cooperative behavior and requiring an ever-changing mix of incentives and sanctions. The Jackson-Vanik amendment quickly took away Kissinger's main carrot; U.S. farmers made presidents reluctant to use food as a weapon; and public and congressional outcries of "no more Vietnams" weakened the stick.

Even had President Carter, unlike his predecessors, not shared the hopes that the cold war was over—indeed, that the very character of international politics had changed and that the old wicked world of power politics had been replaced by a more peaceful, cooperative, interdependent world—he too would have been constrained until the Iranian hostage seizure and Afghanistan invasion from pursuing a policy more in line with the worldview of his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Why is it that this country needs to be slapped in the face to be aroused and do what is necessary in its own defense? Past swing patterns from (pseudo) isolationism to interventionism and crusading, and back again, still make it difficult for the United States to forge balance of power policies required by geostrategic considerations. The author rightly points to the importance of presidential leadership in the conduct of foreign policy, but he fails to discuss the fundamental problems of how to forge a consensus on policy in the absence of external provocation or humiliation. Exhortations for presidential education and mobilization are not sufficient.

JOHN SPANIER
University of Florida

The Struggle for Afghanistan *by Nancy P. Newell and Richard S. Newell. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1981. 236 pp. $14.95.*

Who are the Afghans? What is their country like? Who ruled them before the 1978 Marxist coup? Who were these Marxists and what did they do once they came to power? Who were their opponents? What led to the Soviet invasion, and what should be the international, especially American, response to this Soviet move? These are the questions that this study deals with.

The Newells are sympathetic to the Afghans. They state that unlike other analysts who have focused on the Afghan crisis, that is, on the effects of the Soviet move on détente and Persian Gulf security, they aim at describing the plight of the Afghans. On the whole, they keep their promise. It is largely because of possible effects of the Afghan crisis, however, that the authors call for support of the Afghan mujahidin in their efforts at resisting the Soviets. According to the Newells, "the United States, the nations of South Asia, and all countries dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf therefore have a vital stake in the mujahidin of Afghanistan. In them lies the possibility of denying to the Soviet Union the opportunity to use Afghanistan as a base for expansion into the Middle East" (p. 207).

The Struggle for Afghanistan is atheoretical and descriptive. Chapters one through five deal with internal Afghan politics. They are a useful survey of the major political developments in the country. The authors treat both Zahir Shah (who ruled Afghanistan

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until 1973) and Daoud (who was the country's president between 1973 and 1978) fairly. The Newells, however, do not provide any serious analysis of the choices and constraints these two leaders faced when they were in power. For example, in the case of Daoud they assert that he was "severely crippled by a narrow view of government" (p. 52), although they provide neither an explanation how this was the case nor what role it played in his successes or failures.

A major shortcoming of the Newells' work is the lack of original research including the use of material in Persian and Pashtu. The authors provide very little documentation for their assertions. In fact, the entire book has only 125 footnotes. For example, in the section dealing with the international responses to the Soviet invasion, the authors argue in favor of promotion of regional cooperation in Southwest Asia by the United States. They assert that "lack of regional backing was a major reason for Pakistan's refusal of American aid shortly after the invasion" (p. 211). While promoting regional cooperation is a sensible recommendation, it is not clear on what evidence they attribute Pakistan's rejection of the Carter package to a lack of regional backing. The Pakistanis now have accepted a larger package from the Reagan administration involving economic aid and military sales without a noticeable change in regional relations. When the Newells do document, they generally rely on reports in newspapers or newsmagazines without evaluating the accuracy of the reports.

The authors spend a good deal of time on possible Soviet motives in invading Afghanistan. They enumerate the different and at times conflicting reasons given by various analysts. The Newells do not provide any indicator of the relative importance of the various motives assumed. No broad conclusion is drawn from the case of Afghanistan about Soviet strategy toward small contiguous states.

Despite these shortcomings, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* is a valuable survey of contemporary Afghan history. Those interested in Afghanistan will find it worth reading.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD
Columbia University

NATO after Thirty Years *edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1981. 262 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $8.95.*

This is a disappointing book. It is the product of an April 1980 conference of the Center for NATO Studies, Kent State University, assembling a group of American and West European scholars for retrospection about NATO's first thirty years. NATO has been entering another one of its perennial crises; it is reasonable to have such a conference and remind ourselves that NATO outlasts these crises. Moreover, more than with most symposia, the authors here seem to have stuck to their assigned chores in workmanlike fashion; there are few sharply discordant notes and no wild flights of fancy. But the book has the vices of these virtues. There are almost no exciting displays of insight or imagination to spark up the established standard of competent mediocrity.

Part of the problem is that the essays are too brief to encourage the authors both to

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cover their assigned ground and to exhibit originality. Most of them strain for coverage by mentioning a whole catalogue of events and circumstances in once-over-lightly episodic surveys that would, I should think, be difficult to comprehend for readers who are not already fairly well acquainted with this history. Yet readers who do have such familiarity are not likely to need the surveys and would probably prefer to get a few stimulating insights on a few focused points.

Even as a simple review of NATO, this collection of essays is severely weakened by its underplaying of the military-strategic dimension. NATO is many things and has many relationships; it is proper to be reminded of them. But the core has always been military defense, in a context where it has always been possible that the defense has in fact been provoking the aggressiveness against which it is directed. This security dilemma, vastly exacerbated by nuclear technology, is central—and retrospection can greatly help to clarify it (though probably without ultimately being able to resolve it). Yet these authors prefer to talk about other things very much more than about high strategy.

Another weakness is that the essays tracing some of the origins of NATO (an aspect of the conference that the organizers apparently hoped would produce fresh historical knowledge from archives lately opened) do not succeed in doing so. The authors do not present much research that is truly archival; the accounts they do give are no doubt competent but have long been familiar to attentive observers.

The essays deal with NATO vis-à-vis respectively the United States; Britain, France and Germany; the small states of Western Europe; the European Economic Community; the Warsaw Pact; the United Nations; and the Third World; as well as with weapons standardization, arms control, and (at the beginning and the end of the volume) some military problems of the 1970s and 1980s. There is also an essay on the limited integration between French and U.S. forces in World War I and one on French and British planning in the mid-1940s, before NATO was established. The latter essay, by a French professor, André Kaspi, is one of the two most interesting in the collection—but is itself not well integrated with the others. To my mind the best essay is by Scott L. Bills, on the centrality of Europe in American policy, especially in the post-World War II era, and how this perspective superseded traditional American anticolonialism. But even Bills only hints that perhaps the earlier tradition itself lacked depth and hence was easy to supersede.

Books on NATO are numerous, whereas good up-to-date books on the pertinent military strategy—books that are broad, nonpolemical, reasonably thorough, and not extremely technical—are becoming very nearly extinct. Therein lies a priority need much greater than any that is fulfilled in *NATO After Thirty Years.*

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

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Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933–1950 *by Irvine H. Anderson. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 259 pp. $18.50.*

Most historians, who are used to dealing with high politics or broad economic trends, have special difficulties in integrating the role of business in the workings of government, particularly concerning foreign policy. There is no shortage of crude conspiracy theories, but careful studies of such questions are in considerably smaller supply. Fortunately, Irvine Anderson has a professional background in business as well as in history, which apparently gives him some special deftness in coping with these problems.

While reviewing the origins of U.S. political and economic involvement in Saudi Arabia and the roots of the Saudi kingdom, most of the book concentrates on the decision-making process from 1941 to 1945. There is also a brief section on the implications of some of these choices on the course of postwar events. Much of this story has been told before though Anderson brings out a number of new points in his extremely detailed account. Although he tends to underplay aspects of the British and Saudi role in these events, his analysis is still generally accurate.

His thesis is spelled out in the chapter headings: In the Middle Eastern labyrinth, strategic planners, diplomats, field personnel, and corporate officers form a coalition. In following the involvement of these groups, he shows how their different interpretations of interests led them into compromise and cooperation on the high priority of Saudi oil for the United States.

By 1941, concern over the future of Western oil supplies for strategic requirements led American government officials to focus on the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia in particular, as a solution to potential petroleum problems. "The basic interest," he concludes, "was generated by the changing pattern of resources, and not by any manipulation of the oil companies" (p. 39). It might be added, however, that both the Saudis and the oil companies promoted a false scare over Britain's alleged attempts to undermine the American concession, which heightened the urgency of government action.

Once all agreed on the importance of this issue, there were three different proposals on how to proceed. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and others pressed for direct government participation through a Petroleum Reserves Corporation. The State Department and major companies wanted an Anglo-American agreement for equitable treatment of both countries' interests. This was opposed by the smaller, independent oil companies who feared they would be shut out. Those companies not members of the Arabian-American consortium (Aramco), which controlled Saudi production, also opposed Ickes's plan to put the government into partnership with their competitors.

The final proposal, and the one that was adopted, was to leave operation in the hands of private enterprise with diplomatic efforts aimed at informally ensuring equal access. This was supported by the Socony-Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey companies and by a variety of groups within the government. The government's role was to aid Saudi Arabia, thereby maintaining its stability and its link to the United States.

The expansion of Saudi production, conserving strategically more secure fields in the Western Hemisphere, was deemed to be in the national interest. This approach was supported by Aramco but opposed by companies with competing interests. Consequently,

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the government backed broadening Aramco's ownership to improve the marketing and pace of Saudi production. This also motivated corporate tax incentives and the fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement of 1950.

Combined with Aaron David Miller's, *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Oil Policy 1939–1949*, Anderson's book gives a good picture of the origins of a policy that has tremendous contemporary importance on the international scene.

BARRY RUBIN
Georgetown University

The Adversaries: America, Russia, and the Open World 1941–62 *by Michael Balfour. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 259 pp. $25.00.*

Michael Balfour argues that the history of international relations from 1941 to 1962 was dominated by the American attempt to reconstruct from the rubble of World War II "the open world of which the Enlightenment had dreamed in the eighteenth century and the Liberals in the nineteenth" (p. xi). Although he is not a crude economic determinist, Balfour sees the ensuing cold war as a "tragedy without villains," in which the open world of the Bretton Woods system was inevitably rejected by the "command economies" controlled by the Soviet Union, whereupon the United States belatedly precipitated and subsequently consolidated its own "Free World" political economy. While the seven tight chapters touch on changing perceptions, domestic political restraints, and especially national differences within the evolving Western system, the author views developments from the Atlantic Charter to the Cuban missile crisis through the lens of competing strategies. A concluding chapter too briefly speculates on such post-1962 issues as détente, growing global interdependence, and the possibility and desirability of continued economic growth.

Balfour's approach has much to commend it. He writes ably and succinctly and is especially adept at explaining the connection between economic issues (for example, German monetary reform) and the more visible political contests, such as the Berlin Blockade. His innovative effort to lighten the text with anecdotes and quotations—set apart in distinct type—is quite successful. As a British author of two previous books on Germany, Balfour is excellent in translating such European complexities as the European Defense Community (EDC) to an American readership. He has summarized a wide array of scholarship without burdening the text with jargon or excessive statistics.

Balfour's shortcomings are perhaps inevitable in a book of this sort. By adopting the framework of competing economic systems, *The Adversaries* tends to subordinate other interpretive themes. Balfour pays less attention to internal political choices than he might have done. The recent "revisionist" studies of Stalin's policies by Vojtech Mastny and William McCagg appeared too late for Balfour to use, but they suggest that Stalin's harsh policies in Eastern Europe and his early adoption of cold war rhetoric derived less from the imperatives of a Marxist political economy than from a desire to maintain absolute power and manipulate potential rivals within the Soviet hierarchy. Similarly, by following George Herring rather than Thomas Paterson, Balfour may overlook the range of oppor-

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tunities available to the Truman administration in 1945–1946 in extending American aid for reconstruction without arousing Soviet suspicion and hostility. In view of the fact that the United States initiated the cutoff of trade and investment with the Soviet bloc in 1947, one wonders how threatened the Soviets really were by an "open world." Perhaps the atomic monopoly ranked as a more precipitate cause of the cold war.

These quibbles aside, Balfour's short volume provides a convenient, well-written, and often brilliant summary of the economic battlegrounds of the cold war.

J. GARRY CLIFFORD
University of Connecticut

Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945 *by Akira Iriye. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 304 pp. $22.00.*

This is a book about those who in war shape visions of peace. Neither diplomatic nor military history in the traditional sense, it blends those genres with intellectual history to advance a fascinating and provocative thesis about the Pacific war of 1941–1945: Enemies though they were, Japanese and Americans held essentially similar visions of what the future should be. Indeed, the overlap was so great that statesmen could and should have stopped the fighting well before Hiroshima transformed the future of Japan and of humanity.

Iriye develops this thesis by identifying key policy documents, analyzing their underlying assumptions, and comparing them with one another. He argues that Tokyo and Washington had aims that were more conservative than revolutionary. They harked back to the peaceful internationalist visions of order in the Pacific that prevailed in the 1920s. He then shows how external forces beyond either American or Japanese control modified their war aims. By 1943, both drifted toward acceptance of continued colonial rule for Southeast Asia. Neither had a solution for the problems generated by domestic political turmoil in China. Both recognized the new reality of Soviet power in Northeast Asia without devising viable ways to accommodate it. This brought thoughtful men to the uncomfortable conclusion that Japan and America together would have to provide stability and order for East Asia in the future.

This book complements other recent works on World War II diplomacy in the Pacific. It offers a synthesis broader than that in Thorne's *Allies of a Kind* and a more specifically Pacific–East Asian focus than Louis's *Imperialism at Bay* or Dallek's *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*. Iriye also provides the first English-language interpretation of the evolution of Japanese war aims—a contribution that alone warrants the purchase price. But the book's greatest value is to be found in its challenging thesis. How valid is that thesis?

I found it less than completely convincing in two respects. First, Iriye exaggerates the conservatism and convergence of the two foes' war aims. Their leaders used the rhetoric of the past but added distinctly different elements to it. Washington, for example, looked not to a Pacific divided strategically and economically, but to hegemony over that ocean. Both powers looked to Moscow. But Tokyo saw a makeweight in a balance of power that

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would check Washington and London, while Washington found a partner for the preservation of peace. That peace did not come sooner suggests that Japanese and American war aims still diverged. Japan's liberal peace plotters would not abandon Manchukuo in 1944; Americans could not stomach its continued existence. In 1945, Japanese leaders hoped for some small victory to preserve a modicum of their empire's power; Washington was determined to destroy that power.

Secondly, Iriye neglects the political dimensions of the definition of war aims. Elucidating the visions of Japanese liberals and excoriating the stupidity of their opponents, he never explains how and why the latter prevailed over the former. Nor does the volume consider the wartime views and hopes of either younger politicians who became important later or the Japanese people more generally. On the American side, the book focuses so much on State Department policy planners as to leave one wondering about the power and ideas of others—from Presidents Roosevelt and Truman on down through the military bureaucrats to the mass of the people and their representatives. The reader thus comes away with a clear understanding of the ideas, but not the political processes, that shaped war and peace aims in the Pacific in 1945.

ROGER DINGMAN
University of Southern California

Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure *by James Clay Thompson. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 199 pp. Cloth, $14.00; paper, $6.50.*

On 13 February 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered a sustained program of bombing against North Vietnam, which was given the code name Rolling Thunder. The details of the program were left vague, to allow for maximum flexibility. The duration of the bombing program went through four phases and lasted until the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference in November 1968. A fifth phase, on a sporadic basis, continued until 1972.

James Thompson, who was an intelligence analyst in the Department of Defense in 1965, when Rolling Thunder started, and later taught political science at the University of North Carolina, is a disciple of the fashionable school that explains policy decisions as the result of bureaucratic politics. Using the *Pentagon Papers* as his principal source, Thompson tries to explain why the senior American decision makers "so over-estimated the effect of air power upon a determined enemy" (p. 30). He concludes that "Rolling Thunder was based on theories of warfare between industrial bureaucracies. Under conditions similar to those in Indochina, it is possible for a primitive nation to resist an industrial machine" (p. 73). This is a valid conclusion.

The theme, however, is not pursued in detail. A lot of space is devoted to charts explaining the organizational structure of the national security apparatus that managed the conduct of the Vietnam War and to an account of the disagreements within the bureaucracy about the effectiveness of the bombings. Naturally, the military leaders were more sanguine about the results than some of the civilian intelligence analysts.

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It is hardly a startling insight to learn that when "the president joined the coalition opposed to the bombing . . . the coalition became dominant and policy changed" (p. 81). Obviously, the process of bureaucratic politics aims at convincing the ultimate decision maker, in this instance the president of the United States, as commander in chief. What Thompson does not explain is why Johnson, a highly intelligent leader, failed to understand for three long years that "an agricultural country with a primitive transportation system and almost no industry," fielding an army that "did not need to be supported with a huge logistics tail involving massive supply convoys and large supply bases" (p. 72), as Thompson accurately describes North Vietnam, had so much greater resilience against strategic bombing than would an industrial society.

The explanation that eludes the author cannot be found by tracing elaborate organizational charts of the American national security bureaucracy and by recording how various elements in that bureaucracy shifted from support to opposition of the bombing of North Vietnam. It also does not help to invoke, as an alternative to the prevailing school of organization theory that assumes that "people *know what they are doing*" (p. 129), an alternative "garbage can theory" or "organized anarchy theory" which (quoting James March and Johann P. Olsen) claims that "events happen, and . . . are afterwards described in a systematic fashion as decisions" (p. 129).

Thompson's book does not deliver what its subtitle promises, namely "Understanding Policy and Program Failure," because the author is the victim of the kind of political science he was trained to practice, which relies on a mechanical application to complex realities of inadequate explanatory models. A good historian, asking the same questions, may have discovered that about a year before Rolling Thunder was initiated, the bombing of North Vietnam had been the subject of war games conducted by some of the most-senior advisers of President Johnson. Despite the fact that those playing the Red Team (North Vietnam) argued vigorously that an agricultural society ruled by determined leaders would not yield to strategic bombing, those who played the Blue Team (United States) rejected the argument and were, unfortunately, close enough to the president to have a decisive influence on a man who trusted his learned advisers and who knew very little about foreign countries.

Unfortunately for Lyndon B. Johnson and for the United States, his closest foreign-policy advisers were blinded by their own emotions, reinforced by arrogant disdain for contrary opinions. Determined to coerce Ho Chi Minh and convinced that superior American technology was the appropriate instrument, they disregarded what they did not want to hear until the roar of failure became too loud to be ignored any longer. Good historians will find Thompson's book a useful guide for their initial steps through the maze.

GUY J. PAUKER
Topanga, California

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Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration *by Desmond Ball. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. 322 pp. $27.50.*

This is a very valuable book, convincing overall, though the central thesis is not quite as powerful as the author tries to make it. Desmond Ball's study is a thorough and impressive recapitulation of the strategic, economic, and political considerations involved in U.S. ballistic missile procurement decisions of the early 1960s which established the quantitative force levels that have endured ever since. Developed from a 1972 doctoral dissertation, the book uses numerous interviews to trace the circuitous evolution of recommendations. Aside from what research in declassified documents would reveal, this should remain the definitive narrative.

The book demonstrates that the decision to produce 1,000 Minutemen was made *after* the "missile gap" was debunked and in opposition to U.S. Air Force desires for more missiles and some civilian officials desires for fewer of them. Ball believes that the number of 1,000 was clearly excessive and argues that the principle determinant was domestic political pressure. The first point is uncertain enough to cast doubt on the implication that the political influences were strategically irrational. Moreover, the contingency planning for the Berlin crisis generated much more anxiety about nuclear capabilities than had been dissolved by disappearance of the missile gap.

Ball notes that Robert McNamara did not base his decision on intelligence estimates, but on a personal belief that the Soviet Union would "eventually build a large ICBM force" (p. 141), and that force size was set before the administration "had decided, in any but the most general terms, what . . . policy it would adopt" (p. 206). But McNamara's belief turned out to be correct. (Even he underestimated the Soviet buildup. The implication that the large scale of U.S. deployments provoked that buildup can be argued, but has been debunked by other analysts such as Albert Wohlstetter.) More to the point, commitment to the "controlled response" counterforce doctrine—which logically places no *precise* upper limit on requirements—*did* precede the decision on force levels, as Ball demonstrates. The argument that strategy did not determine force levels builds a mountain from missing molehills. While Ball shows that no rigorous mathematical calculation justified the number of 1,000, he does not prove that it was off by a vast order of magnitude or that a healthy appreciation of uncertainty should not justify hedging in the upper direction. Many would argue that the political process, which forces "satisficing" rather than "optimizing" results, is rational rather than dysfunctional because it compromises between competing idiosyncratic conceptions of strategic rationality. Finally, if the scale of missile deployments was a mistake, and did escalate the arms race, it palls in significance compared to the later decision to deploy MIRVs. These are criticisms of emphasis, not of the essence, of Ball's interpretation which is good.

The book's organization causes some repetition yet leaves apparent inconsistencies. For example, Ball cites the *minimum* number of missiles ever requested by the air force as 1,700 (p. 244), but a few lines later says the "requirement" at one point was 1,450; he reports air force denials that *maximum* formal requests ever exceeded 2,000 (p. 71), then one page later reports a submission to McNamara for 3,190. Perhaps imprecise language accounts for such confusions, as for the statement that ICBM vulnerability "has decreased

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greatly in the last two decades" (p. 49); the statement can only be justified for the 1960s, when ensiloed missiles replaced "soft" ones. Silo vulnerability has certainly *increased* since then, though the degree can be debated. On balance, however, Ball's analysis is good, the data are excellent, and the book is a major entry in the literature on nuclear policy.

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

The Growing Power of Congress *edited by David M. Abshire and Ralph D. Nurnberger. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, Inc., 1981. 320 pp. $18.50.*

This book presents research sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and focused on Congress's changing role in foreign affairs. The initial section, by David M. Abshire, chairman of the center, is very broadly defined. Abshire surveys presidential-congressional relations in foreign affairs since 1789, and he argues that the 1970s witnessed the emergence of a new period of "neo-congressional" government or dominance. In addition, he discusses the causes of this development and offers some proposals designed to increase cooperation between the branches.

The section that follows is also broadly defined. Written by Richard E. Cohen and Ralph D. Nurnberger, it deals with the changing roles and styles of congressional leaders. Here too the authors provide a long historical survey, and they argue that the character and problems of congressional leadership have altered significantly in the 1970s. The third section, written by Joshua Muravchik, examines Senate attitudes and voting on national security issues between 1969 and 1979. The author argues that during this decade the Senate changed from the most dovish body in the government to the most hawkish, and he both documents the trend and seeks to explain it.

The final two sections of the book are less ambitious. One, by Enid Sterling-Conner, succinctly reviews problems and ambiguities in the statutory language of the war-powers resolution. The other simply reprints a lecture given by former President Ford on his experiences under and conclusions regarding the war-powers resolution.

The strengths of this volume derive from the experience and knowledge of the authors. Abshire, for example, is a perceptive and informed student of foreign-policy decision making, and Cohen and Nurnberger have a sure and sophisticated sense of the politics of the modern Congress. Its weaknesses are the inverse of its strengths. While all the authors provide informative and even instructive discussions of events and problems, the levels of analysis are too concrete and the modes of analysis too general to provide much explanatory or predictive power.

Abshire's use of history is thus highly descriptive and provides only general background information. In that survey, as in his treatment of the 1970s, he avoids confronting basic theoretical issues relating to the character of congressional power and its impacts. Rather, he estimates congressional power impressionistically on the basis of particular instances

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of resistance to executive wishes. In addition, he implicitly equates congressional power with conflict and regards conflict as something that must be replaced by cooperation if good or effective decision making is to occur. Several negative consequences result. First, the dimensions and stability of congressional power in both the present and past remain ambiguous. In fact, Muravchik's findings alone provide grounds for questioning Abshire's claims regarding growing congressional power or dominance in the late 1970s. Second, benchmarks for assessment and prescription remain uncertain, and Abshire is open to charges of being either unrealistic or biased in favor of the executive.

Cohen and Nurnberger's use of history is also too descriptive to provide much more than general background information. For them as well, analysis of both the present and past is impaired by reliance on concepts and categories that are not adequate to the task. And in the absence of a more theoretically developed framework for identifying the components of leadership roles, styles, and determinants, treatments of causes and trends cannot escape being overly vague and generalized at various critical points of explication. Finally, Muravchik's argument with respect to events is far better demonstrated than his argument with respect to causes, and Sterling-Conner's analysis is valuable primarily as a legal brief.

In sum, then, this is a useful, but unsatisfying, book. The fault, however, is not the authors' alone. Institutional analysis still lags behind behavioral analysis in the sophistication and range of the concepts and techniques that have been developed and are in current use. The problems of this volume thus reflect a more general problem and define a salient part of the research agenda for future institutional research.

JOSEPH COOPER
Rice University

The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on Executive Power *edited by Thomas M. Franck. New York, New York University Press, 1981. 299 pp. $17.50.*

This collection of fifteen original articles explores the reasons for and the problems of increased tension between the executive and Congress in the formation and conduct of foreign and defense policy. Nearly all the contributors are lawyers, most with government experience. That lends a gritty credence to their "this is the way it really works" inside views of the political processes within and between the two branches.

There are also prescriptions for how it should work, ranging from vague preachments to explicit recommendations. The cogency of the specific proposals salted throughout this book make it thought provoking as well as informative for specialists and nonspecialists alike. I would also recommend it for undergraduate classes if there were a less expensive, paperback edition.

All contributors agree (not surprisingly) that the national interest would be served by a more amicable relationship between both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. But with few exceptions, the overwhelming weight of the views expressed and the remedies prescribed tilt toward greater executive deference to Congress. In short, the implication of the title—

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that the presidency has swung from "imperial" because of insufficient congressional restraint to "tethered" because of too much—is not the message the reader comes away with.

This anthology is divided into three parts with titles of marginal descriptive validity. The content of the articles can be summarized more coherently according to the broad themes they share. Three of the pieces are partially redundant summaries of the political constraints and constitutional ambiguities that combine to limit the autonomy of American, and especially presidential, foreign policy. Most of the other articles cluster around topics that constitute escalating degrees of congressional restraint on the executive: more information for and greater consultation with Congress; congressionally imposed procedural hurdles that delay or deny executive policy decisions; and substantive congressional policymaking by statute.

Two of the most valuable contributions are by Michael J. Glennon and George W. Calhoun, who offer highly informative and contrasting perspectives on the problems of sharing classified intelligence information with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Glennon, former legal counsel to the committee, recounts numerous techniques, short of invoking executive privilege, used by the intelligence community to deny information. Calhoun, Glennon's opposite number in the Justice Department, offers a sympathetic exploration of the responsibilities and attitudes of those who classify information and their legitimate fears of sharing it with Congress. Both writers conclude with concrete prescriptions that merit lively debate in academic and government circles.

Senator Gary Hart's contribution, too, deserves special mention. It recommends four broad principles for a global foreign policy whose ultimate goal is a "*polycentric* resistance to Soviet imperialism" (p. 240). That is, the United States would no longer *directly* confront Soviet aggression on the ground, but would backstop other nations who would. The centerpiece is U.S. naval superiority, which Hart says would permit the United States to protect rimland nations (those not on the Soviet border) against Soviet hegemony. He also argues that because expenditures for personnel consume most of the defense budget, dollars spent to build more ships, rather than to build up ground forces, are more cost-effective.

Hart's position paper raises enough questions for a series of seminars. For example, what would he do about PLO, East German, or Cuban surrogates who train, advise, and arm indigenous revolutionary movements? Would the U.S. Navy quarantine such outside help? Or would that violate his fourth principle that "we must avoid involvement in the internal affairs of other nations" (p. 239)? And how would the navy—absent a rapid deployment force—prevent Soviet or client state overland thrusts into Iran or Saudi Arabia?

HARVEY G. ZEIDENSTEIN
Illinois State University

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The Regional Imperative: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards South Asian States Under Presidents Johnson and Nixon *by Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and others. Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1980. 465 pp. $16.50.*

One of the most difficult policies for a great power is the proper coordination of global with regional and bilateral considerations. When the geostrategic "central balance" preempts undue attention of top officials at the expense of regional peculiarities, opportunities for gains or reducing costs in regional situations may be ignored.

Written in the shadow of the Nixon/Kissinger era for the "Murphy Commission," this study by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph and their associates addresses these long-standing perplexities. Stephen Cohen, Gerald Heeger, Philip Oldenburg, Walter Anderson, and others examine ten cases of U.S. foreign-policy making in South Asia during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Also included is Christopher Van Hollin's unusual insider's essay on "The Tilt Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia," originally published in *Asian Survey*.

Chosen to represent both "normal" and "crisis" activity, the cases explore how the foreign-policy bureaucracy sought to clarify U.S. goals, assessed costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, and then decided what ought to be done. The authors had unusual access to the bureaucratic files and, through interviews, to the actors themselves. These essays represent unusual penetrations of the policymaking system. The concerned nonspecialist and students and professors of U.S. foreign policy will find them both descriptively plausible and evocative of how the process in fact proceeds.

The cases confirm the view that during these presidencies policy toward South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) was generally derivative of U.S. global concerns elsewhere. Some of the authors appear to find that inherently objectionable, but others, such as Oldenburg and Cohen, accept the notion that sometimes other areas apart from South Asia may have to take priority.

In their introduction and conclusion, the Rudolphs argue for considering international politics region-by-region rather than mainly either globally—a tendency they contend is preferred by the White House, the NSC staff, and the military planners—or country-by-country, a bias they attribute to the State Department at the desk level. They contrast the detailed, historically sensitive understanding of the State Department's specialists, who they argue are far less passive than the popular stereotype, with the geopolitical abstractness of the "president's men." The former may be too prone to seek good relations with particular governments, but the wide-angled vision of the global perspective of the latter blurs two important dimensions: the sources of political problems in the real world, usually local interstate rivalries or domestic instabilities; and practically useful ways of dealing with these difficulties. The authors remind readers that "parochialism" is not merely a geographical problem. The "geopolitical" perspective implies that power relations among the superpowers are often considered a sufficient frame of reference. Understandably, remedies are then applied that are not only often irrelevant; they are unnecessarily costly.

One of the advantages of the South Asia focus for such a study is that during both presidencies unnecessary regional costs were incurred with little evidence of commen-

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surate gains elsewhere. The study's utility as a test of the general proposition that regional orientations should be strengthened is somewhat reduced, however, by the implicit assumption that the most important U.S. interest should have been to maintain good relations with India, come what may.

Intellectually more troublesome, there is a conceptual difficulty in the very notion of "region" itself. For example, Pakistan is part of the South Asian region, but it is also an element of the hinterland of the Persian Gulf, an area of far more immediate and vital interest to the U.S. government than the region of South Asia seemed at the time. It may not have been sound policy to have bolstered Pakistan the way the United States did between 1956 and 1962, and U.S. officials may have misread Pakistan's real intentions. But it was not entirely irrational of either the "president's men" of the time or even the specialists in those neighboring other "regions," that is, the "northern tier" or the "Gulf," to consider the possible utility of Pakistan to the states in those regions. Only Cohen alludes to that possibility. A more systematic discussion of the concept of region would have saved the study from an undue subcontinental bias. One would also have wished that the analytical summary were written with the grace and zest of some of the cases.

W. HOWARD WRIGGINS
Columbia University

New Deal Planning: The National Resources Planning Board *by Marion Clawson. Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 356 pp. $32.50.*

If getting government off our backs fails to solve the nation's economic and social problems, we may expect a renewal of interest in government planning. Planning is, of course, a secret addiction of our society, taking place all the time in all sectors, public, private, and neuter; but comprehensive planning as an explicit function of the federal government has been a high-risk activity, with a generally precarious existence. Marion Clawson's valuable study of Franklin D. Roosevelt's National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) will interest not only historians of the New Deal but planners (and antiplanners) of the present and future.

Clawson brings to the study personal memories of New Deal Washington, the experience of a veteran public servant and the detachment of a thoughtful analyst of public administration. His approach is thematic rather than chronological; and his own work in land management, natural resources, and agricultural economics inclines him slightly to favor the physical planning interests of the NRPB over its later contracyclical concerns. But his research is extensive and his judgment incisive and discriminating.

The NRPB existed in various forms for a decade. It began as the National Planning Board within Harold Ickes's Public Works Administration, became a presidential advisory agency in 1934, achieved a statutory basis under the Reorganization Act of 1939, and expired during World War II. Its dominant figures survived all its incarnations. Frederic A. Delano, the chairman, was the president's uncle, a distinguished planner but an old man (seventy-nine in 1943) and perhaps unduly concerned not to exploit his rela-

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tionship with the White House; Charles E. Merriam, the Chicago political scientist, was a part-time vice-chairman more interested in research than in action and suicidally determined to limit the board's contacts with Congress; and Charles W. Eliot, the executive officer, had an activist disposition that clashed repeatedly with Merriam's academic conceptions.

Roosevelt himself liked the NRPB, met with the board some fifty times, defended its work during the depression, but lost interest during the war. The board itself suffered from the Merriam-Eliot feud, from bad relations on Capitol Hill, and from what Clawson regards as a basic confusion in function. His conclusion is that its two central tasks—idea stimulation and program coordination—were inherently incompatible. The NRPB, he thinks, was a relative success in the first task, a relative failure in the second.

Clawson finds much of value in the NRPB reports. The board mobilized an astonishing array of talent—from J. K. Galbraith and Wassily Leontief through Alvin Hansen and Paul Samuelson to Milton Friedman. The NRPB report on water planning "has been basic to everything that has happened in U.S. water planning since then" (p. 8); and its reports on fiscal policy played a vital role in disseminating Keynesian ideas in the United States. Clawson deplores the fact that NRPB's important work on land use, transportation, energy, income distribution, housing, and so on, seems to have vanished not only from postwar policy consideration but even from the world of scholarship. He ends with a useful if inconclusive discussion of the desirability of a new NRPB in the future.

The book's main deficiency is the failure to see how the NRPB looked to the most serious advocates of planning in the New Deal. Adolf Berle is not mentioned at all, and Rexford G. Tugwell, who thought that Merriam had destroyed the promise of the NRPB, figures only as a New Deal historian. Nonetheless, *New Deal Planning* must be accounted a generally successful intellectual rescue operation.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

The Sense of Well-Being in America: Recent Patterns and Trends *by Angus Campbell. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1980. 263 pp. $14.95.*

The books of Angus Campbell share three qualities: the importance of their subject matter; the ambition of their purpose; and the clarity of their exposition. This study is no exception.

Drawing on five cross-sectional surveys by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) between 1957 and 1978, Campbell examines correlates of personal satisfaction. Alert to the ineffable qualities of human experience, Campbell cautions the reader against what Gordon Allport used to call the "simple and sovereign" explanation. "The sense of well-being is not a simple experience," he writes. Embodied within it are "affective feelings of happiness, misery, and strain and cognitive impressions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction." Further, it may relate "to life as a whole and to the specific domains of life" and "may have a short-term reference to life these days, or a long-term reference to life up to now" (p. 223).

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The narrative is unencumbered and is readily accessible to the lay reader. Campbell has organized a myriad of survey data around "domains of life," which include economic and educational status, marriage, family and friendships, work situation, place of residence, life in America, and stage of life. He has done a masterly job of summarizing an immense amount of material. Yet, it is the mastery at the descriptive level that ironically manifests the book's major flaw: it does not start from or build toward a theoretical point of view. The domains of life are discussed exhaustively but absent a general system or framework that has explanatory power at the level of individual experience. The "domains" represent conditions that obtain in varying degrees in people's lives, but from which one can only speculate about the causal processes leading to a sense of well-being. What one might expect as a critical part of the analysis—the discussion of data on "the self"—consists of only six pages of description of two variables specified in the ISR surveys (a sense of personal control and satisfaction with self as a person). These variables are not accompanied by others, nor are they carried through the analysis in relation to other possible predictive variables within the various domains.

Toward the end of the book, after having reviewed findings from all the domains of life, Campbell makes his most important point: "If all these objective indicators are taken together as predictors of feelings of well-being, they succeed in accounting for less than a fifth of the variation we see between the individual members of the population in their assessment of their happiness and satisfaction with life" (p. 230).

The failure of these indicators, Campbell speculates, may result from a methodology that is inappropriate to his subject matter: it may be difficult "to define and measure within the context of a population survey" those facets of human experience dealing with self-fulfillment (p. 229). An alternative explanation may lie in the differentiation between the level of analysis conventionally described as "quality of life" and that dealing with the self.

In pursuit of an accounting of the individual's sense of well-being, Campbell has done readers a great service by demonstrating the small contribution social, economic, and family circumstance make toward varying levels of personal happiness. Yet he leaves us with a question almost as large as that with which he started: what accounts for the remaining 80 percent of the variance?

ALBERT H. CANTRIL
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The Oak Park Strategy: Community Control of Racial Change *by Carole Goodwin. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1979. 240 pp. $15.95.*

The transition of communities from white to black, or from segregation to resegregation, has been a persistent problem in American life particularly since World War II. Consequently, when a comparative study of two communities undergoing racial transition appears, it is of profound interest when one of these communities reverses the self-fulfilling prophecy or anticipated outcome by becoming an integrated community. Such is the research Carole Goodwin offers in her participant-observer study of racial change

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in two adjacent communities, Oak Park, a suburb of Chicago, and Austin, a small enclave within the city of Chicago. Her study focuses on the similarities and dissimilarities of the two communities; their disparate reaction to, and planning for, racial change; and the subsequent differing outcomes in both communities. During the 1970s Austin, through the process of resegregation, became largely black, whereas Oak Park became an integrated community.

In a perceptive fashion, Goodwin presents an in-depth analysis of the two communities undergoing racial change. She explains the processes by which Oak Park, a white middle-class suburb up to 1970, gradually became an integrated community. In like manner, she reviews the history of Austin and the factors operating there during the period when Austin experienced considerable black in-migration until it became largely black through the process of resegregation. In her analysis, the author uses the following factors in her comparison of the two communities: family income, average cost of homes and rentals, type of governmental structures, values of residents, actions of real-estate and banking establishments, in-migration, and actions of neighborhood schools, community institutions, and voluntary organizations. She concludes that the ecological model of racial transition involving competition among groups for scarce resources, which has been frequently used in analyzing racial change, does not suffice to explain the different outcomes in the two communities. Instead she stresses the normative model with its emphasis on values, organizational dimensions, and community structure as having greater relevance to this particular study. In other words, Goodwin argues that it was not merely the higher income among families in Oak Park that precluded substantial black in-migration to that community, but rather active citizen participation, shared organizational goals, and community control that led the elites there to take the initiative in controlling the number and pattern of black in-migration as well as residential location in order to integrate that community successfully.

In her sensitive study Goodwin has demonstrated how the leaders of Oak Park through shared goals and concerted action were able to shape their own community, and not be overwhelmed by outside institutional pressures and ecological forces in the process of achieving racial integration. This is an important study with *possible* profound implications for other communities. Obviously, this research was concluded at a certain point in time, perhaps prematurely. The ultimate test of Oak Park's success as an integrated community may come in the next decade to the extent that it remains a model of integration. Wisely, Goodwin is cautious in her appraisal in that she does not guarantee the future continuity of an integrated Oak Park. In addition, she is not given to extravagant claims in extolling the Oak Park experience as *the* model to be superimposed on other communities in the country; rather she tentatively concludes that it may be *one* model for successful racial transition. Decidedly, whatever the future racial composition of Oak Park, this is a meritorious study deserving of thoughtful reflection by all those who are concerned with racial balance in our communities.

SHIRLEY E. OSTHOLM
York College, City University of New York

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Community Power Succession: Atlanta's Policy-Makers Revisited *by Floyd Hunter. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 198 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $9.00.*

In *Community Power Structure,* which was published nearly a quarter of a century ago and which now can be considered a classic, Floyd Hunter focused on the question: does Atlanta have a power structure, and, if so, what implications does such a structure have for the traditional concept of American democracy? Although his answer was based on a flawed methodology, his argument was both important and challenging. Among other things it provoked a protracted and fruitful controversy between pluralists and their critics on the meanings and uses of power.

In his revisit to Atlanta, Hunter assumes, and then on investigation verifies, that the power structure is still in place. This allows him to turn his attention to three related topics: the difference, if any, between 1950 and the present power structure; the processes of elite succession; and whether or not democracy is better served by this structure than its predecessor.

The most profound change between the two periods, in Hunter's view, is the significant increase in the power of blacks on both the electoral front and in business; an increase that is reflected by the inclusion of blacks in Atlanta's power structure. He is quick to point out, however, that despite this change the power structure remains relatively unaltered. Those who control the white, corporate-dominated structure are threatened by neither the black takeover of City Hall nor the rise of a few black capitalists. Black politicians know that they are powerless to act on important issues without the cooperation of the white power structure, and black businessmen basically have the same interests as their white counterparts in the business world. Essentially, Hunter argues that class interests prevail over racial differences. Thus black leaders and the rising black middle and professional classes live apart from the black masses and tend to ignore the latter's plight. Owing to the dominance of class interest, on both black and white Atlantans, it is not surprising that Hunter finds that democracy has not been better served by the 1970 power structure: the majority of people, black and white, remain powerless and relatively miserable.

Despite the interesting findings of Hunter's study—which are based primarily on interviews with his designated leaders—the book is dull, lacking the analytical sharpness and insights of his former work. I especially object to the repeated exegesis on the evils of the capitalist system. Agreement with his position does not make a continuing repetition of the point less tedious. It was also a disappointment that Hunter refused to reply to the rich criticism of his methodological position in his former book (and adhered to in the present volume) on the excuse that it would serve no useful purpose.

PETER BACHRACH
Temple University

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Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument *by Stephen S. Kaplan et al. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 733 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

First-rate contributors give no guarantee that separate essays can form a useful book. *Diplomacy of Power* (a successor study to Brookings's *Force Without War*, 1978, and now shorn of its hilarious prepublication title, *Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove*) shows that multiple authorship can work. It works here because of the discipline that the principal author and the case-study contributors seem to have imposed upon each other. The conclusions of Stephen Kaplan's long interpretive essay are greatly strengthened by the eight case studies of his coauthors. By the same token, his analysis lends the essays that follow a common intellectual focus. No case study is less than very good; those of Michel Tatu, Thomas Robinson, and Alvin Rubinstein are exceptional.

Certain messages and themes, some of them by now quite familiar, recur in all these essays. The growth of Soviet military power over several decades has given the Soviet Union the capability to pursue an ever broader range of political objectives, on an ever broader stage. This has not, yet, brought with it a corresponding breakdown in Soviet caution; it has meant that greater success can be had *within* the bounds of caution. As they showed in Angola, and elsewhere, the Soviets keep the exits clear. And their current extensive use of proxies, while very important, reflects a long-standing preference for letting others take risks for them. These studies also reiterate that the enhanced Soviet military position has hardly been proof against political reversals. That there are limits to what Soviet power can accomplish is a common, and commonly abused, insight. This volume, however, not only richly demonstrates these limits, whether in the Middle East, China, or Eastern Europe, but provides a useful reminder of the resilience shown by Soviet policy in seeking to overcome them. The Soviets may suffer reverses but they are never dealt wholly out of the game, as the past two decades of their diplomacy in the Middle East have shown. Losing one foothold, they have always found another.

Now that both the United States and the Soviet Union have global military establishments, superpower support for opposing sides may throw a shadow over more and more Third World crises. In analyzing the risks of conflict that past crises have revealed, Kaplan is particularly interested in the informal rules governing superpower conduct. Drawing on others' work, he finds that superpower aid is generally offered to a client state to avert defeat or to restore the status quo; Soviet or American assistance, however, becomes less likely when the same ally takes the offensive against an ally of the other side. This circumspection *sounds* like a formula for moderate conduct and orderly superpower competition. Yet Kaplan may underestimate how much, even within the framework of accepted international norms, one side can gain against its rival. Much American concern since the mid-1970s has focused on the strategic positions that the Soviet Union has acquired, often while showing a formal regard for the status quo. These outwardly moderating rules, it seems, may permit real encroachments on one side's interests. As a result, the rules, while observed in the past, provide precious little assurance that competition will continue to be orderly. As imbalances build up, and vital interests seem to be at stake, the superpowers' respect for informal rules may simply break down.

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A moderate international order, in short, does not have to be overturned by a wholesale challenge; it can be undone from within.

Despite its many strengths, *Diplomacy of Power* is significantly more successful in analyzing Soviet behavior than Soviet objectives. This is particularly true where the objectives seem to have been mixed. It is easy to type Soviet policy in Eastern Europe as defensive, and its purposes in the Third World as offensive. It is much harder to characterize Soviet goals in an intermediate category, which Kaplan has for some reason dubbed "security relations"; this comprises states on the Soviet periphery over which Moscow exercises no hegemony. Above all, it refers to Germany and China, toward which Soviet policy has been a shifting mix of ambition and fear. It is disappointing, then, to find the Soviets' own statements of their policy taken at full face value. Thus Kaplan's judgment: "Given the chance, Moscow believed, the United States would use violence against the USSR." And, "Soviet perceptions of Western intent began to change only after the elections in West Germany in September 1969," which brought Willy Brandt to power (p. 132).

These are conclusions that might be held by a rather credulous reader of *Pravda*, who would have read throughout the 1960s of the danger of "Hitlerite revanchism." They are disappointing here, because one of the lessons suggested by this book's careful study of Soviet behavior is the routine disparity between Soviet word and deed. The one, incautious and inflammatory; the other, acutely mindful of unnecessary risk.

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH
Department of State

The Benefits of Old Age: Social-Welfare Policy for the Elderly *by Elizabeth Ann Kutza. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 187 pp. Cloth, $18.00; paper, $5.95.*

This book adds to the emerging "backlash" literature that views with alarm the proliferation of federal programs for the aged and warns that the United States can ill afford showering an already "advantaged" group with more benefits. The author points to the fact that over one-fourth of the federal expenditures are reserved for an age group constituting barely more than 10 percent of the population. Kutza acknowledges that the bulk of these federal outlays do not proceed from general revenues and may be defined as deferred earnings, held in trust by the social security system, but she dismisses the argument without explanation and sides with the interpretation that these funds should instead be regarded as ordinary taxes. If this is the case, why not subsume social security contributions under the federal income-tax program and give up the fiction about social insurance? Kutza touches only fleetingly on the historical significance of the philosophy underlying the social system, preferring to deal instead with the costs and effectiveness of various federal programs.

It is worthwhile mentioning that the author's declared purpose is to analyze current

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patterns of government programs, "not to argue for more or fewer policies" (pp. 6 and 7), and that the author sought to perform the role of "the analyst not the advocate" (p. 163). Kutza's recommendations are, however, unmistakenly partisan. She argues for lessening the importance of social insurance (OASI) and for gradually replacing it with a need-related income maintenance program. (Readers are expected not to be concerned with this program's resemblance to public welfare.) Leaning on recent studies of the SSI (Supplementary Security Income) program, the author adds that recipients no longer experience a humiliating sense of stigma. Is it possible that Kutza has not suspected a built-in bias in those study samples? A sizable portion of all eligible SSI beneficiaries continue suffering economic hardships. They do not apply for program payments. Is it not therefore plausible that those who actually apply may be less susceptible to feelings of stigmatization?

The first half of the book consists of a didactic description of the demographics on aging and the public benefits designed for this population. The second half is more analytic in nature and dwells on the impact of those programs. Kutza brings special attention to the cumulative effects of multiple benefits and their success in lifting a significant proportion of the aged up from the poverty line. This is quite a feat for a set of programs lacking in coherent policy direction, as she initially stated.

Kutza's contention that current social-insurance and universal programs are target-inefficient and forbiddingly expensive goes hand in hand with her overoptimistic appraisal that the aged are doing well, perhaps too well. The bottom line is that age-related criteria in policymaking should perhaps be abrogated, that pensions and the private sector should assume a greater role in income maintenance, and that public programs should be reserved only for the truly needy. Almost no reference is made to the erosion caused by double-digit inflation on the private pension system or the overwhelming evidence that when services are age integrated, the elderly can hardly compete for access and attention with younger population claimants.

Kutza deserves praise for her well-documented analysis. Her questions are pertinent and incisive. Her conclusion, however, will send a chilly coldness through the spine of all those who await a better reward for their long years of relentless contributions to social security than the prospect of a public-assistance handout.

ABRAHAM MONK
Columbia University

Schools on Trial: An Inside Account of the Boston Desegregation Case *by Robert A. Dentler and Marvin B. Scott. Cambridge, Mass., Abt Books, 1981. 244 pp. $25.00.*

Robert Dentler and Marvin Scott are former deans of the School of Education of Boston University. They had unusual access to the history, politics, and education controversy in the now landmark Boston school desegregation episode. Their story provides an impressive account of how the court-ordered desegregation decree of Judge Arthur Garrity evolved and took shape in the politically uncongenial soil of multiethnic Boston. Here

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and there a few models and practices of use to contemporary urban sociologists and other social scientists are available. Yet on balance this is a disappointing book.

Dentler and Scott remain true believers in the social and educational rightness of mass school desegregation. It is not my purpose to review the many arguments of social policy they engage in with others who have reviewed the massive evidence of the relationship of school desegregation to education. One gleans the advocacy of their cause, however, when at the end they write that "far and away the gravest failures in the Boston story concern the continuation of generally poor instruction. The number of students denied promotions is still significant, and it reveals a sorry state of affairs" (p. 233).

In point of fact, men and women like Dentler and Scott both believed in urban school desegregation and worked hard, against great odds, to bring it about. One's concern ought to be not so much the merits of the case (a seemingly hopeless task since one can now cite an old James Coleman against a new James Coleman, and vice versa), but a model or style of public policy they represent.

"Social Policy Elitism," 1960–1980 genre, is what is before us. It is all here—the heyday of judicial activism in which vital policy about both the racial mix and academic qualifications of students are made by a law clerk (see p. 129); and the disdain of local school and community politics and the ethnic lower-middle and working classes they represent: "Why should the overwhelmingly Irish-American domain of the public school system," ask the authors crustily, "with its thin substratum of Italian-Americans, be singled out for having embraced policies that expressed the essence of the Boston way of life" (p. 8)? Perhaps because lacking advanced degrees at Boston University and Harvard they could not understand why their children should be bussed from one lousy (but familiar) school to another? After all, no one had asked them to vote about the school experiment. That had been determined by the judicial and social-policy activism, anchored in the courts and bureaucracies, the lead force of the social-policy explosion that was to shake Washington to the foundation. There is also the displacement of goals that social scientists have grown accustomed to. Racial balance is intended to promote enhanced academic achievement, but if the latter seems murky, then scholars restudy the issue or change the criterion of academic achievement.

The genre of "Social Policy Elitism" has now become part of the giant welfare state with its interlocking problems and prospects, its nuances of political form and policy substance. That we are so vividly aware of it all owes much to the Reagan critique, for in Dentler and Scott is the prototype of Carter's presidency with its echelon of civil-rights bureaucracies, its legions of regulations, its endless array of affirmative-action quotas.

It is in the final analysis the story of prolonged, unrepresentative governance, the schism between politics and administration, and between the judiciary and the congressional and presidential realms. It is the tragic account of good purposes (the enhancement of education for black children) being perverted to other means, means that inevitably meant the enhancement of self-perpetuating bureaucracies and attorneys representing single-issue interest groups. It begets the moral majority in place of the moral minority, the activist corps of the new Right replaces that of Joe Rauh, the Americans for Democratic Action and the aging Left in a historical rain dance.

What Dentler and Scott do not grasp or even contemplate is that sooner or later the rights (and prejudices) of the majority must be responded to. They will come in gradualist

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responses if gradualist policy demands and the art of political compromise are offered. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has probably done more to help the education of minority children than has desegregation, and Pell Grants more than quota-fixed affirmative-action decrees. Moreover, as Carter initiatives such as the Education Department revealed, the electorate is not foolish about the beneficiaries of discrete programs. They knew that professional, college-educated individuals, not people like them, regardless of race, were the major winners—not least in the policy activist and issue slots in federal, state, and local administrations. As bilingual and biracial education has become more remote from the 1965 Civil Rights Act, the conflict has grown between the older, moderate (and often Jewish, labor) supporters of gradualism and the cadre of the elect.

EDGAR LITT
University of Connecticut

The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America *edited by Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1981. 417 pp. $16.95.*

Flora and Heidenheimer have edited and contributed major substantive chapters to one of the most useful available collections on European and North American welfare states. The work is a first attempt to merge two research streams, an integrated effort led by Flora in Europe and a more loosely interrelated American group cochaired by Heidenheimer. The representation includes economics, political science, sociology, and history.

Although the book was completed and published before the Reagan administration came into office, the participants clearly were attempting to deal with the question of whether the economic problems of welfare states in the 1970s and subsequently, and the electoral responses everywhere to the social policies and tax levels of welfare states, meant that this particular political form had completed its tenure. While all contributors probably could not endorse Hugh Heclo's final paragraphs, the material in the book is certainly consistent with his view that "the rapid expansion of social policies during the post-war period was vastly facilitated by a degree of persisting economic growth. . . . [However] the politically cheap expansion of programs actually tended to devalue the commitment to social policy and transform it into a predicate of economic growthmanship and mass consumerism. The welfare state and its underlying values has never depended on uncontrollable public spending, big bureaucracy, or evermore unrealistic political bidding. . . . there is little reason for thinking that such a course is immutable. . . . these years will show the strength of the underlying welfare state commitment—an affirmation of the importance of *and* a refusal to choose absolute priorities among the basic values of individual liberty, social equality and economic security" (pp. 403–4).

The allocated space does not permit specific discussion of each of the papers, but potential readers will want to know that the general quality is high, and a large number of the papers contain valuable factual information and statistical data as well. In addition to efforts to characterize the welfare state, its growth, and determinants (Flora and

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Heidenheimer; Flora and Jens Alber; Robert T. Kudrle and Theodore R. Marmor), there are specific substantive explorations in three domains—social security (Stein Kuhnle, Alber), income distribution (Franz Kraus), and educational opportunity (Hartmut Kaeble, Heidenheimer). Housing and personal social services are not given similar treatment and medical care is dealt with only as an aspect of social security. The final section seeks to interpret the story and to make projections (Jürgen Kohle, Harold Wilensky, Hugh Heclo).

Oriented as it is to democratic, mixed-economy welfare states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) type, the volume acknowledges but does not fully discuss the fact that many of the programmatic specifics of welfare states exist also in East European socialist countries, indeed, even in feudal oil states, as they were in part present also under fascism. It would be useful, therefore, in future analysis to attempt to disentangle program instruments from the organic context of the welfare state per se and thus to seek fuller explanation of this particular polity. For example, if the welfare state does not have to be a pluralistic democracy, if it does not adopt some specific concepts of social justice or a view of equality, does it not merely become a modernized society with some components of a social minimum, some specific social services, each of these performing different functions in a different societal context?

Missing from this and similar discussions is full recognition that the adequacy of a social minimum is not fully assessed either in level of expenditure or rate of expenditure growth. Only a more complete analysis of the relative generosity of specific components of programs for different population groupings provides one important aspect of the story. Heidenheimer deals creatively with stratification dimensions in relative emphasis on education or social security as program instruments in the United States and West Germany. This type of discussion—focused as well on target populations—should be applied to housing, employment, personal social services, and the subcomponents of income-transfer programs. A more subtle differentiation of specific components of various programs might tell specialists more than they now know about distributional and redistributional policies, and perhaps about the relationship of welfare-state developments to dimensions of quality of life which increasingly enter into public debate.

ALFRED J. KAHN
Columbia University

Democratic Dictatorship: The Emergent Constitution of Control *by Arthur Selwyn Miller. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 268 pp. $29.95.*

The writer of this book of unrelieved gloom and doom is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Washington University and author of a considerable body of writing on American constitutional law. The basic theme of this book is that the American people are drifting inexorably toward some sort of dictatorship "with a friendly face." The main lesson of constitutional history that Miller distills from the American experience is that government is inevitably as strong as it must be to survive and to permit the nation to survive. American society is falling apart, but the American Constitution is bound to adapt itself to the overwhelming need required for sheer survival. Miller asserts: "Constitu-

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tionalism, as it has been known in America, is dying. Its demise will mean that limited government has gone, never to return" (p. 232).

A cancer is eating away at the vitals of our civilization, and it is probably not curable. There are too many people in the world, and we are running out of resources. "Civilizations have risen and perished in the past,. . . and there is no valid reason to believe that the present worldwide civilization—the 'global city'—will not suffer the same fate" (p. 230). Furthermore, "the likelihood of thermonuclear war gets more probable every year—and with it the end of civilization as we know it" (p. 230). We are caught in an ecological trap, from which escape is impossible. "We are in for it, deeply and irretrievably, and the sooner we realize it the better; for that realization—and proper action based upon it—provides the only way out" (p. 227). The trouble with this book is that Miller does not seem to have the foggiest idea just what "proper action" is available to us to escape our seemingly inevitable doom. As I read this book, there is nothing we can do, given the nature of humans and what Miller calls the "climacteric," which seems to be irresistibly imminent. By "climacteric" he apparently means some terrible chaotic collapse of our civilization.

I think it will serve a useful purpose to quote a few of Miller's dogmatic statements. "Some type of authoritarianism, perhaps of totalitarianism, seems to be inevitable" (p. xi). "Liberal 'democracy,' as it was known, is dying. It may already be dead, with only a final shove needed to topple it" (p. xi). "Emergencies had not been, and are not, aberrational. They are fast becoming the norm of human relations" (p. xiii). "Humankind is in the midst of an immense climacteric. We are not merely in a crisis, but something far deeper and much more significant" (p. xiii). "We are, indeed, already well down the road toward a regimented society, one governed by a newly emergent Constitution of Control" (p. xiv). "The State has always been exactly as strong as it is needed in order to survive" (p. 8). "Can there be any question that man has become an endangered species? Certainly not. The evidence is too massive, too clear to believe otherwise" (p. 10). "Law, in sum, is power" (p. 45). "Power in America rests not in the people as such, but in an elite structure" (p. 56). "The State stands alone, entirely independent, not only from formal religion but also from ethical considerations. It is amoral. And supreme" (p. 57). "Sociologically, the United States is a caste society" (p. 69). And so on, and on, and on, one cliché after another.

What useful purpose is served by this book, I must confess, escapes me entirely.

DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin-Madison

British Government and Its Discontents *by Geoffrey Smith and Nelson W. Polsby. New York, Basic Books, 1981. 202 pp. $12.95.*

One of the few growth industries in Britain is the continual production of books that analyze the "British disease" and offer prescriptions for future recovery. Occasionally such studies pronounce the patient not to be seriously ill and advance the interesting

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hypothesis that Britain has simply advanced more quickly into the postindustrial phase than its neighbors. Such mistaken romanticism, with its acceptance of low productivity and muddling through as national virtues rather than as crippling liabilities, is decidedly not the stuff of this book. The product of 1978–1979 dialogue between Polsby, an American political scientist on leave in Britain, and Smith, a British journalist who, as a result of the closure of *The Times* in November 1978, was also apparently on leave, this is an interesting, well-written, and engaging book. Although inevitably in some areas already bypassed by such events as the summer riots and the emergence of the Social Democratic party, the analysis of the current British situation is a model of clarity and precision. The remedies proposed, however, seem inadequate in face of the seriousness and pervasiveness of the symptoms described.

At the root of postwar Britain's difficulties is a crippling lack of individual and national self-confidence that can most readily be restored by political action "because politics is the realm of proximate causes, of manipulable factors—the realm, in short, of the possible" (p. xii). The wartime experience, the subsequent introduction of a full-scale welfare state, and the cross party consensus of much of the past three decades had made it logical for the British people not only to blame successive governments for their difficulties but also to demand solutions for those difficulties from the political process. Problems of economic productivity, social solidarity, and international influence dominate contemporary British life and, in the view of Smith and Polsby, have accordingly set the agenda for British politics in the future. For anyone seeking a comprehensive yet sympathetic overview of Britain's current economic, social, and international woes, the first three chapters of this book cannot be too highly recommended. What makes this overview of Britain's political agenda so persuasive is the manner in which examples apparently as diverse as Scottish or Welsh devolution, the working of either Labour's Social Contract or the Conservative's monetarism, and the official assumptions that permeated the two most recent reviews of the functions of the Foreign Office are utilized to reveal the national loss of confidence in the power and authority of the central government.

To outline the problems is one thing; to propose solutions is a far more daunting undertaking. It is here that this book, inevitably perhaps in view of the seriousness and interrelationships of the problems so ably presented, disappoints. Believing, as they do, that the restoration of British leadership and self-confidence depends upon the strengthening of British political institutions, Smith and Polsby devote the latter half of their book to a discussion of this theme. In calling, however, for a more democratic method of selecting parliamentary candidates, for the development of permanently funded parliamentary select committees with investigative resources and legislative teeth, and for a more politically accountable and worldly civil service, the authors propose simply tinkering with the system of parliamentary government. By their evidence the system requires a major overhaul. The logic of the thesis developed in this book suggests that the loss of confidence in the political process and the consequent loss of national self-confidence in Britain is fundamentally a loss of confidence in democracy itself. Far more daring a solution to this problem would be to propose serious considerations of proportional representation. In Northern Ireland there is already a chilling example of how the existing political system can legitimately produce the tyranny of the democratic majority and the consequent

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suspension of the democratic process itself. The acute social, economic, and political polarization of Britain at this time demands a bold extension of the democratic principle.

J. O. STUBBS
University of Waterloo, Canada

Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960–1980 *by Polyvios G. Polyviou. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1981. 246 pp. $44.50.*

For the past seventeen years the Cyprus problem has been a bone of contention not only between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the island, but also between Turkey and Greece. It has involved intimately certain other powers, notably the United Kingdom and the United States, and it has given rise to several outbursts of fighting, including a war in 1974. The United Nations has conducted a major peacekeeping operation in the island, in addition to an early mediation effort and, since 1968, several missions of good offices by the secretary-general, the last of which is still under way. In offering a detailed analysis of the political and constitutional conflict and negotiating process between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Polyviou has singled out a key aspect of this long-festering dispute.

The book begins with an account of the independence settlement of 1960, the rigid and unworkable constitution to which it gave rise and its breakdown three years later. The second part covers the intercommunal talks of 1968–1974, which from 1972 were conducted under the good offices of the secretary-general of the United Nations and virtually resulted in the solution of the constitutional dispute. Polyviou gives a detailed and penetrating analysis of the progress achieved in 1973–1974 even while the Athens junta was plotting against President Makarios and preparing to take over Cyprus by force. But for the July 1974 coup, complete agreement would no doubt have been reached by the following month. The author fails to credit the role played by the able representative of the secretary-general, B.F. Osorio Tafall, who conceived many of the key elements of the compromise plan.

The third part of the book is devoted to the events of July and August 1974, focusing on the Geneva Conference and its collapse. The author attended that conference as a member of the Greek Cypriot delegation; his account, while obviously sympathetic to his side, is complete and generally well balanced. American readers, who will no doubt be dismayed by Polyviou's merciless dissection of United States policy during that period, can only hope that the forthcoming second volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs will provide some explanation of the fiasco.

The last part of the book attempts, in a disproportionately brief chapter, to cover the last seven years of negotiations. It was obviously written as an afterthought, and the result is disappointing. The reader would be well advised to skip this chapter and rely instead on Glen D. Camp's excellent study which appeared in *Political Science Quarterly* in the Spring of 1980, and on the semiannual reports on Cyprus submitted to the Security Council by Secretary-General Waldheim.

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One can only express the hope that Polyviou, who showed great skill in breathing life and meaning into arid material in the first 200 pages of his book, will at an early date devote an equal effort to the study of the post-1974 negotiations. After all, the future of Cyprus now depends, in good part, on the success of the talks that are currently under way in Nicosia with United Nations good offices.

GEORGE L. SHERRY
*United Nations**

*The opinions expressed in this review are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

Weak States in the International System *by Michael Handel. Totowa, N.J., Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1981. 318 pp. $27.50.*

The literature on small states and weak states—a more accurate if not noticeably more productive label—has grown rapidly in the last fifteen years. But there is still no consensus on how to define or study such states or on whether weak states exhibit unique patterns of international behavior (or whether they are merely great powers writ small or strong states writ weak). Despite a valiant and in some ways sophisticated effort, few of the ambiguities or uncertainties are resolved by this book.

Michael Handel has set himself a very ambitious task: "to develop general theories" or, more prudently, "to find some general insights and observations on the behavior and position of the weak states in international relations" (p. 4). Only the latter need concern us, since there is nothing resembling theory, however defined, in this study. As for "general insights and observations," the record is mixed: there are surely many insights and observations, some of which are useful and interesting—especially those that criticize and correct earlier writers—but it must be said that many are commonplace and familiar and that the author has little to say that is new or innovative.

In the first chapter, Handel sharply criticizes the definitional failures of earlier writers. This assault is surely justified. In the face of the inevitable ambiguities of defining the relative and shifting nature of weakness, however, the author simply posits an ideal-type weak state that "reflects the complexity of the situation without simplifying it" (p. 54). But this does nothing to remove any doubts about the practical or theoretical utility of concentrating on weak states—it incorporates rather than resolves the difficulties—and it raises questions about whether it might not be more productive to search for definitions that are more bounded by context, or situation, or historical system. Nonetheless, because the author wants to talk about an ideal type that persists through all changes in structure and process, he rejects this alternative, despite the fact that this leaves the object of his attentions inadequately clarified.

Another chapter discusses the internal sources of strength and weakness for weak states, but concentrates only on geography and military strength. There is nothing on domestic sources of foreign policy, perhaps because the author overstates the primacy of foreign policy for weak states—a debatable assumption especially for the developing

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countries. Indeed, the failure to make any distinctions among weak states, particularly among developed and developing and among early and later generations, is a persistent weakness throughout the book. A chapter on external sources of strength, which concentrates almost exclusively on alliances, contains interesting and useful material, but fails to discuss other factors (for example, the role of international institutions for the less-developed countries or the changing normative environment, which is discussed only briefly in an appendix). A chapter on different international systems is very general, since it examines only the balance of power, the bipolar, and the unit veto systems and not the many and important variations within each. Finally, a chapter on the economic position of weak states is very disappointing: some familiar material is summarized, but the author also misses or ignores much that is relevant (especially on connections between internal and external policies). Here and elsewhere the material on developed weak states, particularly those facing a genuine security threat, is more convincing than the material on developing weak states.

This is a book that makes some sound and interesting points, and it deserves to be consulted by students of weak states. But it is also a disappointing book because it does not break much new ground and because it ignores or deemphasizes many changes in the role of weak states and many important differences between such states. Perhaps in this case, less ambition (than general theories or insights) might have produced a more genuinely innovative outcome.

ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN
Washington, D.C.

Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy *edited by John Spanier and Joseph Nogee. New York, Pergamon Press, Inc., 1981. 211 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $10.95.*

A major theme of this collection of seven case studies, accompanied by Spanier's introductory essay and Nogee's concluding chapter, is that fragmentation and diffusion of the U.S. foreign-policy process makes the achievement of coherent policies extemely difficult. In developing this theme, the frequently conflictual and always complex interactions between the legislative and executive branches of the federal government receive detailed attention that supports the now familiar observation that Congress with its decentralized decision-making procedures has become increasingly assertive in the foreign-policy area. The studies also demonstrate that such factors as the rise of "intermestic" issues, for example, energy, the activities of interest groups, and the heightened importance of congressional subcommittees, complicate further the formulation of policies in the national interest.

Spanning the administration's of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, the case studies analyze the following policy topics: The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement (Dan Caldwell); the Kissinger-inspired U.S. policy toward the Middle East, 1973–1976 (John F. Roehm, Jr.); congressional reactions to SALT II (Stephen J. Flanagan); negotiation, approval, and implementation of the Panama Canal

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Treaties, 1973–1979 (William L. Furlong); the U.S. embargo of military assistance to Turkey, 1974–1978 (Keith R. Legg); U.S. support of U.N.-imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia (Stephen R. Weissman and Johnnie Carson); and the Carter administration's legislative proposals for a national energy policy (Mark E. Rushefsky). The thoroughly researched and, for the most part, well-written studies of these topics provide relevant background information, identify principal actors and issues, analyze the decision-making process, and assess outcomes.

In terms of executive-legislative interactions producing policies best suited to promote the interests of the United States, the studies demonstrate that neither branch of government is free from criticism. Thus, they present numerous examples of congressional receptivity to the particularistic concerns of ethnic, religious, and economic interest groups and the power of either house of Congress to hinder or alter the foreign-policy proposals of a president with the consequent weakening of its effectiveness. Even though the studies suggest that Congress is the main source of the inadequacies that beset the American conduct of foreign policy, they also provide examples of the failure of presidents to communicate and coordinate efficaciously with Congress as well as to control dissension within the executive branch.

What is needed to improve the quality of American foreign policy, given that power and authority to make policy is shared by the president and Congress? Spanier, in his excellent essay, first explores the shift of power from the presidency toward Congress in the making of foreign policy. He then argues cogently and persuasively that congressional parochialism, the decentralization of power within Congress, its time-consuming deliberative and reconciliation procedures, and, despite larger and more expert staffs, its continuing inability to match the information or expertise available to a president lead ineluctably to the conclusion that "without presidential leadership there can be no effective foreign policy" (p. xxvii). Yet Spanier asserts that the current presidential nominating process is not likely to yield an experienced, politically skilled leader. In the last chapter, Nogee agrees with Spanier that the president, not Congress, must be in charge of American foreign policy. He too, however, tempers his stance by pointing to an enduring "dilemma" inherent in the American political system: "Democracy requires a strong Congress; security requires a strong President" (p. 199).

Contrary to many multiauthored books, this one has a clear focus and its case studies are relevant and informative. Inclusion of a case in which Congress prevented an inappropriate presidential initiative (Angola?) or did not have the opportunity to do so (Mayaguez?) would have given this collection more balance. Anyone concerned about the U.S. government's foreign-policy making capabilities, however, will find this book worth reading.

HIBBERT R. ROBERTS
Illinois State University

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U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea *by Ann L. Hollick. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 496 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $15.00.*

Ann Hollick has written both a very important and a very good book. It focuses on the politics of international maritime negotiations since the late 1930s and the response of the U.S. government to these events in terms both of the policies the United States has followed and how internal government organization was structured to create and carry out these policies. In these areas, this volume should be the standard reference work for many years.

The limitations of the study are in its lack of feel for the sweep of the nonpolitical developments that in the twentieth century have reversed the history of the previous three centuries. For while the author refers often to the role of technology and economic pressures on maritime developments, these forces remain essentially invisible while the political actors play out their roles. That is, there is no model of ocean-use development. The author's statement that "the newer nations had as a common theme their opposition to a maritime law that had been developed by their former colonial masters" (p. 136) could have been the basis for further insights into several complex issues: why treating the oceans as open commons was a central element in the European and North American development process in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries; why the maritime powers were being pushed toward a closed ocean system as early as the beginning of this century; and why many members of the heterogeneous Group of 77 were so long in coming to understand the economics of the use of ocean resources.

After a useful overview, the author provides in chapter 2 a superb treatment of the background of the so-called Truman Proclamation. She points correctly to FDR's lack of understanding of the international implications of unilateral action in extending claims by the United States; the questionable use by Harold Ickes of what ultimately became extended jurisdiction to advance the position of the Department of the Interior, and just how Harry Truman was pushed into making the proclamation by bureaucratic forces that had been created before he came to the presidency.

The chapters that follow carefully review the issues of the 1950s and 1960s; the political importance of fisheries policy; the gradual development of the continental shelf issue as a key problem; the initial role played in formulating legal issues by the International Law Commission; and the 1958 and 1960 conferences on the law of the sea.

The author clearly establishes that by the 1960s the demise of the traditional order of the oceans was becoming apparent and the stage was set for the major event of the 1970s, the extended Law of the Sea Conference. Again, the author provides a lucid treatment of two central questions: why did the nations agree to have the negotiations take place within a United Nations framework when there were other possibilities, and why were all the heterogeneous issues—fisheries, transit, marine science, military, environment, continental shelf—lumped together rather than being negotiated separately?

In skillfully pulling these events together, Hollick has also created a research agenda. This agenda includes, among many other items, the need for more extensive analysis of the role of the United States in developing the Peruvian fisheries during World War II; the subsequent difficulties for Peru caused by U.S. policy on tuna fishing; the linkages between these two events and the subsequent Peruvian offshore claims; examination of

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the linkages between two key fisheries (tuna and salmon) and their effect on the policies of the Department of State; the relationship between the package of important domestic legislation that extended the government's role in the use of ocean space and resources in the 1970 and the law-of-the-sea negotiations; and the complex set of issues involved in why the Freedom of Science Task Force of the National Academy of Sciences was not more effective in defending the interests of ocean science in the negotiations on the law of the sea.

GIULIO PONTECORVO
Columbia University

Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis *by Richard Ned Lebow. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.. 350 pp. $24.50.*

Only in the last decade have systematic efforts been made to synthesize approaches and data provided by diverse disciplines, from history and political science to psychology and economics, in the study of international crises. This volume represents the most recent such effort, with hypotheses tested by the use of history from twenty-six crises, from the early twentieth century to the 1970s, selected because at least one of the participants was a great power and because the possibility of escalation to war existed. The study focuses upon assumptions and analytical questions related to the origin of a crisis. The author asks why certain crises are resolved by diplomacy while others result in war. Under what circumstances do crises lead to further conflict (World War I) or to unfolding collaboration, as in the case of the Fashoda Incident of 1898, from which emerged the Anglo-French entente of 1904 and subsequent alignment between Britain and France?

In large part, answers to such questions are sought in cognitive theory and in motivation theory. Both yield insights into crisis behavior in at least several of the cases examined, although, as the author admits, it is not possible to assess with precision the relative explanatory power of either the cognitive or motivational models or to relate them explicitly to other explanations of decision making. Nor is the idea novel that decision makers often seek information that simply reinforces their original mindset, as the author concludes in his analysis of the 1914 crisis in Europe and in the case of General MacArthur at the time of China's intervention in the Korean conflict in 1950.

Among Lebow's principal findings is that misperception, especially of the resolve of an adversary, is a major cause of war in crises in which one or both adversaries practice brinkmanship. Under such circumstances, "as learning and steering capacity diminish, policy comes to resemble a stone rolling downhill; it can neither be rerolled nor can its path be altered" (p. 147). Equally plausible, however, is the proposition that the lack of demonstrated resolve, especially on the part of status-quo powers against revisionist states, may lead to war as a crisis outcome, as in the case of Britain and France during the Munich Crisis in 1938 which was followed by the outbreak of World War II less than a year later.

The leap from theory to practice—the relevance of findings from this study to the

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needs of crisis decision making—presents difficulties related not only to the tentative nature of the author's findings, but also to his assumptions about the contemporary strategic/political environment. His understanding of modern weapons systems and military doctrines contrasts sharply in its depth and sophistication with his knowledge of past crises. For example, contrary to his statement about the inherent stability of deterrence on strategic forces deployed exclusively at sea (p. 17), there is no evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union would be prepared to rely exclusively on sea-based strategic systems. In fact, although the Soviet Union possesses a formidable submarine force, Soviet strategic forces are composed principally of land-based capabilities; and Soviet mililtary writings emphasize the importance of targeting the military assets of an adversary, most of which are located on land.

Although Lebow ascribes the outcome of certain crises in part to the possession of military superiority by one of the protagonists, he views the period when a strategic gap begins to narrow as potentially dangerous, since the nation possessing a temporary advantage may seek to extract political or military gains before the gap closes. This may or may not describe Soviet behavior in the 1980s; it certainly does not afford an accurate description of American behavior at the zenith of U.S. military superiority or in the years of relative decline in the 1970s.

Although the text contains typographical errors, the value of the study is enhanced by the use of charts to illustrate and summarize conceptual approaches and research findings on a comparative basis. *Between Peace and War* is a useful contribution, both in conceptualization and the creative use of materials drawn from the crises of the recent and more distant past, to an understanding of the causes and nature, as well as the factors affecting the evolution and outcome, of international crises.

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.
Tufts University

Crime and Punishment—Changing Attitudes in America *by Arthur L. Stinchcombe et al. San Francisco, Calif., Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1981. 171 pp. $15.95.*

Crime News and the Public *by Doris A. Graber. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1981. 239 pp. $17.95.*

Stinchcombe et al. undertake an ambitious task. They seek to explore the distribution of public attitudes about crime and punishment in the United States during the past generation. They are particularly puzzled by the apparent contradiction between the growth of liberal attitudes during much of this period and the concomitant increase in the number of people who would deal with crime by punitive measures. They analyze these issues by examining a variety of public-opinion polls from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s, crime data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, an examination of the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, and occasional other sources.

Unfortunately, the information gathered by the authors was inadequate to carry out an

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examination of this extremely complex problem. All of their sources are flawed to a greater or lesser extent. Incomplete, flawed data are a normal burden for the social scientists, but in this instance the authors have not overcome the difficulties posed by their sources. One flaw is their measure of fear of crime, a key element to their analysis. They use a single question: "Is there any area right around here—that is, within a mile—where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" Such a question undoubtedly taps some dimensions of fear and of crime but is not comprehensive for either. It taps fear of familiar environs, not of strange territory; it taps fear of darkness as well as fear of crime, per se. It may measure fear of being mugged but certainly not of household break-ins and burglaries. Crime is a catchall term; it includes not only assaults on the body and the home but also fraud, tax evasion, and public corruption. None of this is sorted out in the Stinchcombe volume, nor can it be given the limitation of their sources.

Their data are sometimes spectacularly unreliable. One of the key puzzles they seek to unravel is why gun owners generally exhibit less fear but more punitiveness than those who do not own guns. They suggest that the answer lies in their discovery that most gun owners live outside the Northeast. These gun owners, they curiously assert, live in hunting regions (p. 104)—as if Chicago, Houston, and Los Angeles, among others, were rural. But more important than this quirk of labeling is their finding that from 1959 to 1976 the "percentage of respondents reporting that they have guns in the household is almost steady" (p. 113). Yet they also report that the average annual increase in gun ownership based on production and import figures was 5.4 percent. Obviously, people did not reveal to surveyors whether they owned guns. The authors attempt to show that most of these new handguns are owned by hunters. I remain unconvinced. Unfortunately, they make no attempt to analyze the attitudes or perceptions of urban gun owners.

The authors are also opaque to a larger puzzle their fragmentary data suggest. While they explore small differences in percentages, they neglect to examine why it is that the vast majority of Americans are afraid of crime even though many do not experience it and even though most do not live near it. While fear increases a little with victimization, vulnerability, and proximity to crime-ridden areas, these factors do not explain why many people are fearful. Similarly, fear is only a very small ingredient in explaining why some people have punitive attitudes toward criminals. In short, this is a premature analysis of a vexing problem. It is a book that should not have been written given the limits of the authors' data; it is one that cannot be read with much profit.

Doris Graber's book examines a more narrowly defined problem with more appropriate data. She is concerned with the ways in which the media present crime news and the manner in which the public receives such information. To examine those questions, she has assembled a unique data base: a content analysis of almost a year's worth of four newspapers in Chicago, Indianapolis, and Lebanon Valley (New Hampshire); an audio and video content analysis of local news broadcasts on two network stations in Chicago and of national network news for ABC, CBS, and NBC for the same time frame; and diary and interview materials from panels of randomly selected members of the general public. Graber thus has a wealth of information about the presentation of crime in newspapers and on television and some measures of the public's reception of those presentations.

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Graber finds that the media devote much time or space to crime news and that they overemphasize the violent and spectacular as many other studies have also found. But Graber shows that there are substantial differences between newspapers and television stations in the crimes they cover. More significantly, Graber shows that the public has an even more distorted view of crime, which comes only in part from their exposure to the media. People, of course, learn about crime from many sources; indeed, the most detailed information that they secure comes from friends and neighbors. By contrast, the media rarely provide sufficient information for people to identify with the problem or to take the requisite protective action. Graber finds that people's awareness and judgement are quite varied and complex. Neither particular news stories nor even similar personal experiences have identical effects. For one person, a recent personal victimization leads to avoidance of crime stories; in others, it reinforces media exposure.

Graber is perhaps too careful in avoiding global conclusions. While Stinchcombe et al.'s data do not carry the analysis far enough, Graber could perhaps delve further into the relationships between personal experiences, neighborhood effects, and media exposure. She does little with the social and geographical location of her panelists and how these affect their perceptions. Nevertheless, this is an absolutely essential book for all who are concerned with the relationship between the media and the public's perceptions of crime. In many ways, it is a model study that deserves careful reading and emulation.

HERBERT JACOB
Northwestern University

Private Churches and Public Money: Church-Government Fiscal Relations *by Paul J. Weber and Dennis A. Gilbert. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 260 pp. $27.95.*

Weber and Gilbert have performed a valuable service for all who are interested in the debate over church-state relations in America. The authors have taken the trouble to look at the actual dollar flows that occur in contemporary America. How much government money is, in fact, flowing to religiously affiliated organizations every year?

The data, of course, are difficult, incomplete, and require considerable tentativeness in interpretation. But the picture that emerges is interesting and somewhat surprising. If there is a "wall of separation" between church and government in the United States, the authors conclude that "it is riddled with fiscal holes." Tax exemption of religious property and the right to deduct contributions from income tax are the deepest channels for dollar flow from government to religious institutions, but local, state, and federal aid to education programs also contribute significantly to church-related schools.

That there are tangled and complicated fiscal interrelationships between the U.S. government and religious institutions does not, in and of itself, imply a desirable policy, constitutional or otherwise, to govern these relationships. But Weber and Gilbert do an excellent job of arguing that some of the distinctions relied upon by American courts in deciding which governmental programs may include religious institutions and which may not are deeply flawed.

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In chapter 5, entitled "Distinction Without Merit," the authors scout the notion that it is possible to distinguish in a consistent and coherent fashion between religious organizations and other sorts of social organizations. The distinctions are necessarily arbitrary and unpersuasive (the classic example being the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between church-related elementary and secondary schools on the one hand and church-related institutions of higher education on the other), and trying to make them involves the government in testing the quality of religious identifications in a fashion that conflicts with the basic thrust of the establishment clause.

The most important chapter of the book is, however, the last, in which the authors advance their "theory of fiscal neutrality," to serve as a principle for future interpretation of the establishment and free exercises clauses.

The framers of the First Amendment, it is urged, wanted to protect the churches from interference by the new federal government, and the government from involvement in intercreedal strife. For the members of the First Congress it was reasonable to seek to secure these objectives by commanding that the federal government keep itself separate and aloof from the activities of religious institutions. So far so good. The problem is that in the contemporary world the goals of the framers can no longer be achieved by simple separation. Major changes have taken place in the United States that require that government adopt a neutral policy toward religious institutions rather than a separationist policy if the purposes of the framers are to be achieved. Since the adoption of the First Amendment, the federal government has assumed a far more active and pervasive role in allocating resources and managing the affairs of society. Furthermore, the religion clauses of the First Amendment have been applied to states through the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Bearing these altered circumstances in mind, Weber and Gilbert argue that the desirable approach to interpreting the religious clauses is one that follows the approach taken by the Supreme Court in implementing the equal-protection clause. That is, that religion be used neither as a criterion to include or exclude individuals or organizations from participating in programs nor as a criterion for conferring or withholding benefits from otherwise justified general governmental programs. The keystone should be equality of treatment of religious and secular organizations and individuals. This approach is a variation and refinement of a suggestion first advanced by Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School, and it is unlikely that their version will find readier acceptance than his. The reason for this is that the policy outcomes dictated by the principle of neutrality would be uncongenial to most of the influential interest groups active in church-state politics. But Weber and Gilbert have added a dimension of subtlety to the argument for neutrality or equality of treatment.

RICHARD E. MORGAN
Bowdoin College

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A Trumpet to Arms: Alternative Media in America *by David Armstrong. Los Angeles, Calif., J.P. Tarcher, Inc., 1981. 384 pp. $14.95.*

David Armstrong, managing editor of the Syracuse *New Times*, syndicated columnist for alternative newspapers, and former editor of the *Berkeley Barb*, has written an encyclopedic history of alternative media in the United States. Nearly every type of publication that cannot qualify as mainstream media is included. That means daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, books, comics, films, videotapes, and radio programs. It also means media geared to a wide range of interests from national political fare to local political problems, from ecology movements to the drug culture, from feminism and gay liberation to hard core pornography.

One of the pleasant surprises of the volume is that, despite its wide range, it provides an amazingly large amount of information not only about the alternative media scene in general but also about particular media. The author manages to embed brief histories of individual media, such as the *Berkeley Barb*, the *Los Angeles Free Press, Mother Jones, Rolling Stone,* or *Whole Earth Catalog*, into the larger historical framework. There also are ample anecdotes and vignettes about major figures from the world of alternative journalism, many of them drawn from Armstrong's personal experiences.

The book uses a chronological approach to trace the evolution of various types of alternative media. Early American developments are briefly summarized; the main emphasis is on the story of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Armstrong links the politics of that era to the alternative media phenomenon, providing the reader with insight into the media history, as well as the history of various dissident movements. He chronicles mainstream reactions to the alternative media phenomenon, includng the dirty tricks designed to suppress them and the support received from champions of First Amendment rights. Much of this fascinating information is familiar to students of the media, but it has not been available before in a single volume.

Among other things, we learn that the radical underground media of the sixties grew out of the antiwar movement and were designed to plead the liberal and often radical causes dear to counterculture people. We learn about the problems dissident journalists faced in financing their publications and the orthodox and unorthodox solutions developed to cope with financial problems. We gain insight into the social forces that led to the demise of most of the ultraradical media and the birth of their more staid and more professional successors.

Armstrong claims that the impact of the alternative media on the American political scene has been vast. He credits them with launching the feminist movement, gay liberation, environmentalism, the drug culture, and with changing the course of the Vietnam war. He sees them as the cutting edge in social responsibility journalism and political reform, which serves to expose and occasionally improve an oppressive and exploitative society. Without ignoring some of the undesirable features and practices of alternative media, he hails them as journalistic innovators whose styles and techniques of communication spurred mainstream media to create better products.

Armstrong's claims may be correct, but, like most claims about the effects of the mass media, the cause-and-effect sequence is not well substantiated. There is circumstantial evidence but little else. Be that as it may, *A Trumpet to Arms* nonetheless makes a major

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contribution because it presents a comprehensive overview of alternative media during the past quarter-century and because it presents this history in an appropriate political context. The book is well researched and well written, albeit a bit overwhelming because of its vast amount of detail. Its ample bibliography, list of sources, and chronology contribute to making it an excellent reference work.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima *by Michael Mandelbaum. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 283 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $8.95.*

This is a clear and well-written book on a subject of obvious importance. Mandelbaum examines the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations by looking at a variety of subjects in a series of autonomous essays that share a common historical and analytical perspective. The subjects he considers include chemical and biological weapons, the balance of power, the arms race, NATO, the American presidency, and contemporary reactions in this country to life in the shadow of the bomb. The essays are usually stimulating and informative and occasionally quite provocative.

The author attempts, though not entirely successfully, to stitch the chapters together through the use of at least three different threads. The first is the author's concern with the writings of Thucydides and the similarities in international relations between the present day and the time when Athens and Sparta confronted each other. Although the parallels are obvious and have been pointed out before, it is still useful to remind ourselves that many characteristics of relations among states even in the nuclear age are of rather long standing.

A second thread, introduced in the first chapter, is Mandelbaum's suggestion that nuclear weapons are the latest of three military revolutions that have characterized modern history. The first of these is the Napoleonic revolution that introduced the citizen army, a military organization that produced functionally integrated divisions, and a change in tactics that stressed offensive battle rather than posturing, feints, and bluffs. These changes helped to usher in the era of modern warfare and set the stage for the second dramatic change which he calls the mechanical revolution. What made World War I so inordinately destructive when compared to its predecessors was the widespread use of machines of all kinds by both sides. Nuclear weapons represent the third great revolution in warfare, even though they have not yet been used extensively in battle.

A third perspective that runs through the book is the author's use of Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis. Mandelbaum suggests that the influence of nuclear weapons can be perceived at the level of the international system as a whole, at the level of the separate states, and at the individual level. This type of analysis is, unfortunately, only suggested and although it recurs from time to time throughout the book it does not provide the framework around which the book is organized. In fact, it is difficult to see exactly what

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framework does tie the book together other than the fact that all of the chapters are concerned with nuclear weapons in one way or the other.

This loose organization could have been avoided had the author used Waltz's scheme and thus achieved a greater coherence than is apparent now. For instance, chapter 3 on the balance of power and chapter 6 on NATO clearly seem to be analyzing dimensions of the international system as a whole. Chapter 4 examines the behavior of particular states, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, concerning their participation in the nuclear arms race, and chapter 5 compares that race to tariff competitions. Chapters 7 and 8, which explore the presidency during the nuclear age and the generation that was born between 1940 and 1950, consider the impact of nuclear weapons on individual and group behavior within the United States. Under such a scheme, chapter 2, which discusses chemical and biological weapons, clearly would not belong in the book. Since at present that chapter appears simply to be added on, however, little would be lost in the general discussion if it were omitted. Such an organization would at least give the reader some idea of the connection between chapters. As it is, one wonders what logical order governs the arrangement of the chapters and why it is precisely that the chapter on NATO, for instance, follows those on the arms race and precedes the one on the presidency.

The ultimately unsettling nature of the organization of the book does not, however, detract from the worth of the individual chapters. Most of the essays are well worth reading and some—such as the ones on the balance of power, the comparison of the arms race and tariff competition, and the concluding one on "the bomb, dread, and eternity"—are exceptionally interesting and provocative. On the whole I would recommend this book to concerned nonspecialists and undergraduates who are interested in the problems posed by nuclear weapons in the modern world.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Child Care, Family Benefits, and Working Parents: A Study in Comparative Policy *by Sheila B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981. 327 pp. $25.00.*

Working at Columbia University's School of Social Work, the coauthors of this study have produced a steady stream of books on social policy in Europe and America, the most recent of which is this exploration of family benefits and child-care services furnished by the governments of six industrialized nations. Their starting point is the observation that industrialized societies are organized in ways that force adults, especially women, to choose between a satisfying work life and a satisfying family life. Were this tension between work and family experienced only by single parents trying to play both parental and breadwinner roles, it might be treated by governments as a limited problem suffered by only a minority of households. Since, however, the two-earner family has become the norm in many industrialized countries, the problem is no longer confined to a minority. Kamerman and Kahn document the growth in employment among women in

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industrialized societies, emphasizing in particular the increasing proportion of working women with preschool children. They assert that this influx of women into the labor force makes the relationship between work and family life the "central family policy issue" of the 1980s in Europe and America

Their book surveys the ways in which six national governments have dealt with this issue. The six (the United States, France, Sweden, West Germany, East Germany, and Hungary) were chosen because they represent a continuum of possible responses, ranging from a high level of government support for working families (Sweden, East Germany) to virtually no policy whatsoever regarding working families (the United States). The information presented in the book was gathered by research teams working in each of the six countries from 1976 to 1979, using jointly developed instruments for data collection.

Not surprisingly, the strengths and weaknesses of this book are similar to those of the authors' previous books. It is packed with useful information on government benefits and services in the six countries, but makes only a weak and inconclusive attempt to interpret all of this information. Successive chapters catalogue the variations in the six countries in the scope and amount of cash benefits to working families (both maternity benefits and family allowances); the availability and quality of day care; and the balance of cash benefits to services.

Having described the variations in policies pursued by the six governments, the authors turn to the task of explaining these variations. Here, the book is disappointing. One positive contribution they make is to challenge certain commonly held views. For example, the level of government support is not necessarily related to the size of the GNP; the governments of countries with higher per capita GNPs provide more modest cash benefits and more limited day-care services than governments in countries with lower GNPs. Nor does the presence of a Communist regime automatically insure extensive day-care coverage; while East Germany does provide the most extensive day care of all six governments, Hungary gives only limited support to day care, opting instead to give a generous cash benefit ("mother's wage") so that women can care for their children at home up to age three.

After debunking these and similar myths, however, the authors offer readers virtually no help in identifying the real determinants of public policy. In chapter 5 they consider a multitude of possible independent variables to explain these governments' policies, but then end up questioning the utility of any such generalizations: "A country's mode of responding and its pacing of the specific elements are and must be idiosyncratic" (p. 211). "In the context of its own traditions, history, politics, and its economic and demographic circumstances, a country shapes its unique benefit-service package" (p. 222). The lack of any generalizations about the relative importance of these various determinants of family policy is a disappointing outcome from a project that is so rich in detailed data about the policies themselves.

CAROLYN TEICH ADAMS
Temple University

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Homemakers: The Forgotten Workers *by Rae André. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 299 pp. $15.00.*

It is by now well established that the women's movement that gained momentum in the United States in the 1970s had little interest in a large number of American women, namely, those who continued to be homemakers. As participants in a movement dedicated to changing traditional definitions of women's rights and opportunities, the feminists of the 1970s understandably had little time for those women who preferred to remain in traditional women's roles. Though these feminists asserted their principled commitment to a broader range of options for all women, in practice this meant claiming the rights of women to employment on equal terms with those of men and denying women's special obligation to care for their own children and provide their families with meals, clean clothes, and a clean home. As a consequence, homemakers felt denigrated and rejected, no better than lowly nursemaids or cleaningwomen, and denied participation in the women's movement unless they denounced their spouses as male chauvinist pigs.

Now, Rae André is trying to come to the aid of homemakers. Unlike such feminist social scientists as Ann Oakley, who deplored and documented the tedium and social isolation of the life of the homemaker, André, herself a convinced feminist, wants to have homemaking revalued. She admits readily that only minimal skills are required to do most housework adequately (indeed, she may underestimate the knowledge and skills required to meet the standards of child raising, entertaining, or interior decoration in an upper-middle-class family), but she asserts that homemakers are denied their just recognition simply because they are not engaged in productive work. André's sympathy for the undervalued homemaker is exaggerated to the point of paranoia: "Few of us would scoff at the labor of a ditchdigger or garbage collector, yet people freely poke fun at homemakers, even to the point of popularizing a comic strip based primarily on this kind of mockery. Deriding the homemaker is especially likely when she does more than the bare necessities. Goals that she herself establishes based on her own values . . . are ignored or ridiculed" (p. 52). The basic problem, as André sees it, is that homemaking is not "demeaning, but it is demeaned" (p. 182). She does not seem aware that a great many studies of social stratification have shown that, universally, occupational prestige is closely related to the levels of knowledge or skill and of responsibility required to carry out occupational roles.

It is not fair to André, however, to imply that she hopes to change the prestige of homemaking by fiat alone. She deals also in more practical terms with the painful ambivalences of the homemakers whose profiles she presents vividly; their need, on the one hand, to be loving and helping, and on the other, their sense of boredom, dependency, and lack of appreciation. She explores the possibilities of greater equality in the home; of alternative life styles, such as the increased participation of fathers in child care; of new forms of households and experimental communities; and of the organization of homemakers for such purposes as consciousness raising, mutual assistance, and the gaining of political and economic power. The book contains useful discussions of the problems of the displaced homemaker and of the possibilities of legislative action to benefit homemakers.

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In sum, this is a book based on admirable values, practical familiarity with the situation of homemakers, and not a great deal of analytical acumen.

ELINOR G. BARBER
Institute of International Education

Racism and Sexism in Corporate Life: Changing Values in American Business *by John P. Fernandez. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1981. 359 pp. $28.95.*

Feminists are not accustomed to having their case made so persuasively by a man, even a minority man, as it is in this book. His credentials, both academic (Harvard, Berkeley, Yale) and corporate (Bell of Pennsylvania), are impeccable. The book is based on a study designed to look into the overall effect of employment practices on the utilization of management personnel and the perception of the work atmosphere of 4,202 managers at all levels, from supervisor to top brass in ten large corporations. Both sexes and five minority groups—blacks, whites, Hispanics, Asians, and native Americans—were included. Racism and sexism were defined as a belief in the inherent superiority of whites and males. Today, in the subtler form of neoracism and neosexism, the power to maintain that superiority is institutionalized in traditional practices which, though not designed orginally to discriminate, have retained this result.

Fernandez feels that although the combined effects of Equal Employment Opportunities (EEO)/Affirmative Action Programs (AAP) and the accompanying changes in values during the past fifteen years have curbed the white male's power, any limit to their accustomed power, however minute, looks enormous to them so they cry "reverse discrimination." Despite their protests, however, they are not victims of reverse discrimination. They are still far more than equitably represented in management. Although only 37 percent of the population, they hold 95 percent of all management jobs. The corporation is still white male turf.

According to the author, however, they no longer have an option about admitting the barbarians at the gate. As a matter of survival they are going to have to come to terms with a new, diverse managerial force, not only as a result of EEO/AAP but also because new styles of management are inevitably going to be called for in postindustrial society. Fernandez invokes what might be called a "cohort theory" of value change. A "new breed" of increasingly vocal workers is coming on the scene, socialized in a different time, with work values quite different from those of the current older, mainly white male "old breed" managers. They no longer unquestioningly accept management decisions; they want some part in them. They want openness and humaneness in management.

Fernandez has a number of recommendations for corporations, including: acceptance of diversity in the work scene, recognition of the costs of racism and sexism, special training programs for managers, and immediate sanctions against violations of EEO/AAP guidelines. I read this book in late summer, 1981, when the full weight of that white male

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95 percent was gutting the guidelines for the implementing of EEO/AAP. I wonder if the author is as hopeful today as when he wrote this book?

But, assuming the best, I wonder what would happen if, either as a result of EEO/AAP or the management expertise of the "new breed," a generation of corporation managers emerges that does, indeed, reflect the sex and race minorities according to their managerial talents. Since we have no basis for telling in advance what the distribution of such talents is in the several populations, we have no basis for anticipating what the racial or sexual composition of such a managerial force would be. What if it turned out that the black female population, let us say, had a disproportionate number of individuals with high-level managerial talents, enough to predominate in top corporate managerial positions?

Let me guess. I wager that both the pay and the prestige of such high management jobs would decline. I am safe no matter how much I bet. Neither you nor I will be around to see what the answer would be.

JESSIE BERNARD
Washington, D.C.

Informed Consent in Medical Therapy and Research *by Bernard Barber. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1980. 214 pp. $14.50.*

In this book Bernard Barber approaches the subject of informed consent in medicine from a much broader perspective than is usually the case. Barber has avoided making another survey of the ethical dilemmas that surround the issue of consent and instead has opted to discuss the institutional and organizational context in which these issues arise. This is an important and valuable expansion of this issue. Too much of the field of Bioethics is devoted to "quandary ethics," and too little to institutional or sociological constraints for ethical choice.

Barber's survey of the background values that structure the issue of consent for patients and research subjects is helpful. His review of the development of the informed consent in the law is especially good, as is his treatment of the structure of medical practice (including the socialization of the physician) which shapes the relationship between the patient and the physician. In the concluding chapters, he discusses the special populations of prisoners, mental patients, and the young. His goal is to present the relations between patients and physicians as one mediated not only by obligations and trust, but also by power, authority, and dominance.

Barber's approach as a sociologist, however, creates its own disappointments. Barber acknowledges that "we are all now aware that the unethical use of human subjects in biomedical research is a social problem" (p. 1). But I would like to have had a little more evidence on just this point. Barber does present data indicating that patients are lacking in the fundamentals of informed consent. These data are largely based on interviews conducted after visits to a physician. But what other harms beside lack of consent are the

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consequences of this? Some clearer idea of precisely how or whether patients suffer in their treatment outcomes as a consequence of lack of consent would have been helpful.

Also, by focusing on structural features, Barber invites the reader to expect fairly detailed recommendations for change. If the major source of the problem lies in the structure of medical practice, how might the structure be altered to permit more equality for the patient and the potential subject? But these policy issues are not a very prominent feature of Barber's book.

This is a good book for those who are unfamiliar with the larger literature on the structure of medical practice and broad issues in the social context for the problem of informed consent. It is a somewhat disappointing book for those who are beyond that point or for that larger audience that would like to know more about what Barber and others see as possibilities for reform.

DAN E. BEAUCHAMP
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Twilight of Progressivism: The Western Republican Senators and the New Deal *by Ronald L. Feinman. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 262 pp. $18.50.*

The leaders discussed in this book are not exactly unknown figures in American history, but Ronald Feinman makes a good contribution by treating them systematically over a period of time, first, concerning their origins in the Senate and, second, in greater detail through the Great Depression period and New Deal. He emphasizes their relations with Franklin D. Roosevelt, the significance of the support they gave him on many issues, and the eventual estrangement that occurred in all but one case—that of George W. Norris of Nebraska. They objected to Roosevelt's growing "abuse" of presidential power, and in foreign affairs they followed an isolationist course that sharply diverged from the president's views and policies. Why did the author choose these particular senators? They were regarded in 1930, he says, as progressives of the Republican party, and by his own criteria they measure up; they also lived through all or part of the New Deal era: William E. Borah of Idaho; George W. Norris; Hiram W. Johnson of California; Charles L. McNary of Oregon; Arthur Capper of Kansas; Peter Norbeck of South Dakota; James Couzens of Michigan; Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota; Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota; Robert M. La Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin; Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota; and Bronson M. Cutting of New Mexico. Philip La Follette, Robert's brother and the governor of Wisconsin in the 1930s, is also prominent in the account.

This was, indeed, an important group serving in a time of great significance for American and world history. But a study of this sort is inherently difficult to write, since each of these senators was individualistic, some of them notoriously so. Typically, the chapters recite the issues one after another and attempt to relate each senator to each issue over a period of some ten years. The account gets a little tedious now and then.

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More serious, in my opinion, is a tendency to focus too closely on this group and to exaggerate its impact. One can doubt, for example, that Roosevelt launched his "Second New Deal" in 1935 principally because of the arguments and "entreaties" of the progressive Republicans (pp. 91, 205).

All in all, however, this is a lucidly written and convincing study based on a variety of manuscript sources. One of the more interesting and poignant sections concerns the period from 1937 to 1941 when all of the progressives except Norris were turning against the president. The great senator from Nebraska tried to support Roosevelt in the Supreme Court fight. He also experienced a "slow evolution from isolationism to internationalism" (p. 175), thus separating himself from his isolationist colleagues, of both parties, in the foreign crises of 1937 to 1941. Meanwhile, Robert M. La Follette, Jr., strongly supported the president's court plans in 1937 but several years later broke with him over the question of aid to the Allies. Others of the progressive bloc generally fought the "court packing" plan, fought the third term for Roosevelt in 1940, and refused to give support to the president's foreign policy. Two extremists in this onslaught against the administration were Hiram Johnson and Gerald Nye, but others also spoke bitterly of FDR's moves toward militarism and war.

Then came the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the "public image and reputation" of the GOP progressives suffered a "mortal blow" (p. 198). The author, however, pays a final tribute to these men, who in long and distinguished careers fought the good fight on many issues and whose legacy in the 1980s seems more valid and useful than it did some forty years ago.

J. LEONARD BATES
University of Illinois

Social Service Politics in the United States and Britain *by Willard C. Richan. Philadelphia, Pa., Temple University Press, 1981. 276 pp. $19.95.*

This is a book about the political activities, strengths, and weaknesses of a new and growing profession. It fulfills two purposes. First, it indicates to social workers how and in what circumstances they can play an effective political part, basing its conclusions on six transatlantic case studies involving social workers over the last twelve years. Second, these case studies constitute an interesting exercise in comparative government analysis, focusing on the operation of a particular professional pressure group in two very different political systems. The author assesses whether and how far organized social workers operate as an advocacy group, speaking for clients' needs, or as an interest group defending its own rank and file.

Two cases concern action taken outside the national legislature in the late 1970s: the prolonged local strikes among British social workers, and the campaign to require a license and specific qualifications for exercising the profession in many American states. Both cases, in his view, represented—in the eyes of many practitioners and of everybody else—a clear assertion of self-interest, however much they were rhetorically presented as

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actions taken on behalf of the clients; consequently both divided the profession and alienated the general public. The strikes were a disastrous failure that did long-term damage; the licensing campaign, requiring action in fifty different political and social settings, was fought on bad ground for mobilizing the group's assets and has won only mixed and partial successes.

The other four cases relate to legislation a decade or so ago and offer more cheer for the readers he is addressing. Three are concerned with the organization of personal social services—one in Scotland, one in England and Wales, and one in the United States; the first two broadly satisfied the profession and offered it new opportunities, but the American bill attracted no substantial support and some strong opposition, and never emerged from committee. The fourth was the battle over revenue sharing and the amount and allocation of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare funds for the amended Title XX of the Social Security Act; against powerful resistance from conservatives in both the administration and Congress, those services retained most, though not all, of the federal funds they had suddenly acquired in the more congenial political climate of a few years earlier.

The explanations offered relate both to the respective political contexts and to the degree of influence that organized social workers can wield (and also relate to accident). The profession is politically weak, but can sometimes succeed, in favorable circumstances, if it is united and can attract powerful allies. It failed over the U.S. reorganization, because of internal fragmentation and liberal suspicion of the Republican administration's intentions. But these suspicions mobilized all liberals plus the state governors in successfully resisting the funding proposals.

Where the system of government in Britain directly impinges on his narrative, the author's judgments are quite sound and his main points well brought out: the great advantage of a dominant executive (provided it is friendly!); the influence a few well-placed individuals can then exert; the strength of even a weak pressure group when its stronger potential rivals are diverted by fighting other battles of more immediate interest to them. But his acquaintance with Britain is much more superficial than it might appear. His description of the governmental background is unduly influenced by Crossman, and his comments on the political scene are occasionally grotesque (for example, pp. 29 and 46). Americans should treat his general comments on Britain with some caution. But British readers will learn much about American politics, and especially about federalism.

PHILIP M. WILLIAMS
Nuffield College, Oxford

Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, vol. 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era *by C. P. Stacey. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981. 491 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $12.50.*

With this volume, C. P. Stacey, now retired from teaching history in the University of Toronto, concludes his magisterial study of Canada's role in international affairs from

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the beginning of the federal union in 1867 to the formation of NATO in 1949. The first volume, published in 1977, ended just after World War I. Canada had risen from a group of dependent colonies to the status of federated self-governing Dominion, proud of the nationhood it had won on the battlefields of that conflict but still "with uncertain and shaky international status" (p. 425); the second volume deals with the period during which Canada became "an undoubted independent nation" (p. 425) while still remaining in the Commonwealth of Nations.

Other themes receiving a good deal of attention are: Washington's replacement of London as the capital that mattered most to Canada; the importance of domestic economic and political conditions to external policy; and the role of personalities in foreign affairs. It is an erudite, lucid, and often fascinating book.

During twenty-one years of the period under review, Canada was ruled by the Liberal party under William Lyon Mackenzie King who thus, as the subtitle indicates, becomes the central figure in the book. A central figure, perhaps, but definitely not a hero, either to Stacey or to most of those who have written about him. King was a man whose personality and career were full of paradoxes and of contradictions. He was a statesman concerned with large-scale problems of governments and politics, a man who had to associate and negotiate with world leaders of the stature of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Yet his private diary reveals him as a naive believer in spiritualism, accustomed to consult the spirits of the departed in the search for solutions to national problems. He "sang hymns to his terrier as it expired, and visited teacup-readers in earnest search for revelation" (p. 426).

Yet he achieved great things. He preserved the unity of a country subject to geographic, economic, and ethnic tensions that seemed, as they still seem to many today, impossible of relief. And he preserved that unity while leading the country into a major war and, with somewhat less success, through the six years of conflict that followed. The author judges this to be King's greatest achievement.

Stacey writes from the viewpoint of a moderate conservative—a term that he applied to himself as a young man. It should perhaps be remembered, too, that he spent a number of years during World War II and after in the Canadian armed forces and seems to show some of the suspicion of the soldier for diplomats when he is dealing with the intellectuals who peopled the Department of External Affairs between the wars. This applies especially to O.D. Skelton, who was for many years permanent head of the Department and one of King's closest advisers. Skelton's nationalism verged on separatism, and King himself confided to his diary that Skelton (who was of Irish background) seemed to be anti-British. One of the very few places where Stacey seemed to be less than fair was when he applied the strong term "mendacious" (p. 67) to a document written by Skelton.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
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Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections *edited by David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981. 367 pp. $8.25.*

This volume is a set of twelve essays in comparative analysis, built substantially on the American Enterprise Institute's *At the Polls* series of country studies issued in recent years. Twenty-eight countries holding regular national elections with wide suffrage make it into the volume's set: the usual assortment (at least all those with 3 million or more people), plus Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. The essays are uniformly well written, intelligent, and informative, suggesting a good editing job as well as a good choice of authors. Several of them can stand as good state-of-the-knowledge renditions on subjects of cross-national interest.

David Butler supplies a good brief treatment of formal electoral systems; Leon Epstein a treatment of party organization (updating his earlier work); Howard Penniman a treatment of campaign styles and methods; Dennis Kavanagh a chapter on public-opinion polls; and Anthony Smith a piece on mass communications and their electoral effects. Austin Ranney compares nomination systems by arraying countries according to the centralization and inclusiveness (that is, how many people can participate) of their processes, and whether participation is direct or indirect. Arend Lijphart offers sensible judgments about which ideological cleavages (out of a possible seven) appear prominently in the party systems of each of the twenty-eight countries and also the European Parliament, the overall conclusion being that socioeconomic cleavages rank first, although religious cleavages rank a pretty strong second. In a treatment of campaign finance Khayyam Zev Paltiel gives attention to West Germany's party foundations, heavily funded by the government, that have reached out to strengthen allied parties elsewhere, notably in Iberia. Ivor Crewe compares voter turnout levels in the various countries, arguing among other things that turnout varies with sharpness of class or religious cleavage among parties (as calculated by Bingham Powell). Donald Stokes uses an essay on "what decides elections?" to remark on the frequency with which elections of recent times seem to have hinged on important things—the postcoup election in India in 1977, is an extreme example—and the commonality now of elections featuring "an effective competition of rival alignments" (for example, in France, West Germany, Israel, Norway, and Sweden), the dualism in some places displacing an earlier pattern of what seemed to be frozen nondualistic voter allegiances (p. 283). Anthony King's piece on "what do elections decide?" is a good think-piece for anybody trying to get a handle on the question; he takes up and appraises longitudinal approaches (for example, the work of Rudolf Klein and Andrew Cowart), promise-performance approaches (for example, Gerald Pomper), and correlational approaches (for example, Thomas Dye and David Cameron).

Not to be found in the volume are treatments of the conditions that make for competitive electoral processes, treatments of frenzy or tragedy in precarious or vanished polyarchies (such as Greece, Turkey, Chile), or appraisals of matters other than electoral processes that might be thought to come under the rubric "democracy." In its tone the volume is something of a celebration of Western systems as we know them. The lead sentence in the first essay reads: "An electoral system is a means of translating the popular

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will into an elected assembly" (p. 7). The last essay, by Jeane Kirkpatrick, recommends a "descriptive" approach (that is, more or less, an approach rooted in contemporary reality) in studying and thinking about democracy, rather than a "rationalist" approach (that is, one said not to be rooted in reality, an instance being Robert Dahl's *Preface to Democratic Theory*). But the difference comes down to how generous one wants to be in defining "democracy." Kirkpatrick is generous; holding competitive elections with mass suffrage is the test. This is too easy. In the end there is no persuasive definitional way of getting around a worry about power relations or the host of nonelectoral matters treated by Tocqueville.

DAVID R. MAYHEW
Yale University

Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment since 1945 *by Michel Louis Martin. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981. 424 pp. $29.00.*

Michel Louis Martin's meticulously crafted work presents the most detailed portrait to be found in the literature today of the French military establishment since World War II. It promises to become a valuable reference for students of military sociology and, more specifically, of French civil-military relations and armed forces. Although the author renounces from the start any great "theoretical ambition," his findings have significant implications for theorists interested in explaining the decline of the mass armed-forces model and the development of modern, and still poorly understood, military institutions.

The book is organized in four parts. The first section sketches the external environment within which the French military has evolved. Martin argues that external strategic imperatives and technological modernization have had the most influential effect on French armed forces from 1945 to 1962, a seventeen-year period during which France was engaged in almost continuous colonial warfare. Given the nature of these struggles in Asia and Africa, the French military establishment resembled more its prewar model than the modernized structures under construction in the United States and Britain. Colonial wars required large numbers of troops, including conscripts, to fight abroad; technological sophistication and nuclear weapons appeared to be more a hindrance than a help in combating an elusive enemy who avoided direct clashes and concentrated on population control. France's wars in Indochina and Algeria thus retarded the modernization of its armed forces. President Charles de Gaulle's decision to create a *force de frappe* catapulted the French military into the nuclear era.

The ordinance of 7 January 1959 was supposed to integrate the armed forces along mission, not service, lines, centered on nuclear weapons. For a variety of factors, including the hold of tradition, budgetary constraints, slow modernization, and alliance roles in NATO, a two-tiered military system developed instead. The army remained tied to the past, attached to notions of mass mobilization and large ground forces in which manpower over machines counted. The air force and navy adapted quickly to a fundamentally altered strategic and technological environment. The strategy of massive retaliation

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also worked against ground forces since it significantly diminished what useful role they might play in a nuclear scenario.

Part two sketches the evolving organizational dimensions of French military forces in terms of rank distributions and citizen participation. What is unique about the French case, and a bar to quick generalization about the end of the mass army, is how tenacious is the attachment of the French to universal conscription. For different, even conflicting reasons, the Right and Left have been agreed on this point: the Right to socialize and discipline a refracted youth through universal national service; the Left to guard against threats to republican institutions issuing from a conservative officer corps or from bourgeois capitalists using the military to dominate the French masses. What better way to control the army for the masses than by having a mass army? Martin discovers, however, that the officer corps also favors universal service and that the value of national service is widely held throughout the society. Universal service thus lingers on as a consequence more of internal political and social factors than of external strategic need.

The final two sections deal with the professional and social dimensions of the French military establishment. As the system modernizes, career motivations are also changing. Vocational military incentives are giving way to concerns about developing expertise and technical skills, personal job satisfaction, and material rewards. Warriors are becoming managers, and the bureaucratic structure resembles more a modern industrial organization than the traditional authority structure of the armed forces. The task of military leadership is less to command and even to lead than to create an atmosphere within which the varied branches of the military can coordinate their efforts and expertise to achieve the general missions of the military services. These changes have been reflected in attempts to modify military discipline and authority but, again, the French, attached to traditional forms, have resisted major reforms more than have other military systems.

The final section on the social structure of the French military offers disturbing evidence of the unrepresentative composition not only of the officer corps—confirming similar studies, like Ezra Suleiman's work on French bureaucracy—but also of noncommissioned officers where such a trend might not have been expected. Moreover, Martin, drawing on his previous published studies, shows that the French military officer corps displays a considerable bias for internal recruitment. Both trends threaten the democratization of the armed forces and civil control of a military that would appear to be increasingly insulated from the parent society and possibly its values.

It is difficult to quarrel with Martin's findings since he is so thorough in assembling his data and so circumspect in drawing inferences from his findings. He eschews dramatic statements or arresting hypotheses that may catch the reader's attention but that are based on material selected more to prove a point than to illuminate a most complex subject. This is a major scholarly work.

EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa *by Robert I. Rotberg. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980. 311 pp. $15.00.*

Robert Rotberg, one of America's most prolific and best informed historians of Africa, has long balanced his study of Africa's past with his concerns for present-day policy issues. *Suffer the Future* brings these interests together in a policy-oriented study of the three most contentious relics of British colonial rule in southern Africa: South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

The book's policy orientation influences its mode of presentation. The author's scholarly erudition undergirds each chapter's well-researched background and knowledgeable, balanced judgments, but the book is virtually devoid of scholarly trappings like footnotes or explicit conceptual apparatus. The result is neither a primer on the area, nor a sustained scholarly argument, but a useful tool for the well-informed generalist. As in the best such works, the specialist, too, can learn much from the occasional inside tidbit, but especially in the choice of background facts and the weight accorded them.

South Africa, the regional powerhouse, appropriately takes up half the book. The discussion benefits greatly from a solid grounding in the country's material environment—its water resources and land-use patterns—in addition to the inevitable discussion of mineral resources. The chapter on South Africa's nuclear industry (written with Norma Krieger) is equally incisive and original. Rotberg's view of South Africa is sober and sobering. Following the line of thought developed by Heribert Adam, Rotberg sees Afrikaner rule as marked historically by "pragmatic responses to the realities of power" rather than by "ideological autarky" or simplistic racism (p. 20). The corollary is that the power balance will have to change before the system changes. Blacks overwhelmingly reject the subordinate status imposed on them but lack the wherewithal to overthrow the white oligarchy, which nonetheless is becoming increasingly dependent on black skills and black acquiescence. In this power confrontation, time and internal pressure work against peaceful evolutionary progress, but not for any obvious revolutionary solution.

The Namibia chapter in brief space recounts the essential background and is particularly good on the complicated ethnic divisions, especially among the Ovambo peoples who are all too often treated as if they were a single tribal bloc. The flavor of Namibian nationalism—indeed of nationalism everywhere—is tellingly conveyed by extensive excerpts from the speech in the dock by South-West Africa People's Organization's (SWAPO) founder, Hermann Toivo ja Toivo, before he, too, was condemned to South Africa's prison storehouse of black leadership talent. Curiously, since it is the area with which Rotberg has the longest-standing connection, the Zimbabwe section seems the most routine part of the book—though one must respect the judgment of a man who could write before the new government took office that Robert Mugabe is "much more pragmatic than he usually appears" (p. 264).

Thus, the intelligent lay reader will find Rotberg's book at least a trustworthy guide—and in places an inspired one—through the thorny brush of southern African politics. But the book aspires beyond that to guide policymakers, to influence their decisions; this aspiration is inadequately met. The problem is not one of goal. Rotberg knows what he wants to achieve: "ordered, leadership-influenced, evolutionary resolution"

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(p. 170). The problem is one of audience: Rotberg explicitly writes at once for Americans, Europeans, and southern Africans of all colors, and implicitly for the reasonable, concerned, and fair-minded among them. But policymakers must be addressed through their particular identities and their particular situational responsibilities, in whose service they must often be unreasonably partisan. For all his expertise, the author lacks the personal standing automatically to influence the most important actors, the black and white leaders of South Africa, and his exposition lacks the detailed concern with their situational interests and action possibilities to compel their attention. The possibilities for American action are more adequately explored, but not the details of self-interest that ought to drive an American administration to act. The book remains, thus, a trustworthy guide for the reasonable and the intelligent. That is a fine achievement, but not one capable of substantially influencing anyone's policy.

WILLIAM J. FOLTZ
Yale University

Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy *by Steven Kelman. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. 270 pp. $19.95.*

How do two regulatory agencies, both charged with the same task (protecting the safety and health of workers), operate in two different political systems? In particular, how do they determine the content of regulations and seek compliance with these regulations? These questions provide the point of departure for Steven Kelman's treatment of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Swedish Worker Protection Board (*Arbetarskyddsverket*—ASV). A review of case materials drawn from substantive issues considered by both agencies between 1970, when occupational safety and health had attained a position of greater prominence in both countries and OSHA was created, and 1976, when there was a change of political power in both countries, reveals great similarity in the actual content of decisions reached, with both agencies displaying a marked propensity to choose more rather than less stringent protective alternatives. On at least five other counts, however, clear differences emerge: "These decisions were fought persistently by business in the United States but accepted meekly by business in Sweden; OSHA was bound by a detailed set of procedural requirements, while ASV was bound by virtually none; OSHA adopted a far more punitive approach to compliance than ASV did; OSHA was far more concerned with controlling field inspectors than was ASV; [and] lawyers and courts were highly involved in both rule making and compliance in the United States and virtually uninvolved in Sweden" (p. 6).

The explanation of these findings, according to Kelman, rests not on considerations of expertise or the exercise of political influence, but rather on the similarity of value orientations among agency officials and the historical legacies of the respective political systems, legacies that are reflected in the predominant styles of rule making and rule implementation within each country. In a nutshell, Kelman argues that Swedish society and

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politics today continue to exhibit deferential values and a "trustee" form of leadership inherited from an *overhet* state tradition—that is, a tradition of fused social power in which ordinary people stood in awe if not reverence. Contemporary U.S. society and politics, by contrast, are characterized by individual self-assertiveness and a "delegate" pattern of leadership deriving from a liberal political tradition.

Much of Kelman's analysis is devoted to exploring the linkages between these political-cultural legacies, on the one hand, and the accommodationist political institutions and practices found in Sweden versus the adversary institutions and practices found in the United States, on the other, plus the implications and consequences associated with these arrangements. Kelman is not blind to the relevance of other explanatory considerations; he merely argues that an appreciation of differences in cultural values and their political outgrowths, as well as their historical underpinnings, aids in understanding differences between the two societies. His analysis is in this respect rich with insightful observations and comparisons, particularly those having to do with the self-destructive nature of U.S. arrangements and the antidemocratic character of Swedish arrangements. Thus, while not everyone may be enamored by Kelman's reliance on political-cultural explanations of national differences, they should nonetheless find his account both penetrating and illuminating, an example of analytic argumentation that deserves grudging admiration from even the strictest logical positivist.

This is not to say the book is without its flaws, some minor, others potentially more critical. There is, for example, a lack of balance and polish in the presentation, much of which appears to reflect the perennial problem of condensing lengthy doctoral dissertations into concise research monographs. Of more serious character are questions arising from the selection of analytical emphases and chronological frame of reference. The deferential values and accommodationist arrangements found in Sweden, for instance, would appear to offer a context more felicitous to adoption of trend-setting, "state-of-the-art" decisions on occupational safety and health issues than conditions in the United States, yet ASV generally went no further than OSHA in this regard, and occasionally followed OSHA's lead. This situation escapes Kelman's attention and is not explained by his analysis.

These comments, however, should not detract from the principal merits of Kelman's book. It belongs to a class of extremely thoughtful, well-researched comparative policy studies that, while perhaps not systematically charting all the factors that may come into play, nevertheless effectively highlight many such factors.

LAWRENCE E. ROSE
University of Virginia

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

America Votes 14: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics *compiled and edited by Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1981. 427 pp. $60.00.*

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The USSR Today: Perspectives from the Soviet Press *compiled and edited by Gordon Livermore and Fred Schulze. Columbus, Ohio, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1981. 242 pp. $10.00.*

Correction: In the process of publishing C. Herman Pritchett's Winter *PSQ* review of Richard C. Cortner's *The Supreme Court and the Second Bill of Rights: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Nationalization of Civil Liberties,* an incorrect year was assigned for the case of *Gideon* v. *Wainwright.* The editors apologize to Professor Pritchett for this error.

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STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

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

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

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

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

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

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